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Abstract 
 
This research investigates the role of policy on crime reduction by 
establishing whether it is inhibiting or enabling e-governance. e-Governance is 
necessary to automate access by the Department of South African Police 
Services (SAPS) to information held by the Department of Home Affairs 
(DoHA). Automated Access to information is needed by SAPS to enhance the 
identification of perpetrators as a strategy for crime reduction.   
The study explored this process through a qualitative data collection and 
analysis methodology that utilized a case study of both departments to 
understand their policy practices with regards to access by SAPS, to information 
held by DoHA. 
The findings revealed that even though the departments are mostly in 
compliance with access to information policy, this does not enable SAPS to 
effectively address crime reduction. It was further revealed that the e-
governance policy has not been regularly evaluated and adapted to the current 
identification needs of other departments and has therefore resulted in e-
governance not being implemented to enable automated access by SAPS to 
information held by DoHA.   
Access to information and e-governance policies should be modified and 
adapted to identify emergency departments to take the urgency of their 
identification requests into account while the perceived benefits of e-governance 
being developed at DoHA should also be viewed in terms of the benefits to the 
rest of the departments taking into account their urgency levels.   
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CHAPTER ONE: THE IMPACT OF POLICY ON CRIME REDUCTION 
1.1    Policy and e-governance challenges for crime reduction   
 South African government departments perform their administration and 
manage their databases separately from one another even though there are situations 
that require departments to cooperate with each other to share information. This 
access by a department to information held by another department has become 
necessary for government to fulfill its service mandate. This process is supported by 
information policy that promotes access to information between departments. Since 
this raises security and privacy concerns, access to information policy therefore also 
calls for information to be protected to only allow legal access to information held by 
government.  
  The South African Police Services (SAPS) requires access to information 
held by the Department of Home Affairs (DoHA) to identify perpetrators and reduce 
crime. The need for this process arises during crime prevention and combating 
operations when the police need to identify suspects or perpetrators who have never 
been convicted and do not have criminal records to reflect in the police databases. 
DoHA, as the only department that is in possession of national civic database, is well 
suited to assist the police with the personal identification details of all suspects. 
Even though access to information policy calls for information held by 
government to be protected so that everyone’s privacy rights should be protected, the 
policy allows personal information held by the state to be disclosed to third parties 
for the protection of other rights. It is for this reason that DoHA allows access by 
SAPS to information in its possession to protect the safety rights of citizens as this 
process enables the police to identify and apprehending perpetrators of crime.  
SAPS and DoHA have implemented e-governance programs, the Automated 
Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) and the Home Affairs National 
Identification System (HANIS) respectively. The departments are utilizing these 
systems which have automated their fingerprint processing that include rapid 
identification of all convicted perpetrators of crimes and all citizens by SAPS and 
DoHA respectively. It should be noted that while SAPS can only store personal 
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information in the form of criminal records, DoHA stores the personal information of 
all citizens and visitors. Despite the implementation of e-governance by both 
departments, the current process of access by SAPS, to information held by DoHA is 
still manual in some cases and slow. This results in the feedback information from 
DoHA being mostly late to reach the police in time within the detention deadline to 
enable them to identify and take appropriate action against the suspects. This is 
because the police have to take reasonable measure to charge the suspects within the 
deadline of the detention period as set down in the Criminal procedure act. 
According to this act, reasonable measures must be taken by the police to charge 
suspect or perpetrators of crimes within 48 working court hours after detaining them.  
Since the police may mostly apprehend individuals on suspicions of various 
factors including but not limited to stolen identity crimes and hence using fake 
documents or impersonating their crime victims, the manual access to information at 
DoHA tends to undermine the operations of the police. This is because the police 
have to release suspects by the set deadline if they cannot positively identify them, 
authenticate their fake identity documents through their fingerprints within the 
deadline.    
  Even though policy and e-governance that is implemented at both SAPS and 
DoHA enable access by SAPS, to information held by DoHA, e-governance is not 
implemented to automate access by SAPS, to information held by DoHA even 
though this is needed to enhance crime reduction.  
The increase in levels of crime and the potential reduction of crime which can 
be achieved through the automation of access by SAPS, to information held by 
DoHA, serves as the reason for the selection of SAPS and DoHA as case studies for 
this research. Should the findings reveal policy as a barrier, the researcher hopes to 
identify alternative ways and present recommendations for an effective e-governance 
policy that would create an enabling environment for the implementation of e-
governance which is needed to enhance crime reduction operations.     
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1.2   Background to Crime, political landscape and e-governance 
Like elsewhere globally, South Africa is faced by high crime levels that 
threaten the safety of citizens. The police are continually making efforts to reduce 
crime where access by SAPS, to information held by DoHA for the identification of 
the perpetrators of crime has become one of the important processes. The 
Constitution guides the formulation of policies and their enactment into laws that 
ensure that only legal access by SAPS, to information held by DoHA takes place. 
Even though government in general and the two departments have implemented e-
governance that is utilized to automate their internal access to information and the 
identification processes, access by SAPS, to information held by DoHA is manual, 
slow and mostly yielding inaccurate information. This does not longer assist SAPS to 
achieve effective crime reduction through perpetrator identification.     
1.2.1   Analysis of the crime situation in South Africa  
 South Africa has a high rate of crime which seems to be higher than most 
countries. According to local and global media reports on a daily bases one sees front 
page stories of newspapers and breaking news on television channels reporting 
assaults, vehicle hijackings, house breaking, murders, rapes, heists of  cash in transit 
vehicle, automated teller machines (ATM) bombings etc.   
 SAPS’ annual crime statistics report is based on reported cases registered 
with the police and contains extensive and comprehensive crime occurrence figures 
(SAPS, 2010). This report categorizes all incidents of reported crimes by type and 
period and some summaries will be highlighted hereunder.  
  The report reveals a steady decrease in crime for the first time since the 
financial year 1995/1996 up to the end of 2009/2010 financial year during which 
murder figures dropped to below 17,000 which is the number of reported cases. Even 
though this figure is still comparatively high, the significant reduction in the murder 
cases represents a drop of fifty percent (50%) in the murder ratios (SAPS, 2010). The 
report categorizes the national crime into contact, contact related, property related 
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and other serious crimes as well as crimes detected as the results of police actions. 
The percentage categories of these crimes are illustrated in table 1.1 above.  
Table 1 1: The national crime category percentages of total national crime 
                     Source: SAPS, 2010 
  Contact crime can be divided further into the categories that are illustrated in 
table 1.2 above. 
Table 1 2: The Proportionate Percentage of Categories of Contact Crime 
CONTACT CRIME 
CATEGORY 
PROPORTION OF TOTAL CONTACT 
CRIME 
Murder 2.5% 
Attempted murder 2.6% 
Assault GBH 30.3% 
Common assault 29.2% 
Aggravated robbery 16.8 
Common robbery 8.5% 
Sexual offences 10.1% 
                           Source: SAPS, 2010 
Contact crime poses a more safety threat to South Africans in general and can 
be further subdivided into social contact crime and robbery. Social contact crime 
takes place mainly between people who know one another where violence mostly 
leads to murder or assault. According to SAPS (2010), murder has dropped by 8.6% 
NATIONAL CRIME 
CATEGORY 
PROPORTION OF TOTAL NATIONAL 
CRIME 
Contact crime 31.9% 
Contact related crime 6.5% 
Property related crimes 26.1% 
Other Serious crimes 25.5% 
Crimes detected as result of 
police actions 
10.0% 
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from the 2008/2009 to 2009/2010 financial years. Various other crimes like robbery, 
assault GBH  and common assault are common and committed at random. Assault 
GBH and common assault constitute sixty percent of social contact crime and 
according to the stats report, this category of crime experienced marginal increase of 
0.5% respectively. SAPS have experienced difficulties in trying to meet the crime 
operations percentage of between 7% to 10% with regards to assault GBH and 
common assault due to the fact that, as social crime category, the crime actions do 
not take place at areas where police can easily detect.  
  SAPS further explains that the robbery with aggravating circumstances 
crime category is divided into subcategories of carjacking, truck hijacking, robbery 
at residential premises (house robbery), robbery at non-residential premises (business 
robbery), cash in transit (CIT) robbery, bank robbery and Street robberies (which are 
other aggravated robberies that are not included in the SAPS stats report even though 
these are aggravated robberies that are being committed in the streets and in other 
public open spaces). 
 Even though the number of the subcategories of robberies with aggravating 
circumstances of cases reported increased while some decreased between the 
financial years 2008/2009 and 2009/2010, the total number of all subcategory cases 
that were reported has decreased. According to SAPS the total of all cases decreased 
by 6.3% which is equal to 7,637 cases calculated from 121 392 to 113 755.  
 It looks like the South African streets are the most unsafe areas in the country 
as the stats reveal that even though this subcategory of crime underwent significant 
decrease and surpassed the maximum reduction target, of 10% by a decrease of 
10.4% that yielded the difference of 0.4% between 2008/2009 and 2009/2010 
financial years, the number of cases reported is the highest compared to other 
subcategories standing at 56.9% of all robberies with aggravating circumstances for 
the financial year 2009/2010. This category’s decrease for the period between the 
financial years 2004/2005 and 2009/2010 financial years amounted to a 38.8% which 
is 41,020 of case number where carjacking decreased by 6.8%.   
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1.2.1.2   Crime detected as the results of police action. 
 The changes in the figures of the cases of crimes detected as the results of 
police action convey little or no trend messages to the analysts. This is because, as 
the SAPS stats report indicate, that the increase in the number of cases that are 
recorded by the police for one of its subcategories for instance, the illegal possession 
of firearm does not necessarily mean that the number of criminals or the crime level 
in the area concerned is increasing. This might also mean that while this crime 
figures remained constant, the police have upped and improved or changed their 
usual operations and efforts of combating crime.  
 The new police operations could mean not only the mounting of more road 
blocks or intelligence driven cordon and search operations, but also having adopted 
different methods or started operating at unusual places or times of day and thereby 
catching the criminals off guard and recording more successes. The number of cases 
of this crime might be on the decrease while the actual crime level is on the increase. 
This could be as the results of the gun smugglers or dealers increasing their trade but 
applying clever tactics and evading the police.     
  Since a reported case of crime detected as the result of police action 
indicates a successful arrest by the police, the number of the cases is directly 
proportional to the number of police successes in dealing with this crime. The 
increases in all subcategories, based on the SAPS stats such as the 2.4% of illegal 
possession of firearms and ammunition, 13.6% of drug related crime and 10.6% of 
driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs indicates the increase in the successes 
of the SAPS crime combating operations.  
1.2.2   Identification of perpetrators through access at SAPS 
 The police have developed a database management system called the 
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) which is the ICT innovation 
that has replaced their traditional manual fingerprint processing through automation. 
Since most of the perpetrators of crimes have to travel to crime spots, the AFIS 
system being utilized by the police at random and at intelligent driven cordon and 
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search operations has proved to be effective in reducing the movements of these 
criminals who they apprehend at random at these operations.  
This is because this system is successful in positively identifying the 
perpetrators or suspects who have been convicted before, or those whose fingerprints 
were lifted from crime scenes as well as or the fingerprints for suspects who have 
outstanding summonses. The AFIS achieves the instant positive identification when 
the suspects’ fingerprints are scanned into the system. The AFIS has a database that 
stores details of all convicted criminals while offering automated addition of new 
records and random retrieval of any record stored. This system empowers the police 
to perform quicker and authentic identification of suspects through their fingerprints.  
 The system is capable of a local and remote connection to other systems 
where its data collection tool, the MorphoTouch system, has both local and remote 
connection facility with AFIS database which is stored at police Central Criminal 
Record Center (CCRC) in Pretoria. This system enables SAPS officials to act 
promptly after verifying or authenticating the personal attributes or details of 
suspects. The system uses the biometric fingerprinting capability where criminals, 
mostly whose fingerprints have been collected at crime scenes or those with fake 
documents are linked with their fingerprints, arrested and prosecuted (ITWeb, 2007).    
ITWeb (2007) explains that the MorphTouch, which is the fingerprinting tool 
that is utilized by the police to scans suspects’ fingerprints into the system, is capable 
of storing 50 000 (fifty thousand) fingerprints locally while it is able to remotely 
connect to the AFIS databases at the CCRC. The AFIS database at CCRC is capable 
of storing millions of fingerprints belonging to convicted criminals or suspects’ 
including the prints that were lifted from crime scenes.  
The police system is also proving to be effective with the identification of 
suspects who have committed stolen identity crimes and running around with their 
victims’ identity documents. Even though they insert the pictures of their faces in the 
fake identity documents, the AFIS system retrieves their true identities once the 
MorphoTouch has scanned their fingerprints.  
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The police have therefore automated their internal access to information and 
are achieving instant identification of convicted perpetrators. Despite the 
implementation of e-governance, the police are still not able to identify all 
perpetrators. This is due to the limitation of the AFIS database which can only 
identify perpetrators who have criminal records in the database at CCRC. This 
creates a need by the police to access information held by DoHA which has the 
identification records of all citizens.  
While access by the police to information held by DoHA is currently enabled 
through manual process, the process does not help the police to expedite their crime 
reduction efforts as it is too slow to enable the police to identify, authenticate or 
verify the identities of perpetrators within the legal detention deadlines before 
charging them. The police need an automated process for instant results and action. 
This however raises policy concerns of possible policy conflicts.             
1.2.2.1   Manual identification by SAPS  
  The manual identification or processing of fingerprints is still taking place 
within SAPS where the police at the criminal record centers, both local and the 
central one manually compare fingerprints of arrested suspects with those lifted from 
crime scenes to find a match and effect arrests. Otherwise the fingerprints are 
transported from all police stations and Local Criminal Record Centers (LCRC) 
which are mostly located within the premises of the police stations to the CCRC 
where the identification takes place. If there are no matching details of the suspects, 
then the CCRC transports the fingerprints to DoHA for identification of the owners. 
The physical handing over and receipts of the fingerprints, to and from DoHA 
respectively is a manual process even though both the processing for identification at 
the CCRC or at DoHA may be automated.      
1.2.2.2   Automated identification at SAPS 
While the police have automated their internal identification process, this has 
limitations since they cannot identify perpetrators who have never been convicted. 
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While automation of access to information at DoHA may seem to be the desired 
solution, this raises policy conflicts which have to be taken into account.     
1.2.3   Identification of citizens through access to information at DoHA 
The Department of Home Affairs (DOHA) has developed a system called the 
Home Affairs National Identification System (HANIS) whose databases, the 
National Fingerprint Identification Registry Database and the Civil database were 
created by electronically scanning the manual individual fingerprints of all citizens 
from paper to a digital media. This was done by transferring the details into the 
electronic media to form the electronic National Fingerprint Identification Database 
of all citizens.   
The database is dynamic as it is continually updated with new comers each 
time babies are born or with foreigner’s information when entering the country 
legally at ports of entry, borderline posts and airports. The database is also updated 
ongoing with information of citizens leaving and entering the country as well as 
death information where births are confirmed with birth certificates and death 
certificates are issued for deaths. The Department of Home Affairs is cautious and 
will not allow remote online access to its database which is in line with the 
legislation in effect for privacy rights. 
Access to both HANIS and Civic databases enable identification of citizens 
and visitors whose details are retrieved when their identification numbers are typed 
into the systems. HANIS extends the identification process to be achieved through 
the scanning of fingerprints. Access by other departments to information held by 
DoHA has therefore become necessary since the latter is the only custodian of the 
national databases. This however presents policy concerns which are exasperated by 
the ICT solutions that tend to offer better and faster access by a department, to 
information held by another department. 
1.2.4   The Constitution 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act No.108 of 1996 
(hereinafter referred to as “the Constitution”), states that South Africa is a sovereign 
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and democratic state that is based on, amongst others, the advancement of human 
rights.   
1.2.4.1   The constitutional right of access to information  
The Bill of Rights in the Constitution includes the right of access to 
information in Section 32 which states that everyone has the right of access to: 
“(1)(a) any information held by the state:” and “(1)(b):  any information that is held 
by another person and that is required for the exercise or protection of any rights” 
and “(2) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to this right, and may 
provide for reasonable measures to alleviate the administrative and financial burden 
on the state.”  
1.2.4.2   The constitutional right to privacy  
Even though the Constitution calls for the rights of access to information to 
be given effect, the Constitution also calls for everyone’s right to privacy to be 
protected. According to Section 14 of the Constitution, everyone has the right to 
privacy. The state is therefore compelled to establish security measures that are to 
ensure that personal information of citizens in public and private hands is protected 
against unlawful retrievals or disclosures, storage and distribution.  
1.2.4.3   The constitutional right to communication  
The Constitution takes factors that affect access to information into account 
and calls for effective measure to be taken to ensure successful communication to or 
from everyone is achieved. Section 30 of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution 
guarantees protection for every one against others and also guarantees the right of 
every one to communicate or be communicated to in the language of their choices. 
To ensure that this is possible, Section 6 of the Constitution identifies eleven official 
languages of South Africa.   
1.2.5   Access to information policy process 
 The access to information policy was kick started at the level of a Bill were the 
initial drafts were referred to as the Open Democracy Bill. Information or Open democracy 
policy was initiated by the then Deputy President Thabo who set up a task team that started 
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drafting the legislation amid various consultation processes (Lor and van As, 2002).  This 
Bill provides for the promotion of access to information held by the state as well calling for 
security measure to be implemented for the protection of such information against privacy 
violation.  
Various initiatives were taken to promote access to information. These include 
Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Access to Information process, Transparent 
information policy formulation process and Government policy initiatives on access to 
information were undertaken at various stages towards formulating access to information 
policy.   
1.2.5.1   Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Access to Information 
Like else where in the world, 1994 was a period that was characterized by the rapid 
developments in ICT systems that were accelerating and providing many easier and faster 
alternatives of information management including the process of distributing or access to 
information from anywhere or any institution and by various media or multimedia platforms.   
For South Africa, this also marked the period where the government needed to 
urgently take a look at the way in which information in its possession was organized and 
how it was made available to the requesting individual members of the public, civil 
institutions or to other government organs in order to achieve compliancy with the freedom 
of expression and freedom of access to government information rights as enshrined in the 
Constitutional Bill of rights.  
1.2.5.2   Transparent information policy formulation process  
The new dispensation in South Africa since 1994 was marked by a significant 
change in the style of government with regards to its decision making processes 
which were driven by the need for greater transparency and public participation. This 
was being reflected by the transparent policy formulating process which was being 
adopted by the government. More efforts were made to encourage the public to 
participate in policy formulation where citizens were requested to provide inputs at 
various stages of policy making process.  
The first policy making stage is the establishment of the green paper which is 
the first document containing government plans that has taken public inputs into 
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account. The second step involves the publication of the government statements of 
policy or intent in a white paper. These policy statements are also made public in 
various media and related public document. The policy making process also 
encourages participation by advertisements which include the web addresses from 
which the public can view or download information (Lor & van As, 2002). 
1.2.5.3   Government policy initiatives on access to information  
Access to information policy initiatives, according to Lor et. al. were started 
around 1990 and were mainly aimed at ensuring that government information was 
not only accessible by the public in general, but that strong mechanisms were put in 
place to ensure the delivery of this information to all corners of South Africa since 
this was believed to be a key requirement for socio-economic developments in the 
country.   
The initiatives according to Lor et. al. include Reconstruction and 
Development Program that was regarded as a democratic strategy of transparent and 
participatory government, the Information Society and Development (ISAD) which 
is a wide consultative strategy of deploying ICT for better public services, universal 
access and enhancing socio-economic developments, a Task Group on Government 
Communications that was set up to implementation a Government to Citizens (G2C) 
communications through multi-purpose community centers (MPCC). 
Other similar initiatives include the National Information Technology Forum 
that was used to survey the implemented MPCC to establish means of strengthening 
them to achieve their intended purposes, the National Information Project (NIP) was 
established to adapt the government information sharing strategies through the 
utilization of ICT to enhance the internal government information management. 
The Government Information Project was established to enhance NIP by 
enabling DPSA to drive the project to improve internal government communication 
between departments, other agencies and the three tiers of government and lastly the 
Non-governmental initiatives was comprised of the civil society and private  
companies like SABINET, Unwembi Communications, Jutastat, Butter-worths and 
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others that played various roles in ensuring that various mechanisms and structures 
were put in place to facilitate the availability of government information through 
various multimedia platforms. While these initiatives were primarily aimed at 
government providing information to the public for accountability and better 
democracy, they laid the foundation for access by a department, to information held 
by another department.   
1.2.6   Access to information legislation 
Some of the laws governing access to information held by government include but 
not limited to the Promotion of Access to Information Amendment Act 54 of 2002 which 
was enacted into law in response to the constitutional requirement for enabling a legal access 
to information held by government and private bodies and the Protection of Personal 
Information Bill published on the 14th of August 2009 etc. The Criminal procedure 
amendment act, No 42 of 2003 was established to, amongst others, guide the police 
operations involving suspects.     
1.2.6.1   Enforcement of accessibility  
   The Promotion of Access to Information Amendment Act 54 of 2002 (PAIA) 
is the legislation that was enacted in response to the requirement of the Constitution 
to give effect to the constitutional right of access to information. PAIA was also 
enacted to attain various objectives which include but are not limited to, promoting 
openness and establishing voluntary and mandatory procedures that give effect to the 
right of access to information in a speedy, cost effective and effortless manner as 
reasonably as possible.   
 Even though the act requires that a request for access to information should 
not be granted if the requested record is covered by one or more grounds of refusal 
listed in section 11 and 50, the Act requires that such a record, despite being covered 
by one or more of these grounds, to be accessed and/or disclosed if the contents of 
the record would reveal important issues that are more harmful undisclosed than 
otherwise.  
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1.2.6.2   Enforcement of privacy through protection of information     
According to Section 14 of the Constitution, everyone has the right to 
privacy. It is for this reason that all rights are subject to the limitation clauses which 
may inhibit access to information under certain conditions. Even though PAIA gives 
effect to the constitutional right of access to information by everyone, the right of 
access to information held by the public hands may be limited to the extent that the 
limitations are reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom as contemplated in section 36 of the 
constitution. The Protection of Personal Information Bill published on the 14th of 
August 2009 amongst others, facilitates for the creation of an independent 
Information protection regulator who will regulate the requirements and codes of 
conduct with regards to the processing of personal information.  
1.2.6.3   The Criminal procedure Act  
 The original Criminal procedure act 51 of 1977 has been amended through 
the Criminal procedure second amendment act number 85 of 1997 to regulate the 
detention of the arrested persons. According to section 1 subsection 1 (c) (ii) of this 
amendment act, reasonable steps will be taken to have any person who has been 
arrested to be charged within 48 working court hours. This point to the fact that time 
is of the essence in processing information necessary for criminal prosecution.  
1.2.7   e-Governance development process 
 South Africa demonstrated its strong commitment to building an inclusive 
information society in which ICT is effectively utilized and harnessed to attain 
universal access to information, to contribute positively to socio-economic 
development and to enable government to deliver citizen centric services, as 
expressed by the Presidential National Commission in the Information Society and 
Development Plan or ISAD Plan (PNC-ISAD, 2006).  
The Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) was tasked 
with the ICT implementation strategy for which it responded by formulating the IT 
policy framework (DPSA, 2001). Even though the policy document calls for e-
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governance initiatives to address the application of IT to intra-governmental 
operations (G2G), some related transactions that involve the possible electronic 
sharing of personal information between departments are not implemented. Instead, 
ICT initiatives are being implemented at various tiers, the national, provincial and 
local governments to improve the services or to increase roll out of ICT services to 
those who cannot afford. 
1.2.7.1   E-Governance initiatives at national government  
National government offers websites and portals that aid in reducing the need 
for citizens to travel to a government office for information. The www.gov.za  portal 
is the electronic communication platform and the official website to represent the 
South Africa government on the internet. The website has various tabs at the top and 
on the left hand side that have familiar descriptive names to help the citizens to 
navigate and receive information about government services, where these services 
can be found, government information, latest speeches by government officials, 
latest news and various other information about relevant issues that are meaningful 
to the South African public in general. These may also include information about 
links to other information, frequently asked questions etc.   
The descriptive navigation tabs are an effort by government to, amongst 
others, create an easy one stop shop access to government information that is well 
coordinated over the net to reduce the possibility of random uncontrolled access to 
duplicated information that may send conflicting messages to the public (Lor & van 
AS, 2002).  The official government website also will provide links or information 
about other departments were such departments are still to create their own websites. 
Many e-governance initiatives exist, showing various levels of success or 
failure. Various departments at national level have developed government-to-citizen 
(G2C) innovations, where access to personal information is automated. These 
innovations are mostly in the form of websites which can be accessed directly or 
through the official national government website. Some of these departments which 
are showing various levels of successes are e-Natis, a national traffic information 
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system utilized by the Department of Transport: e-filing of tax returns for the South 
African Revenue Services (SARS) and the remote automated processing of grant 
applications by the Department of Social Services. 
1.2.7.2    e-Governance initiatives at provincial government 
Provincial departments have established ICT projects initiatives that also vary 
from province to province. The Western Cape Provincial Government has launched 
the Cape Gateway (www.capegateway.gov.za) and the Khanya Project for driving its e-
government initiatives and driving schools project respectively. The Gauteng Online 
Schools project of the Gauteng Provincial Government also serves as another 
example of e-government initiative that is launched to bridge the digital divide in the 
provincial schools.  
1.2.7.3    e-Governance initiatives at local government 
e-Governance at the local government level includes citizen-to-government 
(C2G) and business-to-government (B2G) transactions, where municipality rates and 
charges, TV licenses, electricity bills etc. are paid through supermarket and post 
office counters or over the Internet. The major city malls have mostly launched e-
ticketing systems for parking where the gate control booms are automatically lifted 
to enable one vehicle entry when taking the ticket. These are inserted at their 
machine in the passages of the malls to calculate the parking amount and accept cash 
before enabling the booms to open and enable exiting of vehicles from the malls. 
1.2.7.4   Automated Access to information in South Africa   
 From the e-governance perspective, the government addresses the foundation 
for effective G2G communications by setting the Minimum Information Security 
Standards (MISS) and Minimum Interoperability Standards (MIOS) for information 
systems through Amendment of Public Service Regulations of 5 January 2001 (RSA, 
2001).  
While the MISS specifies security standards due to possible integrations of 
public operations and services, the MIOS specifies the government’s technical 
principles and standards to enable interoperability within and across tiers of 
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government, as well as between departments (RSA, 2001). These principles and 
standards as per Chapter 5 of the amendment of Public Service Regulations (RSA, 
2001) defines requirements and conditions that are prerequisite for connected and 
web-enabled government.  
1.2.8   e-Governance policy in South Africa 
One of the first initiatives for e-governance policy formulation was provided 
by the country’s vision 2014 strategy in which South Africa is described as an 
inclusive information society where the government has modernized the ICT 
infrastructure to provide, amongst others, quality services to the communities. The e-
governance policy initiatives is centrally coordinated by the Department of Public 
Service and Administration (DPSA) that consulted broadly throughout government 
stakeholders (GITO Council) and involved both non-government organizations and 
civil society in general to launch a national IT policy framework (DPSA, 2001). This 
framework created the basis for the implementation of e-governance for the public 
institutions.  
The e-governance policy framework also called for the establishment of a 
central government ICT procurement agency to coordinate the national e-governance 
development. To achieve the planned government wide e-governance infrastructure 
and application standardization and modernization, DPSA established statutory 
coordinating agency, the State Information Technology Agency (SITA) which is to 
oversee all government ICT procurements to ensure that e-governance was being 
developed and implemented by all government departments in accordance with the 
required procedures and standards.   
The DPSA policy framework contains recommendations that the policy 
makers should ensure that the e-government initiative should, amongst others, 
address the intra-governmental operations (G2G). The Framework also emphasizes 
that the implementation of ICT was to be done in phases. Since then, there have been 
various e-governance policy measures and efforts at various tiers of government that 
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are aimed at utilizing ICT to improve operations which would facilitate better access 
and services to the communities. 
1.2.8.1   e-Governance accessibility policy 
The vision of an information society calls for the formulation of, amongst 
others an enabling policy and regulation that would be used to manage the 
implementation of an e-government (Farelo & Morris, 2006). The DPSA policy 
framework contains recommendations that the policy makers should ensure that the 
e-government initiative should address the intra-governmental operations (G2G), e-
services meaning the upgrading of the service delivery models to citizens (G2C) and 
those of operations that relate to business sector (G2B).  
Even though it is generally accepted that South Africa is a front runner with 
regards to the development of e-government in Africa, the policy makers are still 
trying to understand various ways in which to proceed with its implementation. The 
policy makers are for example not certain about the rate at which the implementation 
thereof should be maintained as well as being able to determine the direction the e-
government implementation should take (Maumbe, Owei and Alexander, 2008).  
There is a tradeoff situation facing the e-government policy makers of 
developing countries including South Africa in the form of the existence of two or 
more types of economies in some of them. In South Africa this is due to the 
simultaneous dual existence of the capitalist very rich and the impoverished very 
poor communities who are mostly living without income. E-government 
infrastructure is basically a very expensive investment which may not likely benefit 
the poor people who will not only know how to utilize it, but will also not be able to 
access the services (Maumbe, Owei and Alexander, 2008).  
Despite all the effort being put to create an all inclusive information society 
where the ICT sector is modernized to be thriving and vibrant (Farelo et. al.), 
according to Maumbe et. al. the government policy makers are facing this dilemma 
of alienating the majority of the people who still remain without access. 
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 1.2.8.2   e-Governance Security/Privacy policy 
While the implementation of e-government to automate and expedite mainly 
access by citizens to government information is the preferred and current trends 
followed by governments, the very nature of ICT processing is making information 
readily available for many people, local and remote to share. This introduces new 
security risks of possible unlawful access to information that posse potential threats 
to institutions and possible violation of privacies of citizens where personal 
information held by government is involved. 
The DPSA policy framework calls for the South African policy makers to 
employ security measures that are much broader than just authentication and 
encryption. These measures must include security clusters that caters for thirty 
minimum requirements such as how to: avoid, deter, prevent, detect, correct and 
recover from a security breach or damage against, physical, people, infrastructure, 
applications and information. According to the policy framework, the security policy 
must provide sufficient details of how these potential threats are to be managed.     
1.3   Problem Statement 
South Africa ranks high amongst countries that are riddled with crime. The 
situation is worsened by the insurgent of illegal immigrants who are not registered 
and are mostly committing crime knowing that the trail of their fingerprints they 
leave behind will not help the police to identify and trace them. Some perpetrators 
commit ‘stolen identity’ crimes by using other people’s identity documents as theirs. 
Others easily pass through the police intelligence cordon and search operations since 
the police cannot use their personal fingerprint identification system to instantly 
verify the authenticity of the documents being presented or the criminal record of the 
person.         
The South African Police Services (SAPS) have introduced an e-governance 
innovation to improve and optimize the crime reduction operations. The utilization 
of the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) has improved the police 
crime fighting operations. The success of this system is enabled by its database being 
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able to connect locally and remotely to the fingerprint scanning system, the 
MorphoTouch. The MorphoTouch is capable of locally storing fingerprints for 
instant remote identification while it is also able to connect remotely to the AFIS 
database that is hosted at police headquarters. 
Despite the implementation of e-governance, the police are still not achieving 
the desired crime reduction operations optimization, because the AFIS database 
details are limited to the criminal records of current and previously convicted 
perpetrators of crime. The police are therefore unable to identify all suspects. This 
raises challenges for the crime reduction operations since the police can only detain 
suspects up to 48 working court hours without charging them. Where they have 
detained suspects on suspicion of wrong doing, or where suspects are stopped and 
produce dubious identification documents, the police require instant identification of 
persons not listed in the AFIS database. 
The Department of Home Affairs (DoHA) is the only institution in South 
Africa that is in possession of the national fingerprint identification database. The 
Home Affairs National Information System (HANIS) stores personal identification 
details of all South Africans and legal immigrants. Just like the AFIS, this system has 
the capability to instantly retrieve the personal identification details of individuals 
when scanning their fingerprints. The system enables the DoHA authorities to 
instantly identify any individual in South Africa unless this is an illegal immigrant or 
in an exceptional case where a person has never been registered. 
While access by SAPS, to personal fingerprint identification information held 
by DoHA does take place, this does not contribute towards enabling SAPS to attain 
higher levels of performance in their operations. This is because the process is 
characterized by manual processes with long turn-around times.  Currently the turn-
around times of the identification transactions of the police at DoHA mostly exceed 
the 48 working court hours limit set out in the criminal procedure legislation. Since 
the feedback from DoHA takes longer than the detention limit, the police have to 
release suspects to comply with the law. This challenge undermines the services of 
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SAPS towards providing a safer environment for citizens to live in, as wanted 
suspects may be released due to this technicality.   
Even though the information policy enables access by SAPS to personal 
information held by DoHA, and both departments have implemented e-governance 
applications to automate their processes of access to information, e-governance is not 
implemented to automate access by SAPS to information held by DoHA which is 
necessary to optimize the crime operations. 
1.4   The purpose of the research 
The background review suggests that policy or lack of it may be inhibiting e-
governance with respect to access, by a department to information held by another 
department where access, by SAPS to information held by DoHA could yield 
positive results for crime operations. However, we do not have evidence for this. 
Hence, policy makers and senior public servants are unable to make appropriate 
revisions to existing policy and practice. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to 
investigate how policy or lack therefore inhibits e-governance and what policy 
approaches might enhance e-governance which is necessary for enhancing crime 
operations. 
This will enable the researcher to analyze data from crime operations, DoHA 
environment, policy environment, including policy, legislation and practice as well 
as e-governance, in order to understand why automated access, by SAPS to 
information held by DoHA is not implemented despite the fact that this could 
enhance crime operations needed for effective and efficient SAPS services.  
This analysis will further enable the researcher to contemplate how policy 
can be used to address requirements for accessibility, security and privacy should 
these be the issues of concern when proposing recommendations of possible 
introduction of e-governance to automate access, by a department to information 
held by another department. The research will therefore analyze the policy 
environment in terms of:  
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1) Identifying the relevance of accessibility, privacy and security issues to crime 
operations and what the privacy and security concerns are.  
2) Identifying the extent to which accessibility to information (manual access, 
automated access) held in DoHA is a barrier or enabler to effective crime 
operations.       
3) Investigating ways in which the policy requirement for privacy of 
information (manual access, automated access) held by DoHA is a barrier or 
an enabler to effective crime operations.       
4) Identifying ways in which the policy requirement for security (manual access, 
automated access) presents either a barrier or an enabler to effective crime 
operations.  
5) Identifying how access to information policy and the e-governance policy 
address the issues of accessibility, privacy and security of information and 
how automated information sharing can be effectively regulated. 
This research will, on the basis of the analysis of the findings, propose 
recommendations of possible policy amendment or formulation to contribute to 
effective crime operations within SAPS. 
1.5   Research Questions 
The following main research question is posed: 
How does policy on access to information inhibit or enhance crime reduction 
operations?  
The following research sub-questions are posed:   
1. To what extent is accessibility to information (manual access versus automated 
access) held in DoHA a barrier to or an enabler to effective crime operations? 
2. In which ways is the requirement for privacy and security (manual access 
versus automated access), similarly a barrier or an enabler? 
3. How do the access to information policy and the e-governance policy address 
the issues of accessibility, privacy and security of information? 
4. What is the relevance of these policy issues to crime operations? 
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5. How can policy be improved for automated access to information for more 
effective crime reduction? 
1.6   Chapter Conclusions and Overview of Next Chapter  
Detailed descriptions of access to information policy that governs, amongst 
others, access by a department to information held by another department and the 
crime situation in the country that points to high levels of crime have been provided. 
It has also emerged that e-governance can be implemented and utilized to automate 
access by a department, to information held by another department.  Despite SAPS 
and DoHA having implemented e-governance, this is not optimized for crime 
reduction. Hence, access to information policy will be investigated and analyzed 
through a series of questions to determine how this policy is an enabler or a barrier to 
automated access by a department to information held by another department.    
The investigation of access to information policy requires a broad view of the 
subject matter of the policy environment relating to the relationships between 
management of crime reduction, e-governance and automated access to information. 
The literature review which follows in Chapter Two will review scholars’ views on 
key concepts.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW: REVIEW OF CONCEPTS APPLICABLE TO 
CRIME REDUCTION AND E-GOVERNANCE POLICY AND PRACTICE  
This chapter covers the literature review which is about the reading of 
articles, books and related other sources of information to enable the researcher to 
gain the perspectives of a range of authors on how e-governance policy and practice 
relates to opportunities for crime reduction, through access to information. The 
review is also informed by reading of and consultations of materials of related 
concepts such as factors that affect access to information, access to information in 
public institutions and the right of access thereof. The discussions of these concepts 
should shed light on the role of information policy in e-governance and how the 
latter affects crime reduction.   
 The study operates from the assumption that government access to personal 
information held by public bodies is necessary under circumstances where this 
information is required by the police to, amongst others reduce crime. Automated 
access to information can enable the police to rapidly identify perpetrators, 
preventing them to commit more crime or bringing them to book. The discussions 
will also include ways of identifying possible need to either amend existing policy or 
formulate an effective e-governance policy to enable automated access by SAPS, to 
information held by DoHA for the identification of perpetrators in order to reduce 
crime.   
2.1   The nature of crime operations   
Crime is an illegal action which has been in existence since man came into 
being and it has been evolving with time (Adeola, Alese and Falaki, 2007). The 
criminal actions, as Adeola et. al. further points out, are generally committed at areas 
that are normally hidden from view and are usually not easily detected as the areas 
are mostly from least expected places. Various nations adopt different approaches to 
crime prevention and combating based on the nature of crime patterns that are 
specific to them. 
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Crime reduction operations and planning are now increasing reliance on e-
governance to produce crime intelligence through the gathering, analysis and 
effective communication of information. Because of the diversity of technologies 
and information management systems, the planning of crime reduction operations 
involves other units like the crime intelligence that provides the crime prevention 
and combating operations unit with timely, topical and accurate intelligence policy-
relevant information that informs, forecasts and advises on dangers, opportunities 
and critical developments in crime patterns  (Ratcliffe, 2007).   
  Law enforcement decision makers and executive management are beginning to 
turn the wealth of information produced through the utilization of e-governance into 
advantages (Schiller, 2011). This advantage comes in the form of variety of multiple 
integrated software applications and database management systems which Schiller 
further explains as the automation of information management that presents 
information in variety of formats.  
The automation presents challenges to the police of processing and 
integrating the Meta data produced through e-governance with crime information to 
produce knowledge in the form of crime reduction plans.  Ratcliffe (2007) says that 
the authorities need this process to enhance their decision making to improve crime 
combating and prevention strategies. Schiller also agrees that the power of crime 
reduction operations is enabled by the standardization across operational units and 
the utilization of integrated information.    
 The crime prevention and combating units would therefore benefit from 
integrating their plans with units like crime intelligence division which Ratcliffe says 
it enhances decision making process based on the deeper understanding of 
criminality in general. This, he says is a strategic thinking that has to do with the 
type of decision making that can result in a plan that contributes towards crime 
intelligence in general instead of being a plan for an individual arrest.  
Various advantages can be derived by the crime prevention and combating 
unit for an integrated information management approach by cooperating with crime 
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intelligence units and other relevant management systems from internal or external 
sources. Crime intelligence systems offer intelligence tools that support systems 
integration approaches and are capable of powerful information analysis that 
produces intelligence needed for all levels of crime management planning.      
2.1.1   Crime reduction tools 
Most of the crime intelligence officials in general have evolved with and 
taken advantages of utilizing e-governance. Schiller (2011) says that the police 
departments that used manual operations to process crime information face 
numerous challenges such as filing and struggling to find the right information when 
needed and can not derive synergy benefits of sharing information under such 
manual conditions.  
Schiller further explains that the This system enabled searchable database of 
crime and incident information which Schiller explains that it enhanced their crime 
analyzing processes and easier criminal identification through access to information 
from the databases. Schiller further explains that now officers can quickly access 
information or share it across different operational areas even when driving in patrol 
cars.   
2.1.2   Integrative design of crime intelligence systems 
 Crime reduction operations can also take advantage of how crime intelligence 
systems are designed. This is because the design of crime intelligence system is 
integrative and inclusive in its very nature. This was evidenced by the Nigerian 
authorities when they designed their crime intelligence systems. According to 
Adeola, Alese and Falaki (2007), the Nigerians included various different 
government agencies and stakeholders’ whose information requirements were taken 
into account to facilitate ease of access to its information by all who are concerned 
and authorized while it also enables inputs from various internal and external 
sources. They gathered information from all organizations that were involved in 
crime related activities and various experts for issues such as crime administration 
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during the design of their crime intelligence system (Adeola, Alese and Falaki, 
2007).  
The crime intelligence system is designed to enable for the storage and 
retrieval of information about crime such as personal identification information of 
criminals, crime statistics or patterns where various nations adopt different 
approaches based on the nature of crime patterns that are specific to them (Adeola, 
Alese and Falaki, 2007). Some designs produced multi-distributed database 
management systems that could be accessed simultaneously by many individuals or 
institutions in various platforms while it could also gathers information in the same 
way.  
 2.1.3   Intelligence analysis 
 Data and information collected for the aim of producing intelligence is 
merely evidence if not processed further or analyzed. Such information according to 
Ratcliffe (2007) only become crime intelligence once it is analyzed and structured or 
sometimes when it is combined with other information that may always be readily 
available or of public nature to produce new information content that contain more 
meaningful value to enhance strategic decision making. This view is supported by de 
Lint, O’Connor and Cotter (2007) who refers to intelligence not only as a special 
case of information and knowledge, but also as an analytically refined product which 
serves as a package that enhances business operational strategies in pursuit of targets.       
Criminal intelligence analysis is designed to support various levels of 
institutions. According to the Interpol (2011) the analyzed reports can be used to 
support crime reduction planning at strategic or tactical levels within organizations  
like the police departments. The system can be used to analyze information and 
produce intelligence that can provide the strategic level management of the police 
with early warning signs about potential threats against the country for instance, or to 
identify potential criminal activity before it happens (de Lint, O’Connor and Cotter, 
2007)).  
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 de Lint et. al. further  point out that the system can also support the 
operational or tactical management level which may require the system to interact 
with external sources of information to enable for immediate actions of law 
enforcement. This could be the authentication of identities of suspects needed to 
effect instant arrests while the required personal identification information is held by 
other institutions for instance.  
2.2   Access to information policy 
 According to Jaeger (2007) information policies are implemented to control 
the process of access to information held by government and are shaping the way 
government information is made available to the public. This, as Jaeger further 
explains, is the reason why information policies are regarded as the most influential 
forces that determine the status of the information society of a country. The policies 
provide the control measures which are necessary to put in place some limits or 
security to exclude access to certain types of information where privacy concerns 
may be sited as the reason for instance.   
Access to information policy makers must take various issues that related to 
access to information into account. These are: factors that affect access to 
information and the right of access to information in public hands.  
Even though ICT innovations can simplify the process of access by a 
department to information held by another department, it is still necessary to take 
factors that may affect access to information into account when planning the internal 
or remote communication channels within or between departments respectively. 
Buckland, (1991) says that there are six factors that enable access to information 
which can be categorized as identification, availability, price to the user, cost to the 
provider, cognitive access and acceptability. The author further points out that even 
if the source pertinent to the enquiry is made available, successful access to 
information may not necessarily be gained if one or more of these aspects are not 
taken into account during communication or planning thereof. Table 2.1 above 
contains the factors that enable access to information against their brief descriptions.  
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Table 2 1:  Factors that enable access to information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Buckland, 1991. 
2.2.2   The right of access to information in public institutions 
The Rights of access to information include rights to create and communicate 
information in the form of freedom of expression and association, the right to control 
others’ access to information such as privacy and intellectual property, the right to 
access information in the form of the freedom of thought and the right to read 
(Mathiesen, 2008). The right of access to information held by government is an 
international law recognized by many nations. Saxena (2004, p.7) adds that “…the 
right to information is guaranteed in the international law, as part of the freedom of 
expression in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”. 
 The importance of the right of access to public information has been 
investigated by various researchers who all argue that it is a fundamental human 
right. Mathiesen (2008); Roberts (2003); Saxena (2004) and Sharma and Gopal 
(2006) refer to the right of access to public information as the touch stone of all 
forms of freedoms that hold governments accountable while promoting transparency 
and fairness based on equality for all citizens. This view has long been advocated by 
Factor name Description 
Identification The enquirer may not be able to locate the specific information required even if information is 
provided to the enquirer. The specific source location has to be identified.  
Availability The physical source has to be available. 
Price to the user The charge in a fee based information service may act as a barrier 
Cost to the 
provider 
The providers of sources also incur various types of expenditures like in cases where in archive 
and library service being offered for free to the enquirer whilst the service may cost efforts, 
money, space etc.   
Cognitive Access Education, level of expertise or unfamiliar language etc. may prevent successful access due to 
some difficulties emerging in trying to understand the provided source. 
Acceptability (Wilson as cited in Buckland, 1991) says that acceptability may act as a barrier to access to 
information for instance, if the enquirer views the source with suspicion questioning its 
authenticity as lacking in cognitive authority. The enquirer may also refuse to accept the 
evidence of the source as it is unwelcome in what it signifies and thereby being in conflict with 
the enquirer’s other beliefs. (L. Festinger, A.G. Greewald & D. L. Ronis as cited in Buckland, 
1991) names this refusal as a cognitive dissonance.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
30 
 
various global institutions including the United Nations General Assembly which 
adopted Resolution 59(1) to that effect.   
2.2.3   Policy requirements for accessibility 
Accessibility has long being recognized by almost all democracies including 
international bodies like the European Union (1995), which put emphasis on this 
phenomenon through article 1 issued as a  directive that prevents restrictions on 
personal information from flowing freely amongst its member states. Accessibility is 
widely associated with openness of information in government, partly through the 
utilization of ICT on functions and services to citizens (G2C).  
The integration of the departmental systems to enable information sharing or 
access by a department to information held by another department is sometimes 
confronted with various challenges. Some of these challenges may be associated 
with existing institutional arrangements, organizational structure or managerial 
bureaucracies which may inhibit the process within government and impede on the 
possible attainment of government-wide integrated services at a single point (Luna-
Reyes, Gil-Garcia & Cruz, 2007).  
These challenges could be brought about by, amongst others, the reluctance 
by departmental heads to integrate or share systems and data with other departments 
possibly due to the fear of possible harmful nature of leakages of sensitive data or 
could be due to the lack of some central coordination from executive management 
(Fan and Zhang, 2007). Fan et. al. also argue that for successful accessibility policy 
formulation to be enhanced, officials from participating departments have to 
collaborate, negotiate and agree on the protocols that govern the inter-departmental 
interactions. 
2.2.4   Policy requirements for security  
 During the development of security policy, while great care has to be taken 
into account with regards to the privacy concerns of citizens for confidentiality of 
personal information and complying with best and reliable practices (Singh, 2010), 
the developers must also ensure that production will not be stifled due to restrictive 
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security policy that may result in production information being protected even 
against access by legitimate workers who need to process the information in their 
daily operations (Joia, 2004).  
2.2.5   Policy requirements for privacy 
The importance of privacy has long been recognized and emphasized by 
many international institutions like Universal Declarations of Human Rights of 1948 
through article 12 and the Council of Europe through its Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and the Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 through article 
8. the OECD (1980), the Council of Europe again, through its Convention for the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to the Automatic processing of personal data of 
1981 and other global institutions. 
These institutions have come up with rules to ensure that privacy of 
individuals is not compromised. Some of such rules, for instance, state that personal 
information must be collected fairly and legally and must only be utilized for the 
specific intention for which they were collected. According to Henderson and Snyder 
(1999) privacy is defined as the right of individuals to be in control of how their 
personal information is collected and used. 
2.3   Legislation    
Most of the information held by governments is of personal nature containing 
details of citizens. According to (Sharma & Gopal, 2006), personal information in 
the hands of government is collected and used specifically for lawful functions and 
can be disclosed to third parties without the owner’s consent strictly if it is permitted 
by law, if the disclosure thereof is for reasonably necessary for law enforcement or if 
it is reasonably believed that such disclosure is necessary to prevent or minimize the 
impact of an impending threat to health and/or life for instance. 
2.3.1   Legal access to personal information 
In order for the legislation that promotes the right of access to information in 
the hands of government to comply with the lawful usage of personal information, 
such laws must provide for details of security measures that need to be implemented 
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to address privacy issues (Sharma & Gopal, 2006). Personal information may only 
be disclosed to third parties under exceptional circumstances guided by the 
provisions of the law. These  provisions, according to Sharma et al. requires 
legislation that details and defines procedures for reviews and appeals that may 
extend to the external independent appeals officer, information commissioner or the 
ombudsman who must ensure that government acts fairly in deciding to disclose or 
withhold information.  
Sharma et al. further points out that the ombudsman or the courts could be 
given jurisdiction over such matters depending on the institutional infrastructure of 
the specific country. This is to avoid the situation that may create room for some of 
the officials to deny disclosure of information for legitimate requests. Such officials 
would withhold information that is not covered under any non-disclosure exemption.  
2.3.2   Privacy laws versus access to information 
Privacy laws are not barriers that impede on access to personal information 
held by government. Even though article 12 of the United Nations Universal 
Declarations of Human rights (1948) provides that no individual would be subjected 
to arbitrary interference in their privacy, and that everyone has the right to the 
protection against such unlawful attacks, The word “arbitrary” in the declarations 
below, points towards some acceptance that certain invasions of privacy may be 
regarded as reasonable based on specific circumstance. Article 29 of the Declarations 
recognizes limits to the exercise of rights and defines them as those that are 
determined by law solely for the purposes of securing due recognition and respect for 
the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, 
public order and the general welfare in a democratic society. 
2.3.3   Security laws against rights of access to information 
While the laws on access to information in government hands can create the 
perception that access to information held by governments is unrestricted, no 
government recognizes any rights of access to information without a qualification 
and a scope (Roberts, 2003).  Roberts goes on to say that in passing laws of access to 
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information in government, governments define institutions to be subjected to these 
laws, the circumstances under which these institutions can withhold information and 
works out the cost and price of the  administration required to process the access to 
information activities. 
2.4   The evolution of e-Governance and policy 
e-Governance is the second and current step of the evolutionary path 
followed by the integration of ICT into the public sector which started from the 
initial e-government step. This is because e-government is described as the initial 
developmental stage of e-governance (Paskaleva-Shapira, 2006).   
While there are various and different developmental stages taken by the 
integration of e-governance into the public sector which are provided by different 
authors, Batista (2003) presents three stages which the writer refers to as the stages 
of the integration of ICT into the public sector.  
 Batista’s stages of the integration of ICT into the public sector are more 
suited for the purposes of this paper since the stages enable for the drawing of a line 
that separates and help to differentiate between the concepts of e-government and e-
governance whose boundaries seem to overlap in their description by various writers. 
The stages are tabulated in Table 2.2 above which shows the stage numbers against 
their descriptions. 
Table 2.2 : Three steps of ICT integration into the public sector   
 
Stage No.   Description 
Stage one Technology is only utilized by management in their offices. 
Stage two  State provides government non-interactive and unilaterally designed 
electronic or digital media services to the public. 
Stage three State uses ICT for good governance 
 Source:  Batista, 2003. 
Stage one and two undoubtedly points to e-government stage of the 
development of e-governance since e-government is the initial introductory stage of 
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ICT where the management of the public service first had to understand it before 
extending it to various levels within the sector and as services to the public in 
general. In other words, this is the stage that serves as the initial stage of utilizing 
ICT to automate government operations or functions as well as the automation of 
services to the citizens.  
The third step describes the e-governance stage and shows that the main 
developmental stages of e-governance can be divided into two. The first stage is 
referred to as e-government stage while the second can be e-governance stage. The 
lines separating the boundaries of these concepts might differ from country to 
country due to different e-governance policies which are used by governments to 
control and plan the implementation of e-governance.  
2.4.1   e-Government stage  
The concept of e-government is not new according to Gordon (2002) since 
governments were the first users of computers even though the name “e-
government” was not used. The emergence of internet has been one of the major 
drivers of the take up of e-government in the public sector which Gordon also says 
that the drive to reform public sector also contributed to e-governance take up.  
Various international institutions have joined in the wide descriptions of e-
government for example (OECD, 2003 and World Bank, no date). The latter defines 
e-government as government using technologies like the WAN, the internet, etc. that 
are capable to transforming relations with, amongst others, other arms of government 
for better delivery of government services and improved interactions through access 
to information.   
2.4.2   e-Governance stage 
e-Governance has been brought about by the identified defects and cracks 
that were exposing some limitations of e-government. This is due to the 
implementation of e-government being due to unilateral decisions by government to 
automate services to citizens that include other government departments. Despite 
some advantages and benefits, Paskaleva-Shapira reveals that the utilization of e-
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government was mostly faced with constant challenges that threatened to minimize 
the intended benefits. These challenges faced the public administrators and became 
too diverse and complicated to be addressed by just the implementation of e-
government. Some of them relate to consultation or lack of it that caused the interests 
of the stakeholders to be excluded from the implementation plans and hence 
resulting in its rejection (Klischewski, 2011). This, according to Klischewski was 
because wrong architectures were being unilaterally selected which did not conform 
to the requirements of the specific contexts.  
The process of addressing the new challenges, as Paskaleva-Shapira 
elaborates, has pointed to a need for the consideration of a new concept such as the 
adoption of a strategic approach that should be driven by an adaptive policy and 
regulation and be embraced and used by the executive to control and coordinate co-
operations. This has led to the introduction of the concept of e-governance 
(Paskaleva-Shapira, 2006).  
There are various definitions of e-governance that can help to clarify its 
objectives, for example (see: Batista, 2003; Finger and Pécoud, (2003) and Singh, 
2010). Singh defines it as the application of ICT on the functioning of government 
which accommodates other non ICT concepts that include but are not limited to 
massive government process re-engineering that also impacts on staff related issues 
like the disciplinary and motivational activities.  
 e-Governance can be utilized to address the traditional government 
departments’ limitations of operating separately in silos with little sharing of 
information to benefit from potential synergies of information sharing. e-
Governance’ interoperability function has the capability to integrate the systems of 
local and remote departments while enabling them to be controlled by different 
individuals who may be locally or remotely located and yet achieving this feet at 
optimized government operations while lowering the operational costs (Klischewski, 
2011). It is through this achievement that e-governance can be utilized to implement 
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the process of automated access, by a department to information held by another 
department.   
2.4.2.1   e-Governance automation of access to information  
e-Governance can be utilized to provide the automation of access, by a 
department to information held by another department which offers improved and 
faster ways of sharing information between government departments called 
government to government communication (G2G). G2G is one of the various 
communication types that e-governance is capable of enabling. All government 
departments locally or globally are either in the process of inter-connecting to share 
information or have already implemented (Klischewski, 2011 and Shapard, 1996).  
Shapard further states that governments like the US have been the pace 
setters that interconnected their departments as early as 1982 when they deployed 
telecommunications technologies like fiber optic, automated messaging, trunked 
radio and electronic gateways to interconnect their departments which tended to 
improve their public administration. Telecommunications benefits were also 
exploited in the education sector to localize remote rural schools that has a shortage 
of teachers for instance, by connecting cameras and monitors at both ends to a fiber-
optic bandwidth that connected the schools and enabled remote audio and vision 
(Shapard, 1996). Shapard also say that in this environment, a teacher in the city and 
the remote students in various village schools could communicate by seeing and 
hearing one another as if they were all in the same class.  
According to Gordon (2002) e-governance can be applied to transform the 
institutional infrastructure of governments from the traditional hierarchical 
organizational structures that operated separately in silos of authoritarian top down 
decision and policy making models to multiple departments or agencies that 
collaborates through loosely coupled networks. Fang (2002) adds that this can 
facilitate better communications between departments or tiers of government. 
The resulting models enable the civil servants in different departments to 
collaborate effectively within and across departments (Gordon, 2002). This, e-
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governance achieves by its capability to provide the authorities with ICT 
infrastructure platforms and programs like the internet, which can enable various 
institutions that are remotely connected to communicate as if they were local.   
e-Governance can be utilized to transform the outdated workflows within or 
between government departments and replace them with established digital links of 
workflows (Joia, 2004). The integration of services between departments enables 
governments to offer integrated services at lower costs (Klischewski, 2011; Gordon, 
2002 and Khoumbati and Themistocleos, 2006). This is enabled by departments 
being able to communicate and cooperate better through a single infrastructure that 
eliminates or minimizes duplication costs (Khoumbati and Themistocleos, 2006).  
   e-Government can be utilized to achieve two types of departmental 
integrations referred to as the horizontal and the vertical integrations. 
2.4.2.2   Horizontal integration 
The horizontal integration refers to the integration of the services of the 
departments within the same level of government which according to OECD (2003a)   
enables the departments to achieve cross departmental solutions to complex issues 
that were traditionally of department specific public policy. 
 Singh explains that e-governance can be further utilized to ensure that the 
departments are fully restructured and integrated to exchange and share information 
to offer the seamless one stop shop services.   
2.4.2.3   Vertical Integration 
The vertical integration enables the integration of the operations and services 
of different levels of government departments or tiers of government such as 
national, provincial and local government to, according to OECD (2003a) 
“collaborate closely in order to present a coherent online message to the public” 
(p.58). Gordon (2002) argues that a necessary requirement for any government to 
achieve seamless, multichannel and public-centric packages, the entire government 
departments or tiers of government must operate as a single organization by adopting 
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shared platforms for the core technologies on which to execute common applications 
that have to be consistent across departments.  
This, as Gordon puts it, will enable the departments to create solutions that 
make it easier for citizens, business or other arms of government to access 
government wide services and information within a single department, or across the 
entire governmental system regardless of whether it is at national, provincial or local.   
2.4.2.4   Automated data sharing model implementation requirements 
Work done by Fan and Zhang (2007) indicates that an e-governance 
communication type government to government (G2G) of automated data sharing 
model can be successfully implemented to benefit the integrated departments 
including those from different levels if its developmental requirements, which can be 
categorized into four, are adhered to. Fan et al. also further provide a list of the 
category requirements and their descriptions which can be found in Table 2.3 above. 
A number of writers support this information sharing model and are of the view that 
if the essential requirements for information sharing are met then the departments 
can integrate their systems successfully (see, Luna-Reyes, Gil-Garcia and Cruz, 
2007; Headayetullah and Pradhan, 2009 and Khoumbati and Themistocleos, 2006).  
e-Governance technologies like the Enterprise Application Integration (EAI) is 
capable of integrating different heterogynous technologies from various locally or 
remotely located departments while offering  reliable data transfer, efficient 
information sharing within and between organizations as well as providing security 
over the network (Khoumbati and Themistocleos, 2006). 
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Table 2 3: The requirements of the automated data sharing model. 
Source: Fan and Zhang, 2007.           
2.4.2.5   e-Governance security 
e-Governance provides various means of security measures that can protect 
information that is being shared between two or more users who are geographically 
dispersed in different regions or locations. One of such measures is a tool that can 
control access to such information over the network and limit it only to its intended 
users. The encryption technique that renders the information unreadable and useless 
Implementation 
level name 
Description 
Environmental 
requirements 
Refers to, amongst others, the need for the existence of a key requirement for a 
central coordinating control function or for an officer who has adequate 
authority over the participating departments to guide the sharing process 
according to interoperability regulatory framework that defines amongst 
others, all legal protocols and technical standard which are required to be 
implemented by participating departments.  
Inter-
organizational 
requirements 
Refers to, amongst others, the need for the inter-departmental trust that all 
participating departmental officials will act in the best interest of all 
participators. 
Intra-
organizational 
requirements 
Refers to, amongst others, the need for top organizational support to be in 
place to encourage the process by ensuring that all requirements for effective 
information sharing are in place and that all participating officials have clear 
understanding of the logistic movements and handling of shared information. 
This level also points to a need for effective security measures to protect 
sensitive information like personal information that might be accessed by 
unauthorized individuals to violate privacies or be harmful to the participating 
departments.   
Perceived 
performance 
requirements 
Refers to the perceived benefits and risks as it was found that the perception of 
benefits can encourage participation while that of risk can yield the opposite 
effects 
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to anybody who is not in possession of a decryption key like the Public Key 
Cryptosystem and Agency Identification for instance, can be applied to decode the 
information back to readable format (Sharma and Gopal, 2006 and Headayetullah 
and Pradhan, 2009). 
2.4.3   e-Governance policy  
 e-Governance policy development can be achieved through consultations 
where the process can be done interactively with other government departments or 
stakeholders through websites which, according to Michel (2005) and Paskaleva-
Shapira (2006) can serve as places for discussions and debate enabling propositions 
and initiatives to emerge. Michel further points out that policy can be continually be 
evaluated for instance, by applying key indicators that officials can put in the 
websites.  
It has become important for e-governance policy to include the plans for 
acquisitions and implementations of the new technologies. Singh points out that 
during policy formulating stages for the development of e-governance in India, it 
was found that there were important critical technical issues like how the new 
technologies were going to interact with the existing infrastructure, for instance, 
which were necessary to consider in view of accommodating them in the policy 
requirements. 
2.4.3.1   e-Governance policy requirement for Accessibility 
The policy makers should plan e-governance policy that would take the new 
planned ICT infrastructure and its interoperability with the existing hardware 
platforms and software programs for instance, into consideration to ensure adequate 
access to stakeholders Klischewski (2011). Since Singh (2010) proposes that e-
governance can be developed in four stages, the writer explains that the fourth stage 
is where the systems and operations of various departments are integrated and able to 
share databases. It would be crucial for policy to provide guidance on the type of 
communications of various stakeholders from different departments as well as their 
levels of access to information for instance.  
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It is also at this stage of e-governance development where the G2G 
communications of the departments produce virtual counter services that are enabled 
by the integrated information from various departments (Singh, 2010). Policy should 
also include issues of ownership and quality of the integrated information. The 
quality of information being accessed and shared between various departments for 
instance can be maintained by the utilization of ICT public key infrastructure to 
maintain data integrity using MD5 algorithm (Headayetullah and Pradhan, 2009).  
2.4.3.2   e-Governance policy requirement for Security 
Where two departments are to share sensitive information, the security policy 
calls for information to be transmitted in secure networks where access to 
information has to be restricted through the authenticating applications like the 
requesting of passwords before allowing any access. During the development of 
policy, great care has to be taken not to stifle production due to restrictive policy 
(Joia, 2004).  
e-Governance security policy should consider various security measures that 
can be applied to protect confidentiality of information across the network between 
departments. Headayetullah and Pradhan (2009) suggest that the policy should 
include secure protocol that protects information for confidentiality that could pave 
the way for implementing security ICT applications like the Public Key 
Cryptosystem and Agency Identification using a unique mapping function. 
2.4.3.3   e-Governance policy requirement for Privacy  
The evolution of ICT led to the creation of rules in relation to automation of 
processing of personal data by global institutions like the OECD (1980) and the 
Council of Europe through its Convention for the Protection of Individuals with 
regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data of 1981. Amongst others, some of 
the rules states that personal information must be collected fairly and legally and 
must only be utilized for the specific intention for which it was collected.   
  The security policy developers should take the citizens’ concern over the 
privacies of their lives as well as taking the confidentiality of personal information 
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
42 
 
into account during designs of public web pages (Singh, 2010). Great care has to be 
taken by the policy makers for the purposes of ensuring that security and privacy 
concern are considered for the possible processing of personal data (Klischewski, 
2011). 
An ideal way of addressing privacy and security issues according to Singh is 
also by identifying best practices and reliable ways of usage where security measures 
such as data encryption and Public Key Infrastructure (PK) can be implemented. 
Klischewski (2011) expresses this view and adds that in order to implement a 
successful  e-government interoperability, the architecture that is based on the 
reflection of the specific implementation context should be selected to be acceptable 
by all stakeholders, to standardize all organizational units and be scalable for further 
integrations and upgrades.  Paskaleva-Shapira points to legislative and regulatory 
barriers or inconsistencies in policy as possible obstacles and challenges that may 
inhibit the implementation of e-governance if they are not taken into account. 
2.5   Conceptual framework 
 The components of the conceptual framework (Figure 1) include both 
information and e-governance policies as well as their requirements for accessibility, 
security and privacy. Other components include e-governance and automated access. 
Even though SAPS and DoHA comply with the requirements of information policy, 
which enables access by SAPS, to information held by DoHA, the policy also 
requires access to information to be lawful and in compliance with the security and 
privacy policies.  
The crime reduction operations of SAPS are not effective and efficient as the 
process of the identification of perpetrators by SAPS using the identification 
information held by DoHA is manual and slow. This has resulted in the turn-around 
times that are longer than the detention period limits that are set out in the Criminal 
Procedure act and resulting in the police being unable to identify perpetrators in time 
before the set deadlines. Crime reduction is therefore undermined as the police have 
to release suspects if they fail to identify them by the set deadline.   
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    SAPS and DoHA are utilizing e-governance to automate access to 
information for the identification of perpetrators and citizens respectively. 
 Even though policy enables access, by SAPS to information held by DoHA, 
and that both departments have implemented e-governance to automate access to 
information in their possessions, e-governance is not implemented to automate 
access by SAPS, to information held by DoHA even though this is necessary for the 
identification of perpetrators to enhance crime reduction. This is despite e-
governance complying with policy requirements for accessibility by including 
information integrity MD5 algorithms and for security and privacy by including 
technical secure protocols that uses Public Key Cryptosystem (PKC).   
The conceptual framework for this research study, discussed above, can be 
represented as in Figure 2.1 below. The core of this framework and the elements 
(units of analysis) which are to be studied are: 
(a) Possible policy requirements, where issues of accessibility, privacy and security may 
all be barriers or enablers of e-governance.  
(b) Automated access, by SAPS to information held by DoHA, where protocols for data 
sharing like integrity MD5 algorithms (MD5A) can promote accessibility while 
technical secure protocols for data encryption can promote security and privacy may 
all be barriers or enablers of e-governance. 
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Figure 2 1: Schematic representation of policy impact on crime management 
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Source: Motlhabane, 2010. 
The objective of the study is to examine the relationship between the 
possibilities of automated access to information versus policy requirements in order 
to make recommendations for policy on automated access to enhance crime 
operations.   
2.6    Chapter Summary and Overview of Next Chapter  
According to the review of the literature, access to information policy is used 
to control access to information held by a public institution to ensure that 
information is accessible. This policy also restricts access against un-authorized 
persons for the purposes of protecting the rights of citizens. In order to automate 
access to information, access to information policy has to evolve and link to e-
governance policy in order that they complement each other, not clash and obstruct 
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due process. Where a law enforcement department has achieved the electronic 
integration and automation of access to information with other departments whose 
information enhances the law enforcement’s operations, crime levels are 
significantly dropped in such environments.  
Automation of access by a department to information held by another 
department can therefore be implemented to optimize the performance of both 
departments if the planning, development and implementation of e-governance 
policy and e-governance automation of access are in compliance with development 
requirements such as consultation and taking the institutional context into 
consideration. 
The next chapter will outline the research methodology to be followed. This 
provides information on the research design applicable to answering the research 
questions, how data was obtained and from who, as well as describing the data 
analysis methods. The research limitation and its strategy are also part of the chapter.   
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
 3.1   Introduction    
 Chapter three contains the description of the methodology that was selected 
for this research to investigate the role of information policy on the effectiveness and 
efficiency of crime operations. The investigation was done through a case study of 
the two departments of South African Police Services (SAPS) and the Department of 
Home Affairs (DoHA). The research focused on how information policy impacts on 
the implementation of e-governance since it has a direct influence on the 
development and implementation of e-governance which is needed to enhance crime 
reduction operations.   
 The chapter also goes through various areas which are covered and provides 
the details of the activities that are needed to be carried out from the beginning to the 
end of the research. These are the research methodology and theory of research, 
research design, the case study approach, sampling methodology, research data 
collection instruments, reliability of data for this research, data analysis, significance 
of the research, limitations of the study, assumptions of the research, research 
strategy and the chapter summary. 
3.2   Methodology and theory of research   
This section outlines the methodology and theory of the research for this 
paper. A qualitative research methodology has been selected for this research. 
According to Mack, Woodsong, MacQueen, Guest & Namey (2005) the qualitative 
research methodology is described as a type of scientific research that is consisted of 
a number of characteristics as follows: it takes an investigative approach in soliciting 
an answer to a question,  it follows a systematical predefined set of procedures to 
answer the question: it collects evidence: it produces findings that were not 
determined in advance: it produces findings that are applicable beyond the 
immediate boundaries of the study: it seeks to understand  a given research problem 
or topic based on the local population being involved while it is also effective in 
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obtaining culturally specific information about the values, opinions, behaviors, and 
social contexts of particular populations (Bell, 2005).  
Qualitative research has some strengths which researchers take advantage of 
by utilizing its ability to provide complex textual descriptions of the experiences of 
the participants over phenomena about which data is being collected to provide 
information for instance, about intangible human concepts that may often be in the 
form of contradictory behaviors, beliefs, opinions, emotions, relationships etc 
(Creswell, 2002; Tellis, 1997 and Yin, 2009). These writers are also in agreement 
that qualitative research methodology also offers data analysis methods that enable 
for the investigations and interpretations of large phenomena by breaking it into its 
smaller manageable components that are easier manipulated and understood.  
Qualitative research methodology has the other advantage of offering the 
researchers the flexibility by enabling them to utilize either of the three commonly 
known qualitative research methods which are each particularly suited to a specific 
data collection environment depending on the type of data being collected by the 
researcher. These methods are according to Mack et. al. as follows: Participant 
observation which is appropriate for collecting data on naturally occurring behaviors 
in their usual contexts: In-depth interviews which are optimal for collecting data on 
individuals’ personal histories, perspectives, and experiences, particularly when 
sensitive topics are being explored and: Focus groups which are effective in eliciting 
data on the cultural norms of a group and in generating broad overviews of issues of 
concern to the cultural groups or subgroups represented. 
3.3   Research design  
This researcher has utilized the qualitative research method to explore the 
role played by policy on crime operations by determining the impact of policy on the 
development of e-governance whose successful implementation can contribute 
positively to the operations of crime operations. A qualitative research method is 
selected for this research because of its advantages over other methods. One such 
advantage is that the researcher can select its interview data collection method to 
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gather information that includes abstract concepts that relate to human behavior for 
instance, like emotions, believes, attitudes etc. (Bell, 2005). Interviews were 
structured since, according to Tellis (1997), it is the type where questions are 
detailed and set in advance. In this way, interviewees were made to focus on relevant 
information for accurate answers.  
The structured interviews were conducted with individual employees at 
SAPS, and DoHA where the focus was adopted to ensure that not only typical 
personal experiences were gathered, but to also ensure that their perceptions and 
believes for instance, were gathered. These attitudes, which were in regards to both 
manual and automated access by SAPS to information held by DoHA, has become 
necessary to enhance crime operations. As people remember and relate their personal 
experiences, they told their stories based on these critical incidents that took places 
during their interactions. Barth (2011) refers to this type of information gathering as 
the Critical Incident Technique.   
 Accordingly Barth says that the Critical Incident Technique has been used in 
quality and management literature where critical incidents are described as incidents. 
The interactions were, in this research the incidents during the interactions between 
the employees of the two departments for instance, where members of the querying 
department will remember a specific query incident as something strongly positive or 
negative. (Edvardsson and Roos, cited in Barth, 2011) explain that the critical 
incident invokes memories of an individual who will report it as a story.  
The interview structure was set to follow the descriptive research procedure 
in order to capture the story of both departments’ employee preferences regarding 
access, by SAPS to information held by DoHA. It was a semi structured interview 
conducted by the researcher based on four main questions. The responses were 
written down just under their specific questions in the interview documents. The 
questions were somehow of repetitive nature to ensure consistency in the responses 
of the interviewees.  
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The script was such that these questions were divided into three and are based 
on the requirements of the access to information policy and their implications on 
crime operations. This was intended to unlock the memory and obtain attention of 
the interviewees. The four categories are as follows: (a) questions regarding policy 
requirements for accessibility of personal information: (b) questions regarding 
security of personal information: (c) questions regarding the privacy concerns and 
(d) questions regarding how the requirements relate to e-governance for crime 
reduction.  
 The examples of these questions in section 3.4 are:  Accessibility, “how does 
policy on access to information inhibit or enhance crime reduction operations?  “To 
what extent is accessibility to information (manual access versus automated access) 
held in DoHA a barrier to or an enabler to effective crime operations?”: Security and 
privacy,  “In which ways is the requirement for security and privacy (manual access 
versus automated access), similarly a barrier or an enabler?” e-Governance, “How do 
the access to information policy and the e-governance policy address the issues of 
accessibility, security and privacy of information?” Crime reduction, “What is the 
relevance of these policy issues to crime operations?” and general, “How can policy 
be improved for automated access to information for more effective crime 
reduction?”. 
3.4   Case study approach 
Largely a qualitative data collection and data analysis methodology was 
selected for an in-depth qualitative analysis through describing, understanding and 
explaining what people tell the researcher, their views and interpretations of 
particular situations (Tellis, 1997 and Yin, 2009). The qualitative data analysis was 
supported by some quantitative statistical data on the frequencies of requests of 
access to personal information between the departments or on their failure or success 
rates as well as on their turn around times. Even though a case study methodology 
has been frequently criticized for its lack of generalization which is due to its single 
case limitations (Tellis, 1997 and Xiao and Smith, 2006) or its usage being 
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associated with the data collection method where study participants’ behavior are 
observed (Yin, 1994), Tellis argues that it offers holistic picture of experience.  
This view is also supported by Babbie (2004) who asserts that the in-depth 
investigations capabilities of this methodology produces the explanatory insights of 
the case under study while providing the results that closely represent the 
environment being studied (Yin, 2009). Babbie further asserts that a case study can 
however be able to limit the researchers’ attention to the essential characteristics and 
the specifics of the phenomenon for which data is collected.  
The researcher has therefore used the case study method because it reviews 
practices and approaches with respect to the relevant institutions and the conduct of 
their officials, namely the Department of Home Affairs (DoHA) and the South 
African Police Services (SAPS). In this case, the application of a case study 
methodology produced results for the two departments that offered a holistic picture 
of experience as lessons were representative of the experience of other parts of 
government.  
The case study methodology was also appropriate for this study because it 
helped to produce the results that enabled the researcher to perform in-depth 
investigations on the two departments and obtained explanatory insight behind the 
reasons for certain approaches and procedures, as well as for the officials’ behaviors, 
perceptions, attitude towards technical accessibility automated protocols and security 
applications as opposed to manual processes of accessibility and security protocols 
of access to information in their departments. The researcher has also utilized the 
case study’s capability that enabled the researcher to only focus on the essential 
characteristics of the phenomenon by limiting the researcher’s attention on only the 
two departments being selected for study. The two departments that are selected will 
serve as the essential characteristics of the entire government while enabling the 
researcher ease of use.   
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3.5   Sampling methodology 
Two selection techniques for the sampling methodology of this qualitative 
research were selected and were both applied to identify the sampling group for this 
research. The purposive sampling technique and the random sampling technique 
were combined to identify the interviewees from both departments. Four participants 
from the Department of Home Affairs (DoHA) were selected from the BVR site in 
Pretoria while two were selected from Head Office in Waltloo. The last two 
employees selected where senior ex-employees from Head Office. Their selection 
was informed by the fact that the fingerprint identification process for the police is 
centralized at one area at DoHA at the BVR building. This has also limited the 
number of interviewees to only four from the BVR building and only two from 
National Office since they provided adequate information.  
The eleven police officers that were selected for the study are stationed at six 
different police stations, a Local criminal record center (LCRC) and a Central 
criminal record center (CCRC). The eleven officers were deemed enough to provide 
adequate information since they come from various levels and different police 
stations from different environments. The six police stations are each located as 
follows: Garankuwa, Soshanguve, Silverton, Centurion while two are in Mabopane. 
The CCRC and the LCRC are located in Pretoria and Garankuwa respectively.  
All participating police officials and the DoHA employees are provided with 
pseudo names that were used for the purposes of protecting their identities and 
upholding the confidentiality agreement which they have entered into with the 
researcher for the purposes of this research.  
The researcher did not follow any standard or procedure when creating the 
nicknames except to create them in a way that made it easy for the researcher to 
identify and link them with the right participant. The police officers were selected 
from different police stations because the finger print process takes place at all police 
stations. These names and those of the police stations and DoHA office are tabulated 
in table 3.1 above.   
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3.5.1   The SAPS employees sample  
The purposive selection technique was used to identify the members of the 
police that could be knowledgeable and familiar with the fingerprint processing. The 
police officials were selected from the local criminal record center which is located 
in the Garankuwa police station, CCRC and from the various police stations that 
were randomly selected through a random selection technique since the police 
officers from different police stations do perform same services. Where a group of 
officials qualified to be selected, they were randomly selected.  Other police officials 
were also selected based on the purposive selection technique method from the 
central criminal record center which is the only gateway of fingerprints that are sent 
to DoHA for identification purposes. 
Table 3.1 : The names and numbers of participants per departments   
Source: Motlhabane, 2011.  
Area  Dept. Section Unit Participants Name of participant 
Mabopane   SAPS   
  
Terminus Crime prevention 1 MabCP01 
Loate 1 GarCP02 
Garankuwa SAPS Zone 5   Crime prevention 1 GarCP01 
1 LCRCT01 
LCRC 1 LCRCWO01  
1 LCRCWO02 
Soshanguve SAPS Section H Crime prevention 1 LCRCT02 
Pretoria 
  
SAPS Silverton Crime prevention 1 SilvCP01 
 Hatfield CCRC 1 CCRC01 
1 CCRC02 
Centurion   Intelligence  1 Intell01  
DoHA  Executive  
  
Management  2 
  
DHAEX01 
DHAEX02 
 Operations  Fingerprints 3 DHADR01 
 DHADR02 
DHAfin01 
 Supplier  Consultant  1 DHACO01 
TOTAL    17  
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3.5.2   The DoHA employee sample 
 A purposive selection technique method has been used to identify employees 
from DoHA who could help to shed light on the processing of fingerprints. These are 
employees at various levels of the department such as executive and senior 
management, director(s), assistant directors and employees that are directly involved 
in the processing of the fingerprints. The senior or executive management that was 
interviewed comprised only of ex-employees that could be found to be interviewed.    
3.6   Research data collection Instruments   
Even though the qualitative researchers may use various approaches of data 
collection method for a specific study (Mills, 2003), this researcher has selected the 
in-depth interviews as the main source of data that was collected and was only 
supplemented by other sources such as websites of both departments as this helped to 
increase the reliability of the research results (Yin, 2003). The interview approach 
was chosen because interviews provide information that is reliable as it is obtained 
from individuals with personal experience.  
The interview data collection method was also found to be the most suitable 
for this paper since according to Yin it is an important source of data required for a 
case study approach. The interview approach was also selected to shed light on the 
in-depth insights of the departments through the respondents’ who understand and 
will describe and explain the incidents of their personal experiences (Tellis, 1997) 
which provided the researcher with their views and interpretations of particular 
situations.   
A semi-structured interview schedule was developed for the interviews and 
conducted with the relevant employees of DoHA and SAPS. This enabled for the 
gathering of information with regards to their attitudes and perceptions on policy 
requirements being accessibility, security and privacy of information. Interviews 
were also selected for this research because of the various other advantages that they 
present to the qualitative researcher which include but are not limited to enabling the 
researcher to adapt the interview questions interactively as more light is shed and 
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insight gained to follow up on new phenomena that the researcher was not aware of 
prior to setting original questions (Bell, 2005).  
This advantage has enabled the researcher to adapt the questionnaires 
ongoing when the initial ones referred too much to policy which some of the 
respondents seemed not comfortable about. The adapted questionnaires, which 
mainly refer to procedures and actions, were more easily understood and responded 
to by the participants. The researcher could easily link their actions and practices 
back to each policy requirement. For instance, where the participant explains how 
safely they file information, this is interpreted as being in compliance with the 
security requirement of policy without involving the participant with the policy 
jargon.   
 3.7   The reliability of data for this research 
In order to ensure that the findings of this research were reliable and valid, 
the researcher has selected an interview approach where interviewees were carefully 
selected through the purposive selection technique to ensure that the findings were 
reliable which Silverman (2004) says that it is one of the main conditions for the 
acceptability of the research findings. The researcher also took other conditions such 
as the consistency of the findings as raised by Neuman (2003) amongst others, into 
consideration.  
The reliability of the findings in this case is upheld if the measuring 
technique or instrument is used to perform measurements of allowable variables 
while all other factors are kept constant can produce the same results when 
performed more than once (Bush 2007). To ensure this, the interview sample group 
was comprised of respondents who had the same characteristics in terms of personal 
work experiences within each department and were asked same questions to which 
they provided same responses.    
 The responses were consistent even when same questions were asked 
differently. The technique enabled the researcher to improve the accuracy of the 
findings as the informants demonstrated consistency through the repetitive questions 
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and provided more clarity which helped to minimize potential mistakes or errors as 
well as addressing individual conflicts. In this way, the findings could be regarded as 
true reflections of the respondents’ experiences and views which in turn are taken to 
be reflective of the departments which were being investigated. The researcher has 
therefore demonstrated that the results were valid (Bush 2007) and credible enough 
to ensure that the research can be relied on (McMillan and Schumacher, 2006).    
Great care was taken to allay suspicions as the research targeted two very 
sensitive departments whose employees have been sworn to secrecy because of the 
nature of the business they are conducting. The researcher was in possession of the 
appointment letter that was used for the introduction at the management level of each 
department upon entry. Appointments were only made through each departmental 
communications’ channels from higher authorities. The appointment letter was in the 
letterheads of the university and had the researcher’s identification details, study area 
and the purpose of the research. The letter also contained the confidentiality clauses 
which guaranteed the potential interviewees that their names would not be revealed 
in the research report. 
Even though the questions were in English, efforts were made to explain any 
uncertainty that emerged and the researcher was quick to accept it if the interviewee 
did not know the answer. The appointments were made with the interviewees in such 
a way that the interviewees chose their suitable dates, times and places. To enhance 
ease of communications and foster better relations with the interviewees which 
according to McMillan et. al. is a necessary requirement for conducting a successful 
interview, some of the interviewees who engaged in lengthy and irrelevant answers 
that took long times were not interrupted but were eventually brought in line. 
3.8   Data Analysis   
A qualitative research data analysis method was selected for this research to 
identify common themes out of the volumes of data which was divided into 
categories of these themes without altering or distorting the description of the entire 
process of access or automated access, by a department to information held by 
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another department which is needed to optimize crime operations. This is because a 
qualitative data analysis offers a researcher the advantage of investigating and 
interpreting a large phenomenon through the study of its smaller components 
(Creswell, 2002; Tellis, 1997 and Yin, 2009).  
The smaller components of this research are based on the research questions 
where the responses of different participants to similar questions were grouped 
together as categories of themes that were analyzed separately. Since in this way 
qualitative data analysis enables the qualitative researchers to describe, understand 
and explain the response of the participants, (Creswell, 2002; Tellis, 1997 and Yin, 
2009) the process provided the researcher with an in-depth explanation of whether 
the information policy plays a role in possible access, by SAPS to information held 
by DoHA. These explanations are necessary since the automation of access to 
information between the two departments can possibly determine the effectiveness 
and efficiencies of crime operations.  
In order to understand the current communication status between the two 
departments, the researcher divided the role of policy on the implementation of e-
governance into smaller components which are the policy requirements for 
accessibility, security and privacy. Each requirement was further divided into various 
groups of common themes. As mentioned earlier, these themes are based on 
responses to same question by different participants. The study therefore analyzed 
the possible indirect role of policy on crime operations through the analysis of the 
impact of policy on e-governance since as mentioned earlier, the latter has a direct 
impact on crime operations through automation of access by a department, to 
information held by another departments.        
 The in-depth qualitative data analysis of the impact of the policy requirements 
on e-governance’s automated access, by a department to information held by another 
department was therefore able to provide insights into the current state of affairs that 
relate to automated access, by SAPS to information held by DoHA. The findings 
have located the research data within the conceptual framework of a public 
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administration where the performance of the administration of SAPS’ can be 
effective to provide better services to the community.        
The framework was also used to help separate and maintain the identities of 
the key concepts within policy and e-governance’s possibility of automating access, 
by SAPS to information held by DoHA. The requirements of policy, which formed 
the key concepts or the units of analysis in the framework, are accessibility, security, 
privacy and include all other relevant policy issues that emerged.  The findings from 
both SAPS and DoHA are accordingly categorized into themes based on these units. 
 3.9   Significance of the Study  
The study has contributed towards optimizing the crime operations system to 
enable SAPS to be effective and efficient in their operations. This is to be achieved 
by recommendations towards formulation or amendment of policy for e-governance 
to create, if accepted, an enabling environment that can enhance the implementation 
of e-governance to automate access, by SAPS to personal information held by DoHA 
to enhance crime operations needed for optimized SAPS’ services. 
Since the findings are possibly reflective of the communication between all 
departments of government, the lessons learnt should provide solution for the entire 
government to improve the public administration. This study therefore also aimed to 
contribute to the entire government or public operations and administration to be 
effective to provide efficient public services to the community.     
3.10   Limitations of the Study 
The accuracy of the findings of the research is limited to the information 
provided by the interviewees and this could be based on their perceptions and 
attitude towards their departments. This may however not be reflective of their 
current situations since the researcher has no guarantee that the interviewees where 
completely providing true reflections of the departments and their interactions. The 
interviewees did not know all the answers per questionnaire documents which caused 
most documents to contain responds of more than one participant. 
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3.11   Assumptions of the research   
The study is performed under the assumption that vetted and security cleared 
police officers will not engage in fraudulent and corrupt activities like intentionally 
breaching the security laws and leak sensitive or personal information to 
unauthorized individuals or criminals. It is also further assumed that these officials 
will always tell the truth during interviews.     
3.12   Research strategy 
The research was commenced at the beginning of November 2010 after the 
approval of the proposal report in October 2010. The development of the interview 
instrument and creation of the list of the interviewees took place in December and 
January 2011. The first three chapters of the report were written in February to April 
2011. Data collection was done during May to July 2011. Chapter four and five were 
completed in December 2011. The entire report was completed in March 2012 and 
submitted for marking. The corrections were completed and the final report 
submitted at the end of September 2012.   
3.13   Chapter summary and overview of the next chapter  
This chapter contains the details and descriptions of the methodology that 
includes a case study which was used for a qualitative data collection that was 
selected for this research as well as the reasons for its selection. The steps that were 
taken to complete this research are also detailed in this chapter and include but not 
limited to, research design, sampling group, data collection and analysis methods as 
well as the research limitations and strategy.  
This has shed light on how data, which will be gathered and documented in 
the following chapter four, will be gathered, reported and analyzed.  Chapter four 
therefore will provide the findings which will be analyzed in subsequent chapters. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CASE STUDY OF SAPS AND DoHA  
4.1   Background to SAPS Environment 
The findings presented in this chapter were collected from the organizational 
case study of the South African Police Services (SAPS) in connection with the role 
of policy in the police’ crime reduction operations. Policy comes into play when the 
situation arises where it becomes necessary for the police to access information held 
by the Department of Home Affairs (DoHA). The police require this process to 
prevent and combat crime by using the personal identification information from 
DoHA to identify all perpetrators of crimes or suspects. The developments in ICT 
also offer alternative and better ways of improving ways of access to information 
through automation. 
4.2   SAPS’ key policy objectives    
The police’ performance of crime reduction operations includes the need to 
identify all perpetrators of crime to take appropriate action of either arresting or 
releasing them. The identification of all perpetrators can only be achieved if access 
by SAPS, to information held by DoHA can be enabled. While there is a specific 
police strategy and policy that guide the operations of the police and describing their 
mandate, the process raises broader policy concerns that must be taken into account.   
4.2.1   Crime reduction objectives and policies  
In terms of the Constitution, the objectives and policies of SAPS are to 
prevent, combat and investigate crime: to maintain public order: to protect and 
provide the security of the inhabitants of the Republic and their properties: to uphold 
and enforce the law: to create a safe and secure environment for all people in South 
Africa: to prevent anything that may threaten the safety or security of any 
community: to investigate any crimes that threaten the safety or security of any 
community: to ensure that criminals are brought to justice and: to participate in 
efforts to address the causes of crime. 
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 In order to achieve these mandates, the police have, amongst other, also 
implemented an Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) that has 
enabled them to automate the identification process of perpetrators of crime.    
Various policies, some of which have been enacted into law, are used to 
guide the police operations. Some of the legislation like South African police service 
amendment act No. 57 of 2008 provides guidelines for enhancing the capacity of the 
South African Police Service to prevent, combat and investigate all types of crimes 
including national priority crimes. This legislation also enables the facilitation, 
reviewing, monitoring and improving the inter-departmental co-operation.  Other 
legislations like the criminal procedure amendment act, No. 42 of 2003 and its other 
related amendments amongst others, guides the police with the detention periods of 
suspects without charging them.  
4.2.2   Identification of perpetrators 
SAPS, as opposed to DoHA storing all citizens’ personal identification 
information, only store and process personal identification information of convicted 
criminals. The information is stored in a Criminal record database which enables 
them to track all criminal records of previously and currently convicted criminals. 
The police utilize AFIS as the system that runs the criminal record database to attain 
objectives of identifying all perpetrators of crime through their fingerprints that are 
stored as retrieval keys of the criminal record database stored at the Central Criminal 
Record Center (CCRC) in Pretoria. While the identification of perpetrators can be 
done remotely from the police stations through an identity number, all fingerprints 
identification take place at the CCRC to which the prints are physically transported 
for verification and authentication to identify the suspects positively.   
The identification process at SAPS through access to information in their 
possession works very well in enhancing their crime reduction operations as long as 
the perpetrator whose information is being queried has been convicted and therefore 
has a criminal record. In this case SAPS has no difficulty in a rapid identification 
through an identity number or fingerprints. Where the suspect or a perpetrator of 
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
61 
 
crime has never been convicted before, SAPS has no record of such an individual 
and can therefore not positively identify, verify or authenticate their true identity 
through the normal operations of access to personal identification information in the 
AFIS database. 
Where the matching details are retrieved, the police are able to act swiftly in 
their crime reduction operations. This is in contrast with the situation where the 
matching prints are not available in the criminal record database. If it is important for 
crime operations for the suspect to be rapidly and positively identified, then the 
police have to resort to DoHA for the identification of the suspects.  
4.3   Findings of accessibility policy at SAPS  
The accessibility requirement of policy in this study is about how access by 
SAPS, to information held by DoHA should be maximized to optimize the 
operations of crime reduction. This means that SAPS should adhere to certain 
procedures to comply with the accessibility requirement of policy. This may, for 
instance be to provide DoHA with justifiable reasons for requests for access to 
information. SAPS should create information management procedures that instill 
confidence at DoHA that information obtained in this manner will be used in 
accordance with procedures that will be in compliance with policy for crime 
reduction, including rapid detection and prosecution of criminals.  
While the current manual access by SAPS to information held by DoHA has 
become insufficient for the effective operations of the crime operations at SAPS, the 
developments in ICT seem to be offering better, faster and accurate alternatives. 
These innovative alternatives may bring improvement in operations, but are 
accompanied by challenges that need to be evaluated against the benefits. The police 
are putting procedures in place to ensure that they maximize the benefits that are 
offered by ICT while minimizing the possible threats or risks associated with its 
implementation.   
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4.3.1   Manual access to information 
The participants emphasize their commitment to follow procedures and 
explain various methods followed when taking fingerprints from individuals and 
suspects. GarCP01explains that, “when we take the fingerprints of an individual who 
is making an application for a firearm or for a public driving permit for instance,  the 
prints are only taken for one specific application and we only use them for that 
purpose”. He goes on to say that each application is accompanied by its own set of 
prints which are never used for any other purpose except to check if the person is 
qualified for the applications which they are applying for.  
Another fingerprint processing example came from LCRCWO02 who is in 
the Local Criminal Record Center (LCRC) which is located at the Garankuwa police 
station:   
Where we obtained the prints from crime scenes, we try to process them here locally 
and manually in the dark rooms but we also send copies to the Central Criminal 
Record Center (CCRC) in Pretoria. We investigate if the owner or the suspect has a 
criminal record or any outstanding summons. If he or she has any criminal record, 
we will immediately retrieve their identification details otherwise if our systems do 
not have the matching prints, then we cannot identify the individual. This is when our 
branch in Pretoria takes the case up with the Department of Home Affairs (DoHA). 
Our colleagues at CCRC send the copies of the prints to DoHA to retrieve the 
personal identification details of the owner. 
The SAPS feel that they are justified in seeking access to personal 
information held by DoHA as this is in line with the policy requirement of right of 
access to personal information of third parties to protect the right to safety of 
citizens. In requesting access to personal information from DoHA, which is a public 
institution, GarCP02 had this to say:   
We state clearly in the application forms which we are required to complete for each 
request, the purpose for which information is needed, our identification details, rank, 
our stations details and commanding officers, who must also attach their signatures 
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before the applications are considered. After usage of such information, this must 
not be stored for other eventualities but the information is destroyed if we have no 
further use of it. For instance, where fingerprints are successfully used to retrieve 
personal identification details of suspects at DoHA by the police and the suspects are 
linked with their fingerprints and become incriminated where after they are charged, 
the personal details are destroyed if the suspects are acquitted.      
Since only authorized and expert officials are allowed to lift fingerprints 
where their expertise enables them to provide evidence which the courts can find 
admissible, it is accepted that such officials will respect the law and provide reliable 
and accurate information. The privacy of citizens is deemed as being protected as 
such selected officials are expected to comply with the policy requirements of 
handling the information competently or deleting it if the suspects are cleared by the 
courts.  
4.3.2   Automated access to information     
The police believe that compliance to policy cannot be compromised by ICT 
since they believe that the same compliance as in manual processing is maintained 
except that the technology will provide faster access. As with manual access, they 
say that information stored electronically is only about the suspects or individuals 
being queried and it is used for the stated purposes while it is destroyed if the cases 
against the suspects are dropped. Scanned fingerprints that the police submit for 
fingerprints’ owners’ details at DoHA will only be processed if the SAPS application 
documents contains all the authentication details mentioned earlier under manual 
requests.    
4.3.3   Manual accessibility policy procedure 
  Manual fingerprint processes include completion of various documents at 
local police stations depending on the situation at hand. When an individual 
approaches the police and requests services like a driver’s public service permit, they 
take fingerprints onto the enquiry SAPS 91 document and fax to the CCRC in 
Pretoria while the original documents are sent to the LCRC. The SAPS 91 document 
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is used by the police to enquire from CCRC in Pretoria whether an individual is a 
criminal or has outstanding summonses.  
The police use the SAPS 76 document for the same process if the individual 
has committed a crime while LCRC also uses it to obtain fingerprints from crime 
scenes. To distinguish fingerprints of non-suspects from potential suspects’ found at 
the crime scene, like household members, SAPS 192 documents which takes 
portions of hands and fingerprints, are used and follow the same process as that 
followed when using the SAPS 91. 
The CCRC minimizes chances of querying fingerprints of wrong or innocent 
individuals who are not supposed to be investigated and whose privacy could be 
jeopardized by authenticating the requests for fingerprint processing from various 
police stations and LCRC’S.  
According to SilvCP01 who occasionally requests personal identification 
details of the suspects whose fingerprints are lifted from crime scenes:  
The central criminal record center at Pretoria will refuse to accept the prints 
application forms if they do not contain the mandatory requirements details like the 
requesting police station, the case number, the investigating officer, the 
identification and contact details of the commander in charge at the police station 
and his or her approval signature.  
He goes on to say that failure to comply results in, “our investigations taking 
too long as you are sent back and forth due to the court dates of suspects being 
postponed while waiting for their personal information details”.  
4.3.4   Automated accessibility policy procedures   
Just as in manual requirements, the police must complete the application 
forms to be accepted by the officers at the CCRC where after authorized police 
officers are allowed access to the civil person’s database at DoHA where they can try 
to retrieve the personal identification information if they have identity numbers of 
suspects. Where the fingerprints were taken in full for both hands’ all ten fingers, the 
online verification system, the Home Affairs National Identification System 
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(HANIS), the personal identification database which stores fingerprint identification, 
retrieves the fingerprint owners’ details almost instantly and these are given to the 
authorized police officers from the CCRC.  
In cases where the latent fingerprints were randomly taken and the owners’ 
details are being requested by the police from DoHA, the latter provides a duplicate 
civil database and allows the authorized police officers to have direct access to 
retrieve identification details. According to the police, this process takes too long 
since the records in the DoHA have been stored by sets of hands plus all ten fingers. 
CCRC01 says that: 
DoHA officials have told our members that HANIS has stored the fingerprints as 
pairs of both human hands and their ten fingers to be read simultaneously as one key 
that identifies an individual. If an attempt is made to read just one finger, then the 
system returns a blank or in most cases it retrieves details of a wrong individual. 
This also takes long because the system has to read each ten fingerprints of millions 
of South Africans to compare and find a matching print. Because of this, DoHA has 
told us that they do not have enough manpower to sit around during office hours and 
query the database which also consumes a lot of the system’s memory and disk space 
resources. This results in slow delivery performance of the system and frustrates 
other daily operations like identity and passports processing.   
Since a lot of the computer capacity resources are consumed in this way, 
LCRC01 says that this has prompted DoHA to create a duplicate civil database 
which the police can query daily without disturbing DoHA’s normal daily 
operations. This database is in the premises of DoHA. According to the police, only 
the authorized police personnel have been granted permission to gain entry into 
DoHA offices to access the system.  
This has enabled the police to do a search type one to many, which is a 
process of scanning one fingerprint against all ten fingerprints of an individual’s two 
hands for all South Africans, as they scan one finger’s prints and scan through about 
40 million times. This can take up to three days at times to find a match if any. The 
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police say that the success rate for this process is very low. This is in contrast with a 
process where the ten fingerprints of an individual are scanned into the live Home 
Affairs National Identification System (HANIS) database where an instant match 
retrieves the personal identification details of the fingerprints owner almost 
immediately. 
 One police officer says the police could previously key in the ID of an 
individual into the National Population Registration (NPR) and identify them from 
the database which contains the individual’s name, address, age, date of birth etc. 
which was stopped and privacy reasons cited as being the cause.    
4.3.5   Concerns regarding manual access 
Manual fingerprint processing is difficult and in many cases not successful as 
some fingerprints need to be taken onto paper several times before being readable. 
Long periods up to several weeks elapse before details are provided by DoHA. In 
terms of the LCRC, where an expert has to physically go through many fingerprints 
and do a manual comparison, most of the prints are not easily readable due to lack of 
visible characteristics which results in the process becoming cumbersome and time 
consuming.   
Where the CCRC, which is the only national SAPS’ gate way to DoHA, 
sends fingerprints to DoHA, many of them on many occasions come back 
unprocessed due to being of poor quality and unreadable. This causes delays in the 
SAPS crime operations. “The process of automating access to information held by 
DoHA can never be achieved because where the personal identification details are 
requested by the courts, then the courts require the documents to be signed by a 
DoHA Director General”, according to SilvCP01.   
There are various other challenges with regards to prints submitted to DoHA. 
These may be complicated by tampering of scenes of crime or unrelated prints lifted 
from scenes of crime for instance those of relatives or family members’. While 
manual feedback from DoHA takes time, it sometimes returns unexpected results for 
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instance where a woman’s details are provided while the police are convinced that 
they have submitted a man’s fingerprints. 
4.3.6   Concerns regarding automated access  
Intell01 describes the costs of ICT as being inhibitive to the implementation 
of automation of access by SAPS to information at DoHA.  In his words, 
“technology is expensive and cannot at this stage be deployed at all police stations or 
at intelligence driven cordon and search operations”. He further points to lack of 
skills amongst the officers which can also be a stumbling block.    
According to police inspector CCRC01, the police at CCRC used to have 
automated access to the DoHA system for instant identification of suspects or 
individuals by typing their identification numbers into the system. The process 
would retrieve the suspects’ names, gender, addresses, but this access has been taken 
away due to DoHA claims of irregularity of use by the police. Now the same process 
that used to be done instantly takes up to six weeks or more. Other challenges are 
that the SAPS officials will not be able to utilize DoHA systems due to lack of 
training on operating the system. 
4.3.7   Relevance of access to identification of criminals 
By being able to access the DoHA database the police are able to rapidly 
identify all or most criminals who are not in their AFIS database and this contributes 
directly to the performance of crime reduction like the cordon and search operations. 
The operations would be effective if information at DoHA could be accessed to help 
identify suspects or owners of fingerprints obtained from crime scenes to reduce the 
backlog of unresolved cases or to quickly charge arrested individuals to shorten the 
queues at the courts. Intell01 confirms this need for access by SAPS to information 
at DoHA as follows: 
If the personal fingerprint identification details at DoHA database can be retrieved 
via the MorphoTouch then our criminal intelligence system can be very responsive at 
all times. If this can be achieved anytime as when we are in operations and 
identifying anyone, then we can utilize the system to stop many criminals. This can 
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prevent many more occasions of crime being committed. The system can enable us to 
nail the suspects who have not only stolen or robbed their victims’ cars, but who 
have also stolen their identity documents to fake their own identities and 
impersonate their victims. They drive the victims’ cars past intelligence’s cordon and 
search operations as they replace their victims’ pictures with theirs in the fake 
identification documents. Impersonation is one of South Africa’s main concerns at 
the moment due to the high numbers of illegal foreigners who are desperate to stay 
in this country and the corrupt DoHA officials who try to cash in by selling the fake 
identity documents to these foreigners as you might have seen even on media reports 
recently. Randomly retrieved information at DoHA can be integrated with the 
intelligence for instant answers to the police crime operations strategies and 
operations. Suspects can be arrested with immediate effect and charged within the 
48 hours limit which the cops are required to detain before charging. This can also 
discourage criminals from impounding cars and driving around while the illegal 
foreigners will refrain from stealing and faking identification details, moving around 
or driving around. The police’s success with the current convicted criminals’ record 
retrieval through the MorphoTouch can be expanded by DoHA information to help 
them to bring the national crime under control. 
DoHA is the only institution that can provide national personal identification 
information which can contribute to the productivity of the crime operations 
programs where local and remote identification of suspects with fake identity 
documents can be rapidly and accurately identified through fingerprinting in most 
cases.   
A SAPS’ officer at Garankuwa LCRC says that court turn around times can 
be improved due to a faster rate of charging suspects where if they are successfully 
convicted, they could be removed from society for the safety of all. This, according 
to the officer, could resolve most of the cases for instance, where criminals steal 
other individuals’ identity documents and for instance, when suspects are arrested 
even if it is for other crimes. Suspects who do not possess identification documents 
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
69 
 
can be instantly and accurately identified while other police officials who are 
processing the applications for fire arms and public driving permits can expedite 
their daily operations.  
4.3.8   Access as inhibiting the identification of criminals 
“While we require to access information at DoHA for purposes of combating 
and prevention of crime, like a gun, if sensitive personal information is made 
available to some of our members who are corrupt, it can be dangerous as they can 
pass it to criminals for money”, this is the view of Intell01 who also says that the 
presence of illegal foreigners creates the situation where some of them buy 
identification documents from corrupt SAPS officials or even from DoHA 
employees as seen on the media. Intell01 also warns against access to information 
where there are no control measures because this can:  
…cause problems at possible three levels at which access to information procedures 
must be followed to ensure that information is transferred according to protocols 
and make sure that it becomes helpful to us. The first step is about how we obtain 
information during normal operations. This should be lawful otherwise it will not 
help our cause as evidence in court. Secondly at CCRC where the credibility may be 
jeopardized through contamination as you might have heard in some cases where 
sensitive evidence documents can go missing or fingerprints documents becoming 
damaged where the prints become unreadable and not being able to be processed to 
identify the owners. At the third level this can be at DoHA self where the same 
challenges may occur. Accessibility therefore may work against crime operations if 
it is carelessly enabled without proper controls to ensure validity of results to 
prosecute the criminals without doubts. Otherwise real criminals may be set free 
through carelessness and technicalities. 
  If access is not properly controlled, information about the police planned 
cordon and search operations for instance can be leaked and be made accessible to 
the criminals who will adapt and modify their operations to be smatter than the 
police. This, according to the police could undermine the law enforcement initiatives 
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as criminals gain access to crime operations and increase crime due to these 
criminals always knowing in advance what the police are planning for them. In all 
these instances of access to information, attempts must be made to avoid any 
unauthorized access which in such cases would work against crime operations.  
 SilvCP01 explains that:   
Access to information can be dangerous and easily inhibit crime operations if the 
sensitive personal information like the names and addresses of the honest and hard 
working police officials who are on the tracks of dangerous criminals as well as 
their plans of operations may be leaked to these dangerous criminals who may be 
assisted by corrupt police officials who act as their contacts from within. This will 
not only undermine the crime prevention strategies, but also put the lives of these 
officers and their families in serious danger. 
DHAEX01 is also in full support for access, by SAPS to information held by 
DoHA and provides and example of disadvantages that may occur if access to 
information requirement is not complied with when he says that,    
Non accessibility means that the only department that can provide personal 
identification information that is so vital to crime operations is denying access with 
the results that criminals with multiples fake identification documents can elude the 
police and compromise crime operations. The insurgence of undocumented 
immigrants presents the country with the biggest headache currently which creates a 
platform for various crimes committed by criminals who cannot be traced or 
identified since crime reports would not be able to help due to the lack of access to 
DoHA which is capturing the details of legal and most of the illegal immigrants.  
If an individual’s fingerprints are scanned in the SAPS database and draws a 
blank, then the police would assume that such an individual has never be convicted 
or has no outstanding summonses.  But if the same action performed on DoHA 
yields the same results, then the police have to detain such and individual as a 
possible suspect. Where such individuals are found to be foreign criminals, then 
some crime may have been prevented by apprehending the suspect where more 
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crime could be exposed due to the police action. In this case, access to information 
inhibits crime operations if it is denied. The other reason of possible denial of access, 
by SAPS to information at DoHA may be as presented by CCRC01:  
If the DoHA is not assured that we and other police members from the stations may 
fail to protect the personal details obtained from DoHA and we further fail to 
convince them that only authorized access will take place to use the personal 
information solely for the specific purpose of identification, again, DoHA may deny 
access by SAPS to personal information in its possession. 
If there are no proper control and procedures in place, information may be 
easily and randomly be accessible even by wrong individuals who might jeopardize 
police operations by knowing, for instance, personal details of all key stakeholders or 
potential witnesses in crime operations and court hearings. This might threaten the 
safety of such stakeholders who might stop, out of fear for their life to cooperate 
with the police.  
4.3.9   Manual access as a barrier to crime reduction  
SilvCP01 says that, “Manual access by the police to personal information 
held by DoHA may act as a barrier because it does not always yield accurate results 
or the turn around times are too long for effective crime operations which amongst 
others, require processing of information to provide the verification details fast and 
within detention deadlines”. He also goes on to say that the police have only 48 
working court hour’s limit to detain suspects before charging or releasing them. 
Manual access to information from DoHA does not help the police to clear or charge 
a suspect within this limit which has come to undermine crime combating at times.  
The police are in most cases frustrated when the fingerprints are returned 
unprocessed by DoHA which says that the prints are not clear and readable. If the 
suspect is on bail, they have to wait for the court date to retake the prints which 
further takes months before feedback. This effectively becomes a barrier to effective 
crime operations by amongst others, congesting the courts and slowing the criminal 
investigation process.   
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4.3.10   Manual access as an enabler to crime reduction 
Where manual access by SAPS to personal information held by DoHA is 
successfully achieved, this ensures accurate identification of suspects or individuals 
whose fingerprints are not captured by, or do not exist in the SAPS’ AFIS database 
and therefore enables crime operations to process correct and accurate information 
for effective crime operations. In this case, criminals are linked with their 
fingerprints which might have been collected at crime scenes to enable the police to 
arrest, charge and have suspects prosecuted.   
Any piece of information that leads to productive successful action is important 
regardless of how it is accessed. Personal identification details retrieved manually 
from DoHA enhances the crime operations by positively identifying suspects and 
criminals and linking them with their fingerprints and crimes where applicable.  
4.3.11   Automated access as a barrier to crime reduction 
The police assume that DoHA, like any other institution, has security 
concerns about the HANIS systems’ database and believe that the onus lies in their 
hands to foster confidence within DoHA personnel about their ability as the police to 
maintain the safety of the personal identification information from DoHA if 
automated access can be implemented.  
They believe that the DoHA may be having fears of security risks where 
hackers or fraudsters can also gain access through automation to commit cyber crime 
by unlawfully gaining remote automated access and contaminating information 
where illegal foreigners for instance, might obtain fraudulent identification 
documents and crime operations would be fed wrong information by DoHA. This 
and other such crimes due to possibility of unauthorized automated access would 
yield bad results for crime operations. The police officers may also not be up to 
speed with the current ICT programs. Intell01 feels that:  
…lack of skills on the police to operate the systems or to understand the way reports 
are written by the ICT systems since the enquirer may be the officials from police 
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stations where ICT is not installed yet may also inhibit the effectiveness of crime 
operations.  
 The police officers are as the results of this skills shortage not allowed at 
DoHA to have direct onsite access to their operating system but perform the 
transactions for them where only the complete set of the ten fingerprints for both 
hands are scanned to instantly retrieve the identification details of the print owners.  
This may inhibit the crime operations since the police have to rely on the DoHA 
personnel to do the retrieval for them which might not always be at the rate required 
by the police or the DoHA personnel may not always be available or ready to do the 
automated process for the police. 
Automated access to information process may be fast but hackers may also 
access the system to harmful results. Even though this process is automated, the 
security requirements for approval and releasing of information might still be manual 
and slow inhibiting on effective crime operations. If the requirements also do not 
allow remote automated access, it means that police cannot always instantly identify 
suspects for prompt actions. Even though automation can provide rapid results, the 
police still depend on DoHA employees while they do not have authority to push for 
co-operation from the DoHA employees. Access rights to DoHA system is granted to 
members of the police whose personal details are provided to DoHA for registration. 
If inadequate number of the police is registered, information backlog might occur as 
few police officials would have access rights to DoHA system.  
4.3.12   Automated access as an enabler to crime reduction 
Even though automated access to fingerprint personal identification 
information that is based on complete fingerprints of the whole human set of ten 
fingers at DoHA is done by DoHA personnel, they instantly provide the 
identification details to the police officers that are residing in adjacent offices. Where 
the information is also expedited by the police to reach its destination of crime 
solving or court testimonies for instance, automation becomes and enabler to crime 
operations. According to Intell01: 
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…automated access is an important requirement for effective crime operations as it 
can enable us to be faster than the criminals. This is because once we know their 
identities or if we are in possession of their fingerprints, this would mean instant 
access to any piece of their identification details which can equip us to act swiftly 
and block them from any further communication with others. Automated access to 
information can provide us with the element of surprise to act swiftly before the 
criminals outpace us. This is because when the suspects become aware of our 
progress in the investigations about them, and they get to know that they have been 
identified and that we are on their tracks, they cover their tracks well. 
Automated and random access to information can ensure that the police can 
access personal details of suspects before the suspects become suspicious of being 
tailed and therefore provide the police intelligence operations with the edge over 
criminals. This will definitely make us to be quick and accurate through automated 
and sophisticated information gathering, processing and timely decision making to 
combat crime.  
This can also allows easier information sharing amongst other units that can 
benefit from synergies of combined intelligence sharing as criminals operate at 
random and from all from various areas as they travel around. By sharing 
information the police from other regions can share details of modus operandi of 
certain criminals which can enable for more crime prevention and combating 
strategies. According to the police superintend from Centurion who is now an 
intelligence officer and was once when he was still a crime detective and was 
requested to assist in another area, he saw an operation style of safe crackers and was 
immediately aware of who the suspects were.  
His knowledge of the modus operandi of the suspect was confirmed when the 
suspects were successfully convicted after being tracked and charged. He says that 
using ICT to access the database at DoHA can enable the police with Easier and 
faster access to personal identification details of suspects which can boost crime 
operations to provide the police with quick turn around times, faster courts hearings 
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and outcomes. Automated access to information by SAPS at DoHA would enable 
crime operations system to instantly and accurately identify suspects leading to faster 
legal arrests, releases or prosecutions criminals. The police can act swiftly and their 
planning can lead to instant accurate results since the identities of most or many 
suspects and criminals will not be mistaken.  
4.4   The security policy requirements at SAPS 
The police are expected to implement security measures on information in 
their possession and on information that is made available from DoHA and how it is 
protected while such information is in transit between DoHA and the police. This 
will also include information in transit between the police and the courts where it is 
used as evidence. The security of this information is a very important requirement of 
policy.   
To achieve this, the police are expected to apply procedures that are in 
compliance with security requirements of policy and implement all security 
measures to ensure that possible manual or automated gathering, processing and 
storing of information is achieved without any security breaches. Both manual and 
automated access, by SAPS to information held by DoHA may help enable crime 
operations but this may also present challenges. 
4.4.1   Manual access compliance   
Manual documents of suspects and criminals’ fingerprint records are securely 
filed in locked file cabinets and strong rooms that are protected by butler doors, 
windows and alarms. These offices containing the personal information and 
fingerprints as well as racks and cabinets containing the information are always 
locked where only authorized officers are in possession of keys that enable them to 
gain entry. Measures are also in place to ensure that information that is in transit 
between the LCRC and CCRC is protected. LCRCWO02 says that: 
For security purposes, the CCRC in Pretoria only accepts fingerprints received from 
us as the LCRC or police stations from all provinces to ensure control over legally 
lifted fingerprints to be processed.  Where matching prints are found at DoHA and 
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the suspect is found and charged, the personal details including the fingerprints are 
destroyed if the suspect is acquitted. 
Various other officials in the CRC and the police station are in agreement that 
where arrested suspects are acquitted, their fingerprint identification details including 
those from DoHA are destroyed and not stored as measures of extending security 
against unauthorized access. The officials working and transporting the personal 
information and details are selected, security cleared and vetted. Information in 
offices or in transit is always in sealed protective containers and not exposed to 
potential unauthorized access. Only authorized officers are able to enter the system. 
According SilvCP01, “the authorizations, vetting and security clearances of officials 
are done as a requirement of, or in terms of section 212 of criminal procedure act 51 
of 1977”. He also reiterates what all others are continually repeating that the 
fingerprints are processed in room where unauthorized entries are prohibited.  
4.4.2   Automated access compliance   
The police are convinced that security is enhanced through ICT to protect the 
information from DoHA since in their own environment, the Automated Fingerprint 
Identification System and other crime operations systems are password driven and 
also verify the authenticity of officers that are authorized to operate the electronic 
system through biometric fingerprint identification process. The police system 
contains crime records of only the convicted criminals which are securely stored in 
the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) database at the criminal 
record centre in Pretoria. Scanned fingerprints will also only be processed if the 
request contains all the authentication details which are always required. 
Even if unauthorized officials with bad intentions do gain entry into the 
offices where the AFIS or the HANIS are operated from, security is still tight. 
DHADR01 says that: 
Access to HANIS is restricted through various means. The system will perform a 
fingerprints identification or authentication which, if successful will prompt the user 
to enter their usernames and passwords where after it will perform the authorization 
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procedure before allowing anyone to access the system. The system knows 
everyone’s user profile which contains controlled and predefined specified functions 
that can be carried out by the each user. Where the police are allowed access here at 
DoHA, there is no risk of security violation since they can only query to view 
identification information without any chance of deleting, updating or adding any 
record just like the controls included on ATM machines.   
The authentication process ensures that security requirements are complied 
with even though some of the authorized officials are corrupt and have been reported 
to access the system and contaminate the information to undermine the crime 
operations. This revelation comes from various police officials.  
4.4.3   Manual access procedures      
Like the handling of all other manual documents, all documents with 
fingerprint details are securely locked in areas where unauthorized access is not 
allowed. Both the crime office and the LCRC process the fingerprints in private and 
secured offices and use sealed containers to store and transport them to and from the 
criminal record centers (CRC). All fingerprint related processes are done by security 
cleared and vetted police officials. The information regarding the fingerprints 
identification is only revealed when used by authorized investigating officers or at 
courts. 
4.4.4   Automated access procedures   
The equipment and applications or hardware and software systems 
respectively where the fingerprint processes are performed are safe guarded and 
access to the premises is restricted according to agreements with between SAPS and 
DoHA. Not all SAPS and DoHA personnel have access to these offices. The 
fingerprint identification information in DoHA is highly secured and access to 
information is also highly controlled. 
The identification details on the SAPS officers’ appointment cards should 
correspond with those on the registration list of authorized officers that is kept by 
DoHA to identify the police otherwise the requests will not be deemed valid by 
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DoHA who will not allow even authorized police officers to access their database 
management systems premises. Where officials are allowed access to systems 
database at DoHA fingerprint readers, user profiles and passwords are further 
security measures that are implemented to control access.  
4.4.5   Challenges of manual access     
The manual fingerprint process results in several trips being taken by the 
police officials between SAPS’ central criminal record center and DoHA, or between 
central criminal record center and police stations or local criminal record centers 
which are located at certain police stations. This is due to mostly bad quality of the 
fingerprints lifted randomly from crime scenes. LCRCT01 raises his concerns around 
the possible security violation saying that: 
The security of the information may be jeopardized as some of the prints face risks of 
being lost due to many trips between the two departments and internally between the 
criminal record centre and crime offices in all provinces. This is because of quality 
issues pertaining the latent fingerprint processing. 
These prints are mostly returned unprocessed from either DoHA or CCRC. 
These have to be retaken several times in certain cases. The to and fro trips may 
jeopardize the security of the personal details being processed as some of the lost or 
misplaced prints could land in dangerous hands. Some officials may also bridge the 
security requirements through carelessness during the trips and confusion may arise 
while some officials can engage in corrupt activities with the criminals.   
 4.4.6   Challenges for automated access  
Officials are cleared and their fingerprints are registered in the system as part 
of the user names and unique passwords. Such authorized officials and the skills 
required are sometimes scarce. This is due to the authorization procedures taking too 
long while ICT skills are not rive amongst police officers. Since the system will only 
allow registered, authorized and skilled personnel, this may be a problem. 
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4.4.7   Relevance of security policy to crime reduction   
Security of personal identification fingerprint information is important to 
prevent any contamination of information by unauthorized users including those who 
may have the authority to access the information for viewing only. This is important 
to ensure that information remains reliable and accurate to reflect the true statue of 
citizens and others stored to assist the police by enhancing crime operations. The 
security of information is important for crime operations since protected information 
can be reliable, truthful and lead the police to take accurate steps in confronting 
suspects and criminals. If there are security breaches and information is randomly 
changed by unauthorized individuals for instance, police might chase wrong people 
with fake identification details or plan around wrong addresses that may lead them to 
stage intelligence driven cordon and search operations at wrong areas or places.         
The police believe that if they can assure DoHA that they have implemented 
adequate security measures in place to protect their personal information, and if the 
DoHA security measures allow legal access which the police believe they subscribe 
to, then this will enable them to be able to rapidly identify more criminals at cordon 
and search operations which will contribute to the effective crime operations.  
If information is protected against leakages to, or access by suspects, then the 
information will mostly be authentic and legitimate to effect correct planning and 
accurate representation to produce the right results like crime solving were suspects 
are positively identified or yielding fair outcomes of court verdicts.  
4.4.8   Manual access as inhibiting crime reduction  
The slow manual response is congesting the courts and slows the criminal 
investigation process. The other disadvantage may occur if access by SAPS, to 
information held by DoHA is denied. This can happen if, according to CCRC01:  
…DoHA is not assured that we and other police members from the stations may fail 
to protect the personal details obtained from DoHA and we further fail to convince 
them that only authorized access will take place to use the personal information 
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solely for the specific purpose of identification, again, for security purposes, DoHA 
may deny access by SAPS to personal information in its possession. 
He feels that DoHA may be justified in this case because:  
…if there is lack of security to protect the information and therefore no proper 
access control, information can be deleted, wrongly updated or invalid new entries 
made to create a chaotic environment of unusable information that will mislead the 
police and may results in criminals being set free due to missing dockets or distorted 
evidence being presented.  
CCRC01 also further explained that the success rates of finding matching 
personal details from DoHA are at the moment at very low level with regards to 
needed targets. He went on to explain the challenge as being, “due to lack of proper 
identification of latent fingerprints collected at scenes of crime which are sent to us 
by our colleagues from the police stations”. Without security this could be worse 
where contaminated personal identification information here at DoHA may end up 
retrieving a woman’s details when a man’s fingerprints are scanned for instance. 
Lack of security can therefore completely inhibit on crime operations. This can also 
pose a serious threat to privacy concerns of citizens whose details could be randomly 
accessed by fraudsters.  
 The manual security processes take long due to protocol measures 
implemented where various levels of management have to attach their signatures on 
the application form SAPS to approve the retrieval of personal information which 
has to be given to the police. The latter wait long periods which renders their crime 
prevention strategies to be ineffective and inhibit on the police crime operations as 
well due to lack of information or information that is only available long after the 
damage has been caused. This could be through the freeing of detainees due to 
deadlines of detention period without charging the suspect while waiting for 
information from DoHA.   
The requirements taken for privacy are the security measures that must be 
implemented. Information should always be locked up in offices that are accessed by 
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only authorized personnel. It should also only be processed and transported by 
authorized personnel. All authorized personnel are registered at DoHA. If there is a 
need from the SAPS side to increase production by increasing officers, the 
registration of new officers at DoHA might take long and inhibit crime operations 
due to backlog that might arise since unregistered SAPS personnel will not be able to 
access the DoHA offices. 
4.4.9   Manual access  as enabling crime reduction  
This is already being addressed as seen by the current situation where both 
SAPS and DoHA are working together to exchanging information from adjacent 
offices in same buildings.  Only the authorized officials from both departments have 
access into the premises or cabinets where details of personal information being dealt 
with are processed. The access control systems records the identification details of 
all authorized officers and DoHA employees who enter or leave through the access 
controlled doors and butlers of the offices and premises while any document 
changing hands between SAPS and DoHA personnel gets registered and signed for.   
Secured premises containing sensitive information and records are accessed 
only by designated officials. The DoHA has built security measures around the 
personal identification information details database and also around how information 
is to be accessed exclusively by those who are authorized to do so. The police have 
implemented the same measures and are succeeding in building the same security 
which ensures that there is a seamless safe exchange between the two departments. 
4.4.10   Overcoming automated access challenges  
The security procedures applied for privacy requirements should be applied 
to protect information but to allow the SAPS necessary access for them to perform 
their crime prevention operations. Currently DoHA registers any police official 
identified as suitable to be included in the fingerprint identification process. Once 
registered, the SAPS official is provided with the user name and password to access 
the civil database from the designated offices adjacent to those of DoHA.    
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  Wrong passwords could trigger alarms and disable access if entered 
persistently. The same levels of security built into the systems of the DoHA, and 
around its officials must be implemented in the police environment to ensure that 
information accessed securely reaches its destination. Charge and hold personnel 
accountable for the leaking of protected information that contains sensitive citizens’ 
personal identification information. ICT should be made to record all transaction 
details including identifications of the transaction owners where non complying 
employees should be punished for leaking of information for instance.   
 4.5   The privacy requirements of policy at SAPS 
All security measures that are implemented by both SAPS and DoHA to 
protect the personal information in their possession are aimed at the maintenance of 
privacy. In order to allay the concerns for privacy, certain procedures are 
implemented to overcome the challenges that are associated with unauthorized 
access to sensitive information. This has become necessary for SAPS to develop or 
adhere to access to information policies and procedures with specific reference to 
policy requirements for privacy.    
4.5.1   Compliance of manual access   
The police stations and the CRC’s have implemented strict security measures 
where they use administrative clerks who are the custodians of keys for the strong 
rooms where the fingerprint documents are filed. Only they are allowed into these 
rooms. Even the police at their stations have to communicate through burglared 
doors when seeking information from these rooms. GarCP02 says that, “Since no 
unauthorized entry is allowed in the rooms where we store the files, no privacy 
violation will take place”. By ensuring that only one person has access, this seems to 
enforce accountability on such a person.   
4.5.2   Compliance of automated access   
Where there is a security risk there is the potential of information leakages 
that may compromise the privacy of the fingerprint owners. Only qualified and 
authorized police officials can access information from AFIS as per security 
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measures implemented. The vetting of the officials also ensures that only trusted 
officials can access the personal information. These officials must are authorized and 
skilled to utilize the database management systems using password to access these 
system for instance. 
4.5.3   Manual access procedures   
SAPS follow procedures that ensure that no privacy of personal details 
owners are violated by restricting access to personal information to strong rooms and 
cabinets containing personal details only to authorized officers or clerks. The secured 
offices and selected officials ensure that unauthorized entry and access to 
information is blocked to comply with privacy. The procedures of keeping 
fingerprints with authorized investigating officers or handing them as evidence at 
courts ensures that the requirements of  privacy is being complied with. 
4.5.4   Automated access procedures     
Where SAPS have been granted access at DoHA, they can only view 
information where they are allowed restricted and controlled access and only use 
printed information for either identification during investigations or at courts as 
agreed with DoHA. These control measures are implemented to minimize potential 
violation of privacy. Measures applied for security concerns are adequate to ensure 
protection of the privacy of citizens.   
 The security measures implemented through procedures for the authorization 
of officials ensure that the privacy concerns will be addressed by blocking 
unauthorized access where the ICT is used to preserve privacy of citizens using 
permitted access rights by users. The system complies with privacy by limiting 
access only to security cleared and vetted officers. Security also contributes 
positively to ensure that leakages do not occur to ensure that names or addresses of 
individuals involved in cases that can convict suspects or criminals are not leaked.  
4.5.5   Challenges for manual access   
Where there is a security risk there is the potential of information leakages 
that may compromise the privacy of the fingerprint owners. Privacy violation is at 
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stake in this case if the fingerprint details or personal information lands in the wrong 
hands. The corrupt officials may undermine privacy by leaking information to 
criminals. The challenges that are associated with contamination of scenes of crime 
or where fingerprints of wrong individuals are lifted from crime scenes with the 
results that confidential personal details of individuals who are unrelated to the 
crimes being investigate are retrieved poses a threat to the privacy of such innocent 
individuals.   
4.5.6   Challenges for automated access   
 Even though the system complies with privacy by limiting access only to 
security cleared and vetted officers, the possibility of corrupt officials who are 
authorized to access the system may cause personal information to leak to third party 
criminals and undermine privacy of citizens. The tight security measures applied 
manually and by the database managements system of HANIS take privacy concerns 
into account.  
Automation of access to information also enables remote access. This has a 
potential threat where hackers can remotely access the system to commit crimes like 
cyber crime. “The DoHA does not allow direct access through our computers 
because of fear that we might have uncontrolled and random access that could open 
their systems to abuse or leakages to the public”, this is according to the police 
officer at the Central criminal record center in Pretoria.    
4.5.7   Relevance to crime reduction   
Security ensures privacy which can be problematic if not preserved. Wrong 
identification details can fall into wrong hands through negligence and may be used 
by criminals that fake their own identification details to commit cyber crimes, open 
bank accounts or access their victim’s bank accounts etc. The rate of crime will 
increase if information details are randomly accessible by unauthorized personnel to 
violate privacy. 
The first major problem that arises when sensitive personal information is 
randomly and unlawfully accessed and falling into wrong hands is individual privacy 
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violation. When individuals become married without their knowledge or wrong 
people know your addresses at random. Criminal activities may be committed and 
pointing police to wrong individuals whose identity documents are being used by 
criminals. This makes it difficult for crime operations which are directed by wrong 
information. Privacy has to be complied with to ensure that personal information 
from DoHA is accurate to enhance crime operations in the form of positive 
identification of suspects and criminals through their fingerprints where necessary.     
The security measures, according to the police should convince DoHA that 
the police will comply with the privacy requirements. If their requirements of 
privacy also take into account the need for the police to access their database, then 
the protection of privacy by the police can contribute to effective crime operations. 
“The trust between the police and DoHA which has been destroyed by the corrupt 
behavior of some of our members can be restored if security and privacy concerns 
can be addressed by us when we process personal information that we obtained from 
DoHA”, these are the words of the police officer at the Central criminal record 
center. The officer also says that DoHA had previously allowed them direct access to 
the civil database at DoHA remotely from the police central criminal record center 
through keying the identity numbers and retrieving personal details of suspects or 
criminals.   
By complying with security and privacy requirement procedure, the police 
are hoping that the automated process could be restored and further strengthened to 
allow remote automated by SAPS to information held by DoHA which can comply 
with the accessibility requirement of policy to enhance crime operations. Information 
gathered against criminals will only be helpful if it is not known by the criminals 
meaning in this way complying with security and privacy requirements will enhance 
the police operations through improved crime operations applications. Security 
contributes positively to ensure that leakages do not occur to ensure that names or 
addresses of individuals involved in cases that can convict suspects or criminals are 
not leaked.  
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4.5.8   Manual access as inhibiting crime reduction 
Violation of privacy results in more crimes being committed that relate to 
cyber-crimes where many unsuspecting citizens’ details are illegally accessed and 
used in various fraudulent transactions like hire purchases, loans etc. SilvCP01 feels 
that maintenance of privacy ensures that information is not unlawfully altered but:  
…while this process is important, the requirements to maintain privacy should not be 
too steep to hamper rapid access to information. The identification processes for the 
police by DoHA when the former enters the DoHA premises and at counters where 
the actual information from DoHA is received by the police officials should not be 
done in such a way that the times taken exceed that which is required before the 
successful prosecution of the suspects.  
He argues that the privacy requirements can in this case work against crime 
operations.    
 If innocent citizens details are accessed by unauthorized personnel and 
randomly changed, criminals can change their identities, addresses etc. and the 
information would negate on and counter the possible success of crime operations 
when its intelligence is integrated with the fingerprint identification details form 
DoHA systems. Both SAPS and DoHA must protect the information from such 
access and ensure that only authorized personnel have predetermined access rights 
that will only allow approved access levels and that information being retrieved and 
exchanged does not leak to those who are not supposed to see it.  
 Potential witnesses or other stakeholders in crime operations or court 
procedures who pull out due to life threats from suspects or criminals who have 
become aware of them means that these criminals have invaded the privacy of the 
witnesses negative consequences. By violating the witnesses’ privacy, crime 
operations will experience negative effect as criminals might walk free from 
prosecution as the results. If privacy is compromised, personal details of individuals 
fall in the wrong hands where witness details like addresses may be known by 
criminals who may kill them to stop them from testifying against them which may 
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result in a dangerous criminal evading jail term. CCRC01 believes that closer 
cooperation is the answer where:   
…we have to understand their privacy requirements and demonstrate that we can 
comply otherwise they will deny access and this would be a barrier to crime 
operations as we need to identify everybody otherwise our crime operations will not 
be effective.  
 This is especially important for CCRC officials since the national 
fingerprints gateway from SAPS to DoHA is through CCRC in Pretoria. All police 
branches in all provinces submit their requests there from where they are given to 
DoHA personnel for processing. If few investigating officers around the country are 
not vetted and security cleared at the level required by DoHA, then the movement of 
documents between the two departments might bottleneck. 
This is because SAPS understands that the privacy requirements at DoHA 
include that the sensitive personal identification information retrieved for SAPS 
should only be handled and transported by those appropriately cleared to minimize 
information leakage to unauthorized officials. Information from DoHA will also not 
be admissible in court unless signed by a DoHA director. The piling of processed 
documents waiting to be signed might act as barrier to crime operations whose 
success mostly depends on timely action by SAPS’ intelligence officers. 
4.5.9   Automated access as inhibiting crime reduction  
Even though the automated access to fingerprint personal identification 
information of complete fingerprints at DoHA is done by DoHA personnel to ensure 
that no privacy violation occurs, the police do not have the authority to push the 
DoHA personnel for faster feedback. They regard this as inhibiting since it causes 
delays which undermine the police crime operations. Information has still to be 
delivered to reach the destinations in various provinces which further delay crime 
solving activities or court testimonies for instance. While automated access to 
information could improve the SAPS’ system’s reaction times CCRC01 also 
understand the possible concerns at DoHA and explains it as follows: 
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
88 
 
This might also create the impression of possible unauthorized access to information 
which DoHA personnel may be suspicious that even unauthorized individuals from 
elsewhere can remotely access the personal details and violate privacy if they allow 
us remote access: 
CCRC01 also points to other various factors which he feels are restrictive to 
possible automation of access by SAPS to information held by DoHA when he 
further explains that:  
If remote access can be granted without proper controls, this will increase the risk of 
privacy violation as there are hackers out there who train themselves with skills to 
disrupt other’s information through remote access. We have to train our officials 
with DoHA systems to ensure that we all meet their requirements for privacy and 
security practices when we remotely sign on to their screens otherwise the damage 
that might result will cause more harm. This could result in our chances of tapping 
into the national identity system going up in smoke and impede our crime operations. 
Remote and automated access to HANIS can have the negative effects for privacy 
and crime operations in general. 
Apart from the training needs identified by CCRC01 and various other 
officials, there are other requirements at DoHA that are general acknowledged by the 
SAPS. DoHA requires that all SAPS personnel should undergo security clearances 
up to the highest level before being considered for any possible access to the HANIS. 
This request, according to DHADR01 has been relaxed since the clearance 
procedures are said to take too long and would impact negatively if it was tightly 
applied as a strict access to information condition at DoHA. Should DoHA insist on 
this request, very few SAPS personnel will be provided with user names and 
passwords to access the DoHA’s HANIS system. This would impact negatively on 
crime operations. Remote printing of documents by SAPS from DoHA will not be 
beneficial if the documents have to be manually signed by a DoHA director before 
they can be admitted as evidence in the courts. This would negate on the gains that 
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can be achieved by automated access and reduce the productivity level to that of the 
manual one.  
 4.5.10   Manual access privacy challenges for crime reduction   
CCRC01 says that the concerns around manual access which are being 
echoed by most officers within SAPS are continually being addressed since they are 
in the process of subjecting their members to the necessary authorization procedures. 
The SAPS’ and DoHA management are currently engaging in talks regarding the 
problem areas since crime, as he says is a problem to the entire country and not just 
to the police.    
SilvCP01 says that, “all the authorized DoHA and police officials should be 
vetted and subjected to the highest level of security clearance related to top secret 
clearances which must be given priority and not be on waiting lists”. This is because 
the general feeling is that only those officials including investigating officers and 
administrators that may have to legally access the information should be able to 
exchange information and be able to access it with minimal delay.  
4.5.11   Automated access privacy challenges for crime reduction   
CCRC01 is convinced that ICT has reliable security systems if proper 
controls and security applications are implemented. According to him:  
…there is no chance that we can change the DoHA information in their systems 
since a user like me, or any of my colleagues who have been granted only viewing 
rights without any other capability where they can only view what is approved for 
them to view, can do any harm. This can be made to work just like an auto bank 
where one cannot change their bank balances.  
According to most police officers, the authorized investigating officer for 
instance should only be able to view the personal identification details of only the 
prints’ owner who is being investigated. 
4.6   e-Governance developments at SAPS 
SAPS, just like DoHA used to engage in manual fingerprint processing to 
identify suspects. This process has been in use for a very long time and required staff 
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at the Criminal Record Centre to physically compare fingerprints found on a scene of 
crime with the sets of hard copy fingerprints. This has led to SAPS introducing an e-
governance initiative, the MorphoTouch which is a biometric fingerprinting tool that 
has revolutionized the way SAPS process criminal suspects. The system is deployed 
in various police sites countrywide. According to ITWeb (2007, in press) the system 
is used at roadblocks and during intelligence-driven cordon-and-search operations to 
link suspects with their crimes. In this way, a number of suspects including those 
who have eluded the police for prolonged periods of time have been arrested, 
prosecuted and sentenced after having been identified via the MorphoTouch. 
The device was said to be housing about 50 000 fingerprints while it can be 
physically or remotely connected to the central police Automated Fingerprint 
Identification System (AFIS) database at the Central Criminal Record Center which 
houses copies of the fingerprints of over five million criminals. According to the 
ITWeb, The MorphoTouch can complete a local database query at operational areas 
like roadblocks for instance, within five seconds, while a search of the full database 
takes between five and 10 minutes depending on the network. Apart from the 
mentioned speed, the MorphoTouch is also claimed by ITWeb to be 98.5% accurate 
in the identification of fingerprints owners. The AFIS system is however only limited 
to criminal fingerprints in the police Criminal Record database while legislation 
prohibits automated access to personal fingerprint identification information in the 
civil databases like those held by the DoHA.    
4.7   Background to DoHA environment   
The findings presented in this chapter were collected from the organizational 
case study of the Department of Home Affairs (DoHA) in connection with the role 
played by policy in the process of access by the police, to information in their 
possession. While the database is utilized by the authorities at DoHA to fulfill their 
mandates of ensuring that citizens and visitors are registered, it can also be utilized 
for identification purposes. Since the citizens’ database includes information of all 
perpetrators of crime, access by the police to this database has become important for 
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identifying the perpetrators of crime. While this measure has the potential to 
contribute positively to crime reduction, possible policy conflicts may arise.   
4.8   DoHA services, related policies/legislation   
DoHA authorities pursue their mandate of ensuring that every South African 
and visitors are appropriately registered and can be identified through their 
performance of civic and immigration services. The department has various offices 
in all provinces and in many regions within these provinces where the offices are 
mostly found in cities and smaller towns as well as in townships. Some cities have 
multiple office sites while the department has also organized mobile units to reach 
some of the underlying remote rural areas. DoHA strives to reach all citizens of 
South Africa and visiting foreigners including those that may wish for permanent 
citizenship, to work or do trade locally.  
4.8.1   The civic and immigration services objectives and policy 
According to the Constitution, the services performed by DoHA are divided 
into two broad categories, the Civic services and the Immigration services. These 
services are guided by related policy and legislation. The civic and immigration 
services are offered to citizens and foreigners respectively.  
Some of the civic services include determining if citizens are eligible to be 
issued with identity, passport and travel documents or whether they qualify for social 
grants and other such benefits. The civic services are mostly enabled through the 
management of National Population Register (NPR) and the Home Affairs National 
Information System (HANIS). Both these databases contain the citizens’ personal 
identification information such as names, identity numbers, sex statue, addresses etc. 
as well as birth, marriage and death records.  
The immigration services include controlling the entry of foreigners into the 
country and determining their residency statue while managing the refugee affairs. 
Permit documents are also issued to the foreigners from the department for identity 
purposes and efficient management and regulation of migrations. DoHA thus uses 
the NPR and HANIS databases to acts as a sole custodian and the single national 
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point of verification of the statue of the identities of citizens or resident foreigners 
while securely storing these databases to contribute positively to the promotion of 
national security. The provision of immigration services projects a good global 
image for the republic. 
By providing civic and immigration services locally and globally, the 
department attains other objectives of contributing significantly towards the national 
socio-economic development by ensuring that citizens and legal visitors have 
appropriate identification documents that enable them to access the benefits and 
opportunities in both the public and private domains.  
DoHA officials are guided by various policies and relevant legislation in 
pursuing the objectives of ensuring that everybody, young or old are registered and 
can be uniquely identified through their identification numbers or fingerprints. To 
achieve this, the Identification policy and its related Identification act, No. 68 of 
1997 as amended and the Regulation made in terms of this act serve as guidelines for 
compliance.  
4.8.2   Citizens identification   
 The NPR is indexed by the identity number which is typed into the system to 
retrieve the unique personal identification details of the identity document holder. In 
contrast, HANIS can also be indexed by the fingerprints of both hands which if 
scanned into the system in the particular sequence in which the fingerprints were 
stored, retrieves the unique personal identification details of the prints’ owner. The 
databases therefore compliments one another while they may be more useful than 
one another depending on what is available to use as key to search for personal 
identification details. 
Since DoHA is the sole custodian of the national databases, it has become 
essential for officials from SAPS to have a need to access these databases for 
verifications and confirmations of identities of perpetrators of crimes in their 
investigations for crime prevention and combating operations. 
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Access by the police, to information held by DoHA takes place when the 
former submit the identity numbers or fingerprints belonging to the perpetrators of 
crimes to DoHA who keys the identity numbers into their system or scan the 
fingerprints to produce accurate personal identification details that are provided back 
to the police to enable them to take appropriate actions against suspects during their 
crime operations. 
 4.9   The accessibility requirements of policy at DoHA  
The accessibility requirement of policy at the Department of Home Affairs 
(DoHA) is about how access by SAPS to information held by DoHA should be made 
possible and in accordance with policy. While e-governance programs that are being 
implemented can expedite this process by providing amongst others, easier, remote 
and faster ways of access by SAPS to information held by DoHA for instance, some 
challenges are emerging with the implementation of e-governance technologies 
which may be in conflict with both security and privacy policy requirements. This 
raises concerns that need to be taken into account.   
4.9.1   Manual access compliance to Policy   
DoHA has implemented strict information access control measures to ensure 
that the SAPS comply with the manual accessibility requirement of policy when 
requesting access to the fingerprint identification details in its possession. 
DHADR01 had this to say: 
…we only provide the personal details of only the suspects that are being 
investigated since the police are required to furnish case details that are being 
investigated when they request fingerprint identification details. They have to do this 
in accordance with the agreements that are reached with them to ensure that they 
use the personal information from us strictly for specific identification and 
verification of the suspects being investigated. 
According to DHAEX01: 
…the police have made an undertaking to us through the relevant structures that 
they will never use the personal information from us for any other purpose except for 
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what it was acquired for as required by law. They are only given the matching 
personal information details for the fingerprints they submit to us and for which they 
provide our officials with the reasons which are always to do with crime as the main 
purpose.  
DHAEX01 also say that for as long as the police’ application requests for 
information are in compliance with the current protocol procedures of DOHA, then 
the latter will continue to cooperate with them. The other reason for cooperating with 
the police is that DoHA regards crime as an important issue which should be 
resolved by all citizens. They trust that the police will respect information policy 
since they are a public institution bound accordingly to comply.  
The fingerprints on hardcopy prints contained in sealed envelopes are handed 
in only by registered and known SAPS officials to ensure that the accessibility of the 
identification details is controlled and only given to right people and for right 
reasons. The DoHA co-operates and makes sure that where possible, the personal 
information that is being legally required is provided in accordance with the 
agreements between the two departments.    
4.9.2   Automated access compliance to policy   
DHAEX02 believes in the accuracy of HANIS that will always be relied on 
to retrieve the correct details and not infringe on privacies by retrieving innocent 
details. He says that: 
HANIS will never retrieve details of an individual who is not the owner of the 
fingerprints. When fingerprints are scanned into the computer, it only retrieves the 
matching personal details which DoHA is assured will be used only for the 
identification purposes and given to authorized SAPS officials.  
He maintains that privacy will not be violated if fingerprints are used to 
retrieve any personal details. 
4.9.3   Procedures for manual access   
Even though DoHA has automated the fingerprint processing, there are 
manual processes that have to be followed prior to scanning the prints into the 
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computer. The DoHA personnel will only start the identification process after 
verifying and authenticating the approved application forms from SAPS for 
fingerprint identification of only complete prints (all ten fingerprints from both hands 
and clearly marked so that each fingerprint corresponds with its specific finger as 
stored in the HANIS).  
Latent fingerprints or fingerprints uplifted from crime scenes cannot be 
positioned to indicate the position of the finger on the hand. This creates a challenge 
since the fingerprints cannot be used to instantly retrieve the details of the owner.  
The SAPS officials transacting with DoHA have to be registered and be in the list 
which is in the possession of DoHA. Once this has been cleared, there is a duplicate 
database, which is not live or active and from which the registered SAPS are allowed 
to perform the time consuming search based on one fingerprint. This process takes 
too long and does more often than once fail to produce the correct identification 
details.   
4.9.4   Procedures for automated access   
 All requests for matching fingerprints follows the same authentication 
procedure before the actual prints from SAPS are scanned into the HANIS at DoHA. 
The HANIS is designed to do online verification by reading all ten fingerprints from 
both hands of an individual and retrieving the identification details of only the owner 
of the prints without exposing anybody else. This is the only information details 
provided to the police upon their presenting legitimately approved application for 
such details. This is also done on the assumption that SAPS will use such 
information strictly for the intended use of identifying the suspects or individuals for 
whom they have done such application.  
4.9.5   Concerns for manual access  
The process of retrieving personal fingerprint identification information for 
the police is not adequately helping them since most of the police queries are based 
on latent fingerprints which even if they are retrieved successfully, it still takes days 
to produce results. The DoHA is under resourced to provide optimal services to the 
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police. Their success rate of helping the police to identify criminals is still too low, 
according to DHADR01. DHAEX02 says that there are too many illegal immigrants 
whose personal identification details are not in the DoHA database system and 
therefore cannot be identified through the processing of the latent crime scene 
fingerprints. 
Information from DoHA is that the request for personal identification 
information through fingerprints is only instantly successful if the individual is 
available in the system and all his or her ten fingerprints from both hands are not 
only available, but are aligned according to their positions on the hands which 
DHADR02 says is the only condition where HANIS instantly produces results. He 
also feels that the two departments have to work together and cooperate to ensure 
better results. This is because the illegal immigrant crime may be a police issue but it 
impacts on DoHA as well as it is trying to control the movement of all individuals 
into or out of the country.     
DoHA feels that the other concern albeit of minor importance is that they 
have no control on how the personal information is used once it is in the possession 
of SAPS. While they trust SAPS, this does create some concerns even though they 
expect the police to abide by the regulations.  
4.9.6   Concerns for automated access  
In his own words, DHADR01 had this to say:   
The DoHA systems were done in isolation and no considerations for other 
departments’ systems interactions were taken into account. The HANIS system 
should be adapted to enable it to be productive to all police fingerprint identification 
requirements. Currently the system is only helping the police if they are in 
possession of all the ten individual fingerprints and positioned according to how they 
were captured into the HANIS system. The police’s biggest challenge is the latent 
fingerprints that they lift from crime scenes.   
The DHADR01 further explained that it is for this reason that the DoHA 
system, in its current form is not designed to adequately assist the police. He said 
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that too much money will be needed to upgrade the system and even then, good co-
operations starting at the political level is needed which is not currently visible. 
Cyber and fake identity crimes are still high due to too many undocumented 
immigrants. He felt that some of the crimes are committed by the police like losing 
information for instance, leaking it to criminals is also seriously on the high. 
DHADR01 further argues that the system on its own will not be effective for current 
crime wave which he suggests that the system should be augmented with DNA 
capabilities to add more evidence needed to link suspects with crime. 
HANIS works successfully when all ten fingers are scanned. The need to 
identify owners of latent incomplete fingerprints collected from scenes of crime is 
the most important for crime operations as this is the one issue that would greatly 
help the police. DHADR02 confirms the concerns being raised and says that the 
technical design and capability of the retrieval criteria of HANIS is incompatible 
with the way the police request information from DoHA and hence the latter’s failure 
to enhance crime operations. He also re-emphasized the need for a major upgrade if 
the system was to be enabled to improve the police searches for identification details. 
He was not only concerned with the police for possible privacy violation as he said 
that even their own officials can commit cyber crime by bridging security and 
leaking information with harmful results. 
4.9.7   Relevance of access to crime reduction 
The DoHA employees agree that access to identification information will 
increase the success rate of crime operations. DHADR01 explained that lots of crime 
takes place against many departments resulting in loss of billions of rand as seen by 
housing and social grants being fraudulently obtained by non deserving individuals 
including illegal immigrants while the waiting lists of houses for citizens are 
growing by day. “These crimes could be greatly reduced if all the departments were 
co-operating and all were able to access the fingerprints identification details from 
DoHA to accurately validate all individuals before they provided them with 
services”, DHADR01 further argues. The participants felt mostly felt that legal 
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access to fingerprint identification personal information at DoHA is vital to crime 
operations to prevent and resolve crime issues. 
Like all other participants, DHAEX02 says that since DoHA is the only 
department with the civil database and HANIS that also contains images of photos 
and fingerprints, this makes DoHA central to crime resolution through accurate 
identification but according to him:  
The resolution of crime is the responsibility of all citizens, departments and 
institutions. It is also the responsibility of DoHA to contribute to the combating of 
crime. The one way that DoHA can contribute to crime operations is by ensuring 
that any information in its possession is legally being made available to the police as 
and when it is needed as long as the process is controlled and not abused. 
The DoHA views automated access to its database by SAPS as enhancing to 
crime operations which can definitely be boosted by automated timely identification 
information to reduce uncertainties during crime operations and courts. This is also 
due to access to personal information by SAPS at DoHA being necessary to also 
addressing crimes that affect DoHA which relate to entry into the country by illegal 
immigrants or undocumented migrants. DoHA also feels that access to their 
databases should also be extended to other departments like the South African 
National Defense Force at borderline operations or at ports of entry. 
4.9.8   Access as inhibiting crime operations 
Lack of communication, trust, and believe that SAPS would use the 
information strictly in accordance with the agreed conditions to safely secure 
personal information obtained from DoHA and thereby preserving privacy of 
individuals could lead to access to personal identification information from DoHA to 
be made more difficult and could compromise on the data gathering from DoHA and 
hence on the possible success of crime operations.   
4.9.9   Manual access as a barrier to crime reduction  
Manual access causes delays as most fingerprints uplifted randomly are 
damaged and there are lots of repeated attempts before unique matching prints are 
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retrieved. This delays the prosecutions and police programs as sometimes accurate 
matching prints are not easily identified and mistakes can be made. 
4.9.10   Manual access an enabler to crime reduction  
The DoHA is certain that where matching prints are found and these are 
given to the applying police officials, the information details are mostly very helpful 
to SAPS and serve to enhance their crime operations activities. The fingerprint 
services are now done on the ICT system and manual comparison is not done 
anymore. 
4.9.11   Automated access as a barrier to crime reduction  
Where identification based on fingerprints which are randomly collected at 
scenes of crime is requested by the police, DHAEX02 says that: 
The DoHA system is not designed to verify that way and it takes long times to find 
random matching prints as searches are done (one to many) where a one 
fingerprints are scanned and have to perform search against millions of prints. This 
consumes the system resources and inhibit on other day to day processes of identity 
documents and passports. Our relevant units have created a duplicate database 
which is specifically created and is separately searched and takes several days at 
times to find a match and in many instances the search operation is not successful.  
In this regard, he feels that HANIS may not contribute positively to crime 
operations. 
 The current agreements are that only DoHA personnel can sign onto the 
HANIS system and are co-operating with the police who sit in adjacent rooms but 
same DoHA buildings and provide instant details of all legal request of complete 
fingerprints searches.  This may create a bottleneck since this is the only national 
police gateway to DoHA fingerprint identification process. Security and privacy 
violations could be the concerns of DoHA and thereby rendering automated access to 
be a barrier to crime operations. Automated access can provide fast information 
gathering, processing and quick decision making required by crime operations 
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systems and therefore it‘s non-implementation would be a major barrier to effective 
crime operations.  
Several employees at DoHA are unanimous that the police deserve their 
cooperation but they stress that even though the automated access enables easy and 
fast information exchange by internet or email for instance it may also pose risks of 
unauthorized access by hackers. They do believe that ICT can be trusted to be 
properly controlled through firewall applications for instance and other uses such as 
the biometric authentication passwords must at all times be enforced. They also 
suggest that great care by those who are authorized should be taken to avoid 
passwords for instance from falling into wrong hands and resulting in damaging 
effects on both DoHA and crime operations. This is because hackers, as they say, 
may access the system and corrupt information or criminals may get access to know 
identities and photos of police informers or witnesses.  
Opening the electronic databases for remote automated access over the wide 
area network also means possible opening for hackers who would try to access. 
Where “sign on” details falls in the hands of such users and they can remotely access 
the system with devastating consequences for DoHA and crime operations where 
such information is needed to combat crime. This type of access should only be 
restricted to selected few officials who are cleared with the highest security level by 
NIA.  
4.9.12   Automated access as an enabler to crime reduction 
DHACO02 is a consultant that works for the private company that is 
involved with the development and implementation of HANIS and he had this to say: 
Technology adds value to information by making it timely available. Easy, fast and 
accurate automated access to DoHA database will be a plus for crime operations 
that will combine the criminal record information with the instantaneous random 
personal identification information details from DoHA to identify many more 
criminals who will have nowhere to hide. Any remote link by the police could pave 
the way for unlimited pool of resourceful information that is available in various 
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forms and images. The police can view the faces of suspects, names and addresses by 
entering the suspects’ identification numbers and most importantly, their fingerprints 
then the police will be swift in their actions to bring the crime levels down.   
Most DoHA participants share this view and agree that during the period 
when the police were linked and could remotely retrieve the identification details of 
suspects from DoHA, they were responding faster to cases where the identification 
details were important. The police needed to at least be in possession of the identity 
number to be able to achieve this. 
4.10   The requirements of the security policy at DoHA 
The Department of Home Affairs (DoHA) is expected to implement security 
measures on information in its possession and on how information is made available 
and used by external recipients like SAPS and other department. This is a 
requirement of policy which DoHA also expects SAPS to abide by. To succeed in 
the implementation of these security measures, DoHA applies procedures that are 
aimed at protecting both manual and possible automated access to information in its 
possession to comply with security policy. Both manual and automated access, by 
SAPS to information held by DoHA may help enable crime operations but they also 
present challenges that raise security concerns if they are not taken into account. 
4.10.1   Compliance of manual access   
 
DHAEX02 is adamant that security measures at DoHA are implemented at 
all times during the communications between the two departments. The employees at 
DoHA and police officers involved follow certain procedures like being vetted. He 
says that more details on these can be found at the relevant offices. He says that the 
security measures are such that:    
…information at DOHA is strictly protected and cannot randomly be accessed 
without following protocol procedures. I know from experience when I was still 
employed there that they apply strict control measures to ensure that access to 
information from their databases is done under strict security measures and that 
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information is protected and only made available to the applying police officials and 
is never leaked to any unauthorized personnel by us.  
DHAEX02 says that even though he was not directly involved, he does know 
about how greatest care was taken to protect the information.   
Entry to offices that are being used to process personal information is 
restricted to only the registered DoHA officials and the SAPS officers. According to 
the Director at DoHA fingerprint processing office, DoHA personnel are in 
possession of the register that contains the names and force numbers of all the police 
officials or police members that are authorized to bring or take the fingerprints detail 
information. These officials from the police are identified by their appointment cards 
that bear their identification details that include their names, identification numbers, 
force or Persal numbers as well as their facial photos.  
4.10.2   Compliance of automated access   
The system is not accessible by anybody including DoHA personnel who are 
not authorized. The details retrieved are only given to known authorized SAPS 
officials under agreements that the information will be protected at all costs. Several 
employees at DoHA have the confidence in the security provided by the computer 
system where access cards, usernames and passwords are used to control access to 
the system or databases.    
4.10.3   Security procedures for manual access   
Access cards are provided for entry into the premises and offices where 
sensitive information is being processed at all times. These checks are done upon 
entry and exit movement in and out of the DoHA premises for all individuals 
regardless of whether they are DoHA employees or the police officials. All internal 
or external authorized personnel have to make applications for the access cards while 
their fingerprints are scanned and registered in the biometrics systems at entry and 
exit points of the offices and premises. This is to ensure that the security 
requirements at DoHA are complied with. 
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4.10.4   Security procedures for automated access   
Various security procedures are followed to comply with policy at DoHA. 
DHADR01 explains some of them as follows: 
Access to HANIS is restricted through various means. Fingerprints identification and 
authentication will prompt the user to enter user names and passwords of approved 
officers allowed to access the systems. Within each user profiles, there are controlled 
predefined specified functions that can be carried out by any user. Where the police 
are allowed access, there is no risk of security violation since they can only query to 
view identification information without any chance of deleting, updating or adding 
any record just like the controls included on ATM machines. 
This echoes the confidence which various participants have on the security 
around the database at DoHA. This was also corroborated by DHACO01 when 
saying that, “the only way an unauthorized individual to fraudulently access the 
HANIS is to do what criminals do with the ATM’s to access and steal money from 
the machines”. He goes on to say that they can only achieve this by, “by bombing it”. 
DHADR02 confirmed what DHADR01 and the police officials had told the 
researcher when explaining about the security procedures of automated access by 
saying:  
…the authorized police used to be granted restricted access rights to the National 
Population Register (NPR) database system that enabled them to only retrieve 
identification details by entering or keying ID numbers of the suspects for instance to 
instantly identifying or verifying the suspect’s identification details. The HANIS is 
only accessed by DoHA personnel who co-operate with and work together with the 
police sitting in adjacent offices to expedite the fingerprint identification process. 
The various levels of access rights to both databases are to ensure that information 
can never be contaminated since rights that enable users to change, delete or add 
information are restricted to only those who are authorized to do so. 
DHADR02 and DHACO01 also both further explained that once a user is 
identified and tasks are allocated to him or her, access rights that are relevant to such 
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tasks are built in the users’ profiles and each time such a users “sign on” to the 
system, the system sets up how the user will access it and will never permit such 
users to do anything else other than that being prescribed in their profiles.  
4.10.5   Security concerns for manual access   
Various concerns are being raised around the authorization procedures which 
the police are required to undergo to be eligible to deal with the sensitive personal 
information at DoHA. DHADR01 shows that some of the procedures may actually 
work against crime operations even though this would not be the DoHA’s fault. He 
says that:   
…even though the police officials have to be vetted and security cleared to gain 
trustworthiness from us so as we can believe that our information in their possession 
will be safely stored and used, the process of vetting and clearances are done by NIA 
and these takes too long to complete where the waiting list stays high. The police 
officials are hired and begin to work while waiting for clearances which are 
completed long after they have gained too much experience in their work to be 
expelled if their results came out negative. This may result in unsuitable officials 
being kept in employment and dealing with sensitive information and can pose 
security risks. 
DHADR01 says that this is the reason DoHA has relaxed in some cases, the 
requirements of authorization of police officials to enable continuity while the 
authorization waiting queues are being addressed.  The current security measures are 
adequate and there should not be any security bridges unless vetted and security 
cleared officers commit frauds. 
4.10.6   Security concerns for automated access  
Even though the security systems are in place it will not help if crime is done 
from inside by those who should be preventing it to renders the security systems 
ineffective. This is because the system is adequately equipped with security 
measures to ensure that only those permitted to access can actually do so in 
accordance with their allowable functions. “There are no concerns with regards to 
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our security as the physical access is highly restrictive and the access rights to the 
NPR and HANIS cannot be easily bypassed unlawfully”, says DHADR02. 
Some officials felt that cyber crime can be committed even by vetted officials 
from both the DoHA and the SAPS therefore none of the officials should point 
fingers at others. The DoHA officials who are saying this say that they do not have 
any concern for the police either being provided with the information or being 
allowed access to retrieve. 
4.10.7   Relevance of security to crime reduction   
DHAEX02 and DHADR01 believe that personal identification information 
should be provided to SAPS as and when it is required. DHADR01 further explained 
that it was unfortunate that the system at DoHA was not designed to be more helpful 
to the police than what it was currently designed to do. But the information was 
definitely required by the police to provide the services to the community which 
makes this the responsibility of DoHA as well.  
He further says that the provision of information to SAPS should not be done 
at the expense of security considerations which have to be taken into account with 
specific reference to addressing privacy concerns. Security measures being 
implemented should ensures that sensitive personal identification information, which 
can be harmful if leaked to wrong individuals like criminals, is protected. Names or 
addresses of potential witnesses may land in the hands of criminals who might pose 
danger to the safety of such individuals if strict security measures are not applied 
around such information. 
4.10.8   Manual access as inhibiting crime reduction   
The security requirements of policy may inhibit crime operations if not 
properly set up to ensure smooth operations during manual access by SAPS, to 
information held by DoHA. SAPS may be the reason at times for this challenge. 
DHAEX01 explains it as follows:  
If the SAPS do not apply adequate security measures to personal information 
acquired from DoHA, leakages of sensitive personal details would result in the 
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outcry from the citizens at large and this would put pressure on DoHA not to easily 
release the information which would hinder the crime operations programs since 
only DoHA possesses the national personal fingerprint identification information.  
DHAEX01 emphasizes how important it is for both departments to comply to 
security requirements as the public has the vested interest in how their personal 
information is being processed. This also highlights how non-compliance by SAPS 
can inhibit crime operations. 
  The participants at DoHA understand that compliance to privacy at their 
department is about innocent citizens’ personal information being protected against 
illegal access. If security measure as per policy are not properly implemented by 
SAPS to protect the information during manual access where physical envelopes 
containing fingerprints details are transported hence and forth between the two 
departments, then DoHA firstly will not release such information which will have 
devastating consequences for crime operations as access will be denied.  
If there is privacy violation then there will be an outcry from the community 
who will call for stricter security measure around their personal information to be 
implemented and these measures might include tighter protocol procedures that will 
further delay the exchange of information between SAPS and DoHA. Again this will 
work against the timely access by SAPS, to information at DoHA and hence work as 
a barrier to crime operations. DHADR02 explains that:  
…the security procedure requires the Director General at DoHA to follow an 
authentication protocol procedure to physically sign the forms that contains the 
personal details received from DoHA by SAPS before these can be accepted as valid 
evidence by the magistrates at the courts. 
While this manual process is a requirement for security purposes, it also 
unfortunately seems to undermine the processes for crime operations due to it being 
too slow for the process of access by SAPS to information held by DoHA. This 
would inhibit crime operations and impede on efforts that aim for instant 
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identification of suspects for positively linking them with their photos or fingerprints 
for prompt action. 
4.10.9   Automated access as inhibiting crime reduction  
The senior management at DoHA is in unison where access by SAPS, to 
information held by DoHA is concerned. This has to be achieved at all costs but the 
ball is always thrown at SAPS to ensure that the process is successful. DHAEX02 for 
instance, is not wavering in the trust he has on DoHA to always comply with the 
security requirements. But whether SAPS will successfully continue with this 
process, is in the hands of the police. He says that:  
…if the security measures are not adequately implemented by SAPS during access 
and transmission of information to their areas where this is needed for their crime 
combating and prevention operations, or if because of this, information is accessed 
by hackers who have only bad intentions for instance, privacies of citizens would be 
at stake. If this can happen, the citizens would be up in arms and will make calls for 
the external automated access to information at DoHA by SAPS and other 
departments to be stopped. In this way, automation of access by SAPS, to 
information at DoHA would be in conflict with the security policies and will be the 
cause for the process to be stopped and pose as an inhibiting factor. 
 He said that under the circumstances then it can correctly be said that the 
automation of access to information is acting as the inhibitor to crime operations 
despite the automation having the potential to greatly benefit the process. Most 
participants at DoHA echoes the sentiments that as long as controls are not 
implemented to permit only legal access to information, the threat of leakages will 
result in automated access not being secured and safe and thereby negating on 
implementation of effective crime operations. 
  Skills are also raised as challenges that can render the automation process as 
inhibiting to crime operations. DHAEX01believes that:  
Since only security cleared and vetted police officials are eligible to access the 
premises and the DoHA systems, therefore should these officials not have the 
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necessary technical skills required to understand the DoHA applications, this could 
negate on automated access which can in turn inhibit on crime operations. This can 
also have the same effects if the trained and skilled officials commit security 
breaches and are removed from the system. The system at DoHA works different 
from the SAPS’ system which requires intense training for SAPS officials to make 
sense of. 
This, as he further explains, calls for the two departments to cooperate in 
various ways to ensuring that they maximize the benefits that can be offered by the 
interactions of their systems.  
4.10.10   Manual access concerns for crime operations   
As in privacy concerns, authentication measures must be in place but with 
minimum process delays performed by vetted and security cleared officials from 
both SAPS and DoHA who are sworn to secrecy. The cabinets or any other container 
of personal information and details from offices or in transit between SAPS and 
DoHA offices must be sealed with auditable registered seals. Buildings must be 
physically secured and guarded to ensure that information is not contaminated or 
damaged so that it can be useful to crime operations. 
The authorized officials must open and process the personal information 
documents only in locked offices where unauthorized officials are not allowed to 
enter. The document containers must be sealed and seals registered before they can 
be taken out of the offices for transportation between departments. Authorized SAPS 
and DoHA personnel have to know one another and work closer together. They must 
all be security cleared, vetted and sworn to secrecy by signing confidentiality 
clauses. Information being exchanged between the two departments must always be 
enclosed in containers with registered seals that have number tags. All officials must 
sign for removing and returning personal information documents being processed. 
4.10.11   Automated access concerns for crime operations   
The biometric fingerprint identification to authenticate the user accessing the 
computer system must be part of the passwords and the Persal or identification 
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numbers serving as user names to identify any authorized user before allowing 
automated local or remote access. It is correct, according to DoHA participants to 
allow both authorized SAPS and DoHA officials to share buildings albeit in different 
offices to exchange information to ensure that it always lands in the designated 
personnel. This would enable fast legal automated access to enhance the police 
intelligence operations and the courts. The systems must always be secured and no 
illegal entrants should be allowed in the buildings housing the offices mentioned. 
The participants feel strongly about physical security of premises as well. 
They indicate this when some of them mention that even though the ICT systems 
responsible for the fingerprint processing require passwords for access, the 
equipment must still not be physically accessible by any unauthorized officials who, 
where possible, must also not see them. The necessary protection software must be 
used to only allow those who are allowed to access the system locally or remotely.   
4.11   The privacy requirements of policy at DoHA 
The privacy concerns at DoHA are the primary reason why security measures 
are being implemented. While it is easier to implement internal security to protect 
the department’s databases, privacy of information that is being made available and 
shared with external departments like SAPS is still a big concern for DoHA even 
though it is virtually impossible to control the security measures over such 
information once it is no longer in their possession. 
DoHA can therefore only rely on trust that other departments who are also 
subjected to and should be in compliance with the requirements of information 
policy to use personal information in accordance with the relevant laws. The 
department has also therefore made certain requests for SAPS for instance, which is 
one of the departments that is allowed access to information at DoHA to follow 
certain procedures for access to its information to minimize the concerns of privacy 
that may be aggravated by the possible implementation of remote automation of 
access by SAPS, to information in its possession.   
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4.11.1   Compliance of manual access   
DoHA restricts information to ensure that it never lands in wrong hands 
except into those of authorized police officials or of its employees for instance. 
DHAEX02 explains this as follows:  
Only SAPS personnel who have applied for fingerprint identification information 
and where approved to receive such information from DoHA are allowed access to 
such information after authenticating their identification and clearing their requests 
after thorough verification. 
The participants at DoHA are unanimous on the safety of the information as 
they share similar feeling about the utilization of trusted individuals who must be 
authorized from both their department and the police as being aimed at ensuring that 
the process of the enquiry is legal and that only the relevant personal information 
being requested is retrieved, protected from falling into wrong hands and exchanged 
with authorized police officials to comply with the requirements of privacy. No one 
is allowed to enter the offices in which citizens’ personal identification information 
is stored unless such individuals are authorized.   
4.11.2   Compliance of automated access  
Only authorized personnel possesses access cards or their fingerprints are 
authenticated by the system to enable only authorized personnel to access the 
information from the National Population Register (NPR) or Home Affairs National 
Information System (HANIS). DHAEX02 explained his staff used to comply with 
procedures for ease of use of the automated environment as follows: 
If a correct identification number is typed in the computer that manages the database 
management system for the NPR or a fingerprints are scanned into the HANIS, then 
the accurate matching personal identification information of the owner of the 
identification number or of the fingerprints respectively is retrieved with minimal 
efforts.     
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He how ever immediately reminds the researcher of the concept of “garbage 
in, garbage out”, which he says that this was at minimal levels at DoHA as they 
perform occasional verification processes.   
4.11.3   Manual access procedures     
DHADR02 explains that manual access to information procedures that are 
followed by employees and other external individuals like the police when applying 
for, or are being granted permission to receive personal identification information 
from their department are as follows: 
The authorization procedure that is being followed by officials through vetting for 
instance is aimed at ensuring that only allowed officials can gain access to and use 
information from us. The fingerprint identification information at here is only made 
accessible to authorized personnel to avoid violations of the privacy of the nation at 
large. Once information is in the hands of police it is up to them to maintain our 
trust to protect the information for the future co-operation between the two 
departments. Our relationship should be based on trust and understanding.   
It is with this understanding that the police receive and use personal 
information from DoHA in accordance with the legal purposes for which the 
information was requested. This is according to the DHADR01 who further added to 
his subordinate’s authorization procedure comments that the security measures are 
aimed at preserving the privacy concerns in the environment that is only permitting 
authorized access to personal information. 
4.11.4   Automated access procedure     
  While the DoHA participants are convinced that the “computer” as they 
occasionally refer to the keyboards and screens at their tables, will not allow any 
individual to gain entry to its system without been granted permission, DHACO01, 
who is the consultant from the private company explains this in a more technical 
jargon and says: 
…the user profile of each user is issued with access rights that are granted to such a 
user to determine the transaction type that is permissible on each of all the records 
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in the database. These transaction types are, amongst others, “delete”, “remove”, 
“add”, “save” and “change” or “modify” a record. Each user’s transaction in the 
database is based on this user authority levels. No one can perform any transaction 
using their designated user-names and passwords which is outside what their 
granted rights stipulate. It is for this reason that you see cashiers calling their 
superiors to change something in the systems if they have committed errors or if they 
want to reverse a certain transaction because their user profiles only allow them to 
“add” money and not to change any transaction that had completed its execution. 
Our client’s systems are also built on the same access control levels which allows 
those with more seniority to perform certain transactions which only they can 
perform at that level because they have been granted with relevant access rights to 
do so. A fraudulent transaction may be performed by a junior employee or police 
official if the get hold of their senior’s user-names and passwords to gain entry into 
the system. This is also what the hackers are known to be doing at other people’s 
systems without permission. 
DHADR02 also added his voice to the procedures of automated access by 
explaining that during investigations of cases for instance where an individual’s 
details are not correctly captured in the system as shown in their identification 
documents, once the concerns were validated and the details in the HANIS needs to 
be changed, even he could not effect the changes. He has to make recommendations 
to those who have the authority in the system to effect the changes and correct the 
details of the citizens directly.  
4.11.5   Concerns regarding manual access    
The participants at DoHA argue that from their side the security protocols are 
observed by employees who have all been vetted and security cleared.  They believe 
that if ever the privacy of citizens and the nation at large can be at risk, this can come 
from the side of the cops as they say that compliance to privacy is dependent on the 
security provided by cops on the information once it is removed from DoHA site.  
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The officials and police who are not cleared according to security 
requirements may not be suitable for handling sensitive personal information that the 
DoHA is exchanging with the police. This, as they go on to elaborate, may result in 
leakages that will violate privacy. “Privacy should not be violated if we stick to 
current procedures and requirements. If we can do that then information can be 
safely and securely exchanged”, said DHADR02. 
4.11.6   Concerns regarding automated access      
The system is programmed to restrict access to only those security cleared 
and vetted officers, if these officials abides by the law, the requirements for non 
disclosure and the secrecy of information will be complied with and no violation of 
privacy through information leakages will occur. DHACO01 explains the automation 
challenges that may raise concern for the safety of the information in transit: 
The tight security measures implemented into the database managements system that 
runs the HANIS does not necessarily guarantee that there will be no unauthorized 
access as this is totally dependent on those with the authority to keep their 
passwords safely protected from wrong hands. Opening the system to enable and 
allow remote access over the network is like anyone walking out of their house to 
walk in the risky and rough streets at night where possible criminals are roaming 
around. Even though one is armed for protection against the criminal elements, the 
safety of being armed is still not as safer as when one is safely locked in their houses. 
Information in the databases that do not permit external access is safer than when it 
is in the server that permit external access, or worse still, when it is in transit over 
the network between its destinations where various risks and threats of landing in 
wrong hands are more on the increase even though there are security measures in 
place for network transmissions. 
The departments will however have to make do with the network security as 
information has to be shared to overcome crime. Unfortunately the commitment of 
DoHA personnel to serve the police and stop crime in its tracks through remote 
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transmission is just a dream since the DHADR01 says that their systems and those of 
the SAPS are not technically compatible to achieve such automated access. 
4.11.7   Relevance of privacy to crime operations   
 The participants agree that the security measures are implemented to ensure 
that the privacy requirements which can be problematic if not preserved are upheld. 
Wrong identification details falling into wrong hands can be stolen and used by 
criminals that fake their details for cyber crimes, open bank accounts or access their 
individual’s bank accounts etc. The rate of crime will increase if information details 
are randomly accessible by unauthorized personnel to violate privacy. Security is 
necessary to avoid any violation of privacy where an innocent individual may 
become arrested due to their details being used by criminals while they, as victims 
are innocent. This therefore according to most participants means that if the 
requirements of privacy are respected then crime operations systems will be accurate 
when the police access information at DoHA. 
4.11.8   Manual access as inhibiting the identification process  
The violation of privacy is the results of lack of adequate security measures 
and this will have the same negative results as with lack of security. According to 
DHADR02, the verification process and the protocol procedures aimed at 
compliance to privacy may be necessary but they consume a lot of time before the 
personal identification information is retrieved to reach its destination at various 
police stations or courts. Other destinations may be crime information offices 
stationed in the premises of the police stations in various regions or at the local 
criminal record centers which are also located in the police stationed in the regions 
of all provinces. This process inhibits on the effectiveness of crime operations. 
4.11.9   Automated access as inhibiting the identification process  
DHADR01 explained how privacy policy requirements for automated access 
to information might derail crime operations:   
We perform instant retrieval of personal identification details for the owner of all ten 
fingers’ fingerprints that are scanned simultaneously from HANIS and this is the 
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only time we are satisfied that only the real owners’ details will be retrieved without 
including those of other individuals to violate their privacies due to them being 
innocent in this case. But where latent fingerprints which are not always visible and 
are drawn randomly from crime scenes which results in them sometimes retrieving 
wrong details, these are viewed as being in violation of the privacies of the owners of 
the wrong personal details that are retrieved. This has resulted in very restrictive 
control measures being implemented for privacy concerns on the automated access 
process done through the latent fingerprint searches. Even though the latent 
fingerprint searches, which are the instances where one fingerprint is compared with 
all South African’s ten fingers (a one to many search) is an automated process, these 
searches take too long with inhibiting implications for the police crime operations. 
While the biggest challenges for the police is to identify the owners of the 
fingerprints that are collected from crime scenes, the system at DoHA according to 
the DHADR01 was not designed to perform searches based on individual and 
isolated fingerprints  
4.11.10   Concerns regarding manual access for crime reduction 
The Director points out that DoHA requires all police members being 
identified to be registered at DoHA for the processing of fingerprint identifications to 
be security cleared even though this requirement is relaxed to allow the minimum 
delays in the processes. This he says is because the process of vetting takes too long. 
He also said that the police should prioritize the clearance processes so that DoHA 
could provide automated access rights to the civil database for the police. 
4.11.11   Concerns regarding automated access for crime operations 
The user names and passwords should clearly identify the officers accessing 
the system and should store the transaction details of officers for accountability. The 
SAPS personnel can be subjected to the same authorization procedures required to be 
performed on DoHA personnel to exclude those that are unauthorized from accessing 
the systems to ensure that only legal access to the systems is achieved for privacy of 
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information. Anybody taking a shift should be allocated identifications that will 
point all transactions to specific individuals.  
4.12   Citizen identification process 
In order to protect the identities of citizens, the personal identification details 
of the citizens are stored in the National Population Register (NPR) and the Home 
Affairs National Identification System (HANIS), which identifies individuals 
through their fingerprints. DoHA performs the civic services which include the 
recording of personal particulars with a view to issuing identity documents (IDs) to 
enable unique identification through identity numbers and by means of fingerprints 
and photographs to confirm identities once details are retrieved. 
 By being able to identify everybody through their identification numbers and 
fingerprints, DoHA is also able to serve other departments that need to verify and 
authenticate the identities of their clients like SAPS in particular who always have a 
need for accurately identifying suspects in their crime combating and prevention 
operations. SAPS submits the identification numbers or fingerprints of suspects to 
DoHA who keys the identity numbers into their system or scan the fingerprints to 
produce accurate personal identification details that are provided to the police to 
enable them to take correct actions against suspects during their crime operations.  
4.13   e-Governance developments   
Traditionally, the fingerprint authentication at DoHA used to be a manual 
legacy paper system process of checking which was consuming a lot of time while it 
was also according to the HANIS Website not very accurate and was unmanageable. 
This is due to the manual database becoming too large with time as the volume of 
files continued to grow and hence became unmanageable. To overcome these 
challenges, DoHA engaged a third party supplier company, NEC which introduced 
the Home Affairs National Identification System (HANIS) which is the world’s 
largest civilian fingerprint identification database that has provided DoHA with a 
fully integrated 10 fingerprint identity solution to cater for over 50 million adults 
citizens in South Africa (HANIS, no date).          
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HANIS is a digital database that implemented a one to many (1:n) search 
database as the system’s core ICT to ensures that every single new and existing 
fingerprint could be properly processed, verified and is accessible in real time with 
the accuracy rates of more than 99.9%. This is according to the Website which also 
states that the system’s capability has also ensured that the database records which 
are in excess of 30 million are now digitally and securely stored in the database 
while the search engine demonstrates a significant improvement in accuracy. The 
Website further explains that HANIS is currently capable of storing and searching up 
to 50 million records. 
4.14   Chapter summary and overview of the next chapter   
Data was successfully gathered from officials of SAPS and DoHA through 
semi-structured interviews which went well even though the police were mostly 
uneasy at sharing information about their operations with a stranger who claimed to 
be a student. The findings from both SAPS and DoHA are accordingly categorized 
into themes based on the units of analysis in the form of the requirements of policy 
being accessibility, security and privacy. 
These findings will now be analyzed in the next chapter five.   
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CHAPTER FIVE: ANALYSIS OF POLICY   
5.1   Introduction 
The mandate of SAPS is to reduce crime hence they must always be able to 
identify all the perpetrators while that of DoHA is to ensure that all citizens and other 
persons in the country are properly registered and hence they must always be able to 
identify all citizens and visitors. This is therefore creating a very important overlap 
between the departments’ mandates. Since information at DoHA is used to identify 
all citizens, this has necessitated a need for access by SAPS to information held by 
DoHA for the identification of perpetrators to benefit crime reduction efforts. This 
process has however met with challenges as it is currently manual and too slow for 
the police to be effective in the crime reduction operations.   
This has led to the need for the implementation of e-governance to automate 
access by SAPS, to information held by DoHA. While this will overcome the 
challenges of the optimization of crime reduction operations, the automation may 
potentially compound the policy conflict that will raise the concerns relating to 
privacy to higher levels. Both departments are interested in an effective policy for 
the guidelines for developing e-governance to automate access by SAPS, to 
information held by DoHA which is needed for the identification of all perpetrators 
to enhance the crime reduction process. 
5.1.1   SAPS crime reduction 
South Africa is faced by high crime levels that threaten the safety of citizens. 
The country is rated amongst the high crime countries (SAPS, 2010). The police are 
continually devising means of reducing crime. One of the strategies they are 
applying to reduce crime is the identification of the perpetrators. Since some of the 
crimes being committed are detected and hence reduced as the results of police 
actions, the police are intensifying the current manual identification of perpetrators 
through fingerprints and have automated the fingerprint processing for rapid, 
accurate and remote identification of the perpetrators.    
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The automation of access to information held by government for the 
identification of perpetrators with the intention of reducing crime has become an 
international norm. Schiller (2006) provides an example of the Erlanger, Ky., police 
department that used manual operations. Once the officials there adopted automation 
of access to information and gained the necessary ICT operations knowledge, 
Schiller explains that the shared searchable crime databases and systems enabled the 
officials to identify perpetrators remotely from their patrol cars.   
5.1.2   The process of identifying perpetrators  
The police are currently performing the identification of perpetrators at two 
levels. The first level takes place internally where they identify a suspect who has a 
criminal record and hence they can retrieve the suspect’s identification details from 
their databases through the suspect’s fingerprints. The second level concerns the 
identification done at DoHA for a non convict suspect whose personal details do not 
exist in the police system’s database. The latter level is manual and slow since the 
fingerprints have to be physically transported to and from DoHA offices from all 
police stations through the CCRC. This manual process is despite SAPS and DoHA 
having automated their internal fingerprint identification processes where SAPS and 
DoHA are able to identify convicted perpetrators and all citizens including visitors 
respectively. 
5.1.2.1   Manual identification  
The physical transportation of the fingerprints from police stations and 
CCRC as well as between the latter and DoHA takes too long over a period that is 
mostly longer than the detention limited set by the law. This undermines the crime 
reduction process of the police since the perpetrators have to be released within 48 
working court hours of being detained if the police action depends on the 
identification of the perpetrators which is taking longer than the detention period.  
5.1.2.2   Automated identification  
The two departments have each implemented e-governance to automate their 
fingerprint identification functions which enables for instant identifications of 
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perpetrators and citizens at SAPS and DoHA respectively. The automation of access 
to information at SAPS is also limited to the identification of convicted perpetrators. 
Even though information policy enables and guides the process of access, by SAPS 
to information held by DoHA, e-governance is not implemented to automate access 
by SAPS, to information held by DoHA. Since such automation raises challenges of 
policy conflicts, it would be important for an enabling e-governance policy to be 
established.    
5.2   Broad access to information policy 
In order to balance the right of access to information held by government, the 
policy includes three requirements that must be complied with in order to enable 
access to information while catering for possible associated concerns. The 
accessibility requirement calls for the promotion of access to information held by the 
state while the second, the security requirement calls for the effective protection of 
information to comply with the third requirement that relate to the privacy of 
citizens. 
 Various initiatives that were undertaken for the formulation of access to 
information policy includes broad consultations of the stakeholders in government at 
various levels, a range of civil organizations and non-governmental organizations as 
well as the public in general participates.   
5.3   Access to information legislation  
Sections 32(1)(a) and 32(1)(b) of the Constitution provides that everyone has 
the right of access to any information held by the State and for the horizontal 
application of the right of access to information held by another person to everyone 
when that information is required for the exercise or protection of any rights 
respectively. The Constitution also calls for national legislation to be enacted to give 
effect to this right in section 32. The Promotion of Access to Information act, No. 2 
of 2000 is thus the resulting national legislation that was enacted to give effect to this 
right in section 32 of the Constitution. 
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The Constitution also calls for the State to respect, protect, promote and 
fulfill at least all the rights in the Bill of Rights which include the right of everyone 
to privacy. The right of access to information held by a public or private body is 
therefore not absolute and may be limited to the extent that the limitations are 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom as contemplated in section 36 of the Constitution.   
Section 30 of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution guarantees protection for 
every one against others and also guarantees the right of every one to communicate 
or be communicated to in the language of their choices. To ensure that this is 
possible, Section 6 of the Constitution identifies eleven official languages of South 
Africa.  
5.4   e-Governance planning and developments   
e-Governance initiatives in South Africa were taken at the highest level 
within government structures including the Presidency. The process also followed a 
wide consultative path where all government departments were represented together 
with Ngo’s and the public in general. The development were driven by the 
attainment of the Vision 2014 which calls for the inclusive information where ICT is 
effectively utilized and harnessed to, amongst others, modernize the ICT 
infrastructure to deliver citizen centric services. This is according to the Presidential 
National Commission in the Information Society and Development Plan or ISAD 
Plan (PNC-ISAD, 2006).  
5.5   e-Governance policy    
One of the first initiatives for e-governance policy formulation was provided 
by the country’s vision 2014 strategy in which South Africa is described as an 
inclusive information society where the government has modernized the ICT 
infrastructure to provide, amongst others, quality services to the communities. The e-
governance policy initiatives is centrally coordinated by the Department of Public 
Service and Administration (DPSA) that consulted broadly throughout government 
stakeholders (GITO Council) and involved both non-government organizations and 
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civil society in general to launch a national IT policy framework (DPSA, 2001). This 
framework created the basis for the implementation of e-governance for the public 
institutions.  
The DPSA policy framework contains recommendations that the policy 
makers should ensure that the e-government initiative should, amongst others, 
address the intra-governmental operations (G2G). The Framework also emphasizes 
that the implementation of ICT was to be done in phases. Since then, there have been 
various e-governance policy measures and efforts at various tiers of government that 
are aimed at utilizing ICT to improve operations which would facilitate better access 
and services to the communities. 
5.6   Key aspects of public policy                                                                                                   
The access to information policy addresses the rights of access to information 
held by government as well as the rights of everyone to privacy which requires 
adequate security measures to be implemented to protect citizens’ personal 
information held by government. Some of the key aspects of policy which also plays 
a role in crime reduction are as follows: it enables access to information held by 
government: enhances crime reduction by enabling the identification of perpetrators: 
enables the identification of all citizens: determine the status of the information 
society of a country:  require security to protect information and: requires privacy of 
citizens to be maintained. 
5.7   The analysis of the findings     
All the themes and sub-themes have been summarized and categorized 
according to the three requirements of policy being, accessibility, security and 
privacy as the main themes as well as how they affect crime reduction through their 
role on the implementation of e-governance.   
5.7.1   The analysis of the accessibility requirements of policy 
The accessibility requirement of policy requires access by a department, to 
information held by another department to be enabled. The requirement also calls for 
access to information to be properly controlled to ensure that it is used legally and 
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for the purposes for which access was granted. This research was therefore 
conducted to investigate if access by SAPS, to information held by DoHA was being 
allowed as per the requirement of this policy.    
The findings reveal that DoHA does provide SAPS with the identification 
information under controlled and secure environment where the fingerprints or 
identity numbers of perpetrators are brought to DoHA offices by authorized 
personnel and physically handed over. The DoHA officials performs the fingerprint 
processing after authenticating each request to ensure adherence to legal 
requirements before feedback to the police. There is no specific period for the return 
of the feedback from DoHA since this, according to DoHA, depends on its own 
volume of daily work and that of SAPS. Both SAPS’ and DoHA’s officials have 
good communications and are committed to following access to information 
procedures where they were able to explain various methods and procedures. It also 
came to light that the pre-described procedures enabled the departments to 
successfully adhere to the requirements of accessibility policy.   
It is clear from the findings that manual access to information has been 
posing some challenges such as taking too long to provide the evidence that are 
being awaited by the police for prosecution of suspects, for instance. This has for 
some times, in many cases failed, as further indicated by the findings, to contribute 
positively to the police’ objectives especially during emergencies which negated on 
police operations. Where manual access to information is successfully utilized, it is 
found to be very helpful in assisting the police in the identification processes.  
 The findings also revealed that as far as the personal attitudes of DoHA 
employees are concerned, they have been mostly found to be in support of both 
manual and automated access, by SAPS to information held by DoHA as long as this 
is done in accordance with the policy requirements. A further revelation from the 
findings is that the police are abiding by the policy and procedures of the 
accessibility requirement of policy internally when they gather information, use and 
store it. This was also found to be the case when they obtain and process information 
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from DoHA which also processes information according to policy requirements as 
evidenced from the findings.  
The findings also revealed that being in compliance to policy was not the 
only reason DoHA enabled SAPS to access its information. DoHA employees also 
understood how access, by SAPS to information in its possession was relevant to the 
success of crime operations. It was further revealed that DoHA understands that 
crime is a national priority that was to be tackled by all South Africans who should 
all support the police. 
Since employees are not acting as barriers, and policy is neither inhibiting 
access to information while the concerns raised can be addressed by the utilization of 
authorized officials, the presented barriers of slow turn around feedback requires the 
implementation of e-governance. E-governance has the capability to enhance crime 
reduction by automating access by SAPS to information held by DoHA needed for 
rapid identification of perpetrators.  
5.7.2   The analysis of the security requirements of policy 
The security requirement of access to information policy requires adequate 
security measures to be implemented to protect information held by government or 
which is in transit between departments. This is to ensure that information is not used 
for unintended purposes. This research was therefore conducted to investigate if the 
security measures were being implemented as per the requirements of policy. 
The findings reveal that both DoHA employees and the police officials are 
committed to following procedures where they were able to explain various methods 
and procedures which they have been following to adhere to requirements of security 
policy in terms of restricting physical access to fingerprints offices etc.  The findings 
also revealed that SAPS have been subjected to manual access to information 
security procedures.   
The findings reveal that both SAPS and DoHA have implemented security 
measures to protect personal identification information in their possession and in the 
processes during manual access, by SAPS to information held by DoHA. The 
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physical security measures being implemented were found to include but not limited 
to offices that are always locked and protected with steel burglar proofed doors and 
windows where entry is highly controlled. This has enabled both departments to 
ensure that information and evidence being provided at courts were credible and 
contributing to the court prosecutions.  
This has been successfully implemented where sole office occupants were 
revealed to be the sole custodian of keys to such offices. It was further revealed that 
there were various procedures being followed by the departments to follow security 
policy requirements where DoHA employees and police officials have to be 
subjected to authorization procedures and being sworn to secrecy which has over the 
time been successfully implemented to ensure that information at both departments 
and in transit between them is always protected by trusted officials. According to the 
findings, these officials followed security procedures where each of them has to 
follow identification procedure before being allowed entry into offices containing 
sensitive documents or before being given such documents for which they sign. This 
has also enabled the police that are approaching the courts for the prosecution of 
suspects to produce reliable evidence that was not accessed and contaminated by 
unauthorized individuals.         
The findings revealed that the departments have also implemented security 
measures to protect their electronic databases where access is controlled through 
various measures such as user profiles, passwords, access cards and biometric 
applications that read an individual’s fingerprints to authenticate their identities for 
instance. It could be established that both departments were satisfied that security 
measures were necessary for the protection and reliability of the information in their 
database.  
While the security requirements for SAPS at DoHA were suspected to be one 
of the obstacles of automated access by SAPS, to information held by DoHA, on the 
contrary, the findings reveal that the inadequacy of, or lack of security measures at 
SAPS needed to protect information retrieved from DoHA could impede crime 
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operations as this could be used by DoHA as the reason to block access, by SAPS to 
information held by DoHA. 
Some concerns revealed are that the security of information can be 
jeopardized by the repeated trips between the SAPS and DoHA which are made for 
the same fingerprints that are mostly returned unprocessed by the Central criminal 
record centers to the Local criminal record centers or police stations due to bad 
quality of manual fingerprints. The security concerns for automated access to 
information is that the authorization process takes too long and that officials are 
trained with ICT skills before their results are returned. If these are returned negative 
and skilled officials have to be removed from classified operations, this will create 
problems as ICT skills are scarce.  
The departments are both in compliance with the security measures being 
implemented and persons from both departments are constantly in communication 
and are aware of the risks associated with access to information. Under these 
conditions, since they are also aware of the security capabilities of e-governance 
applications, an effective and adaptive e-governance policy can be formulated to 
enable the implementation of e-governance to expedite crime operations. This can be 
achieved by utilizing it for the automation of access by SAPS, to information held by 
DoHA which is required to enhance the identification of perpetrators.    
5.7.3   The analysis of the privacy requirements of policy 
 The privacy requirement of policy is about ensuring that information of 
private citizens held by government should always and only be accessible by 
authorized personnel who must not use it without the citizen’s permission except for 
lawful purposes. This research was therefore conducted to investigate if privacy 
requirements were being complied with by SAPS and DoHA during access by SAPS, 
to information held by DoHA.  
The findings reveal that both DoHA employees and the police officials are 
committed to following procedures where they were able to explain various methods 
and procedures which they have been following to adhere to requirements of privacy 
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policy. The findings also revealed that SAPS have been subjected to manual access 
to information privacy procedures. The police are also expected to adhere to the 
privacy policy requirements during automated access, by SAPS to information held 
by DoHA as a public institution. 
The findings reveal that both SAPS and DoHA have implemented privacy 
measures to protect personal identification information in their possession and in the 
processes during manual access, by SAPS to information held by DoHA. The 
physical security measures being implemented such as offices that are always locked 
and protected with steel burglar proofed doors and windows where entry is highly 
controlled, is done mostly for the purposes of complying with the privacy 
requirements. 
The burglared doors at entrances of buildings and offices are marked in bold 
letters that say, “No unauthorized access” which according to the findings are 
measures of security aimed at minimizing unauthorized access to the personal 
identification information being stored or being in transit between both SAPS and 
DoHA.  According to the findings, all these measures are at not only complying with 
policy, but to also ensure that the privacy of citizens is not violated. The revelation 
from the findings indicate that DoHA employees are more concerned about the 
privacy of citizens while some of the police officials regard the privacy procedures 
as mandatory to be followed.   
Where automated access to information takes place, it was found that both 
departments utilizes passwords and user profiles which act as security measures to 
only allow access in accordance with prescribed limitation to ensure that only 
authorized users can view only what was prescribed for them to see. When the 
departments subjected their users to the authorization procedures, this was found to 
have brought consistency in the maintenance of privacy requirements since the 
departments’ process personal details of citizens.   
The findings reveal that there are concerns being raised by DoHA that 
privacy of individuals could be compromised if security measures are not adequately 
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implemented. Where remote and automated access to information by SAPS, to 
information held by DoHA can be implemented without proper security measures, 
this can raise potential threats of hackers who can remotely access the system to 
violate the privacy of citizens or contaminate the information to distort evidence for 
instance, which might work against crime operations.  
It was also found that maintenance of privacy was as high amongst the police 
as it was for DoHA, this was found to be due to the feedback from DoHA regarded 
as being direct related to crime. Violation of both security and privacy raises 
concerns of the police since this is associated with the contamination of evidence 
where crime levels may go up as criminals may fake their identities and impersonate 
others for instance, and commit more crime. Violation of privacy therefore is found 
to inhibit crime operations. By contrast, if the police can comply with the 
requirements of privacy as laid down by DoHA, it was found that this would enable 
crime operations since DoHA regards compliance to privacy as a condition to 
supporting access or automated access, by SAPS to information at DoHA.   
SAPS and DoHA share the same security objectives since the former views 
unauthorized access to information impacting on validity of evidence while for 
DoHA, this constitute a persistent and serious crime of stolen identity that is causing 
the department countless problems. Since both departments are in agreement on the 
need to enhance crime reduction, and they are also in communication and agreement 
on the manual and automated security measures, the formulation of e-governance 
policy would be easier achieved to automate access by SAPS to information held by 
DoHA. 
5.7.4   The analysis of crime reduction against global trends    
In terms of this research, crime reduction operations are in relation to those 
carried out through the identification of perpetrators where the police can take 
appropriate actions like effecting arrests, charging or releasing perpetrators, for 
instance. Since the successful identification of perpetrators requires the cooperation 
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of more than one department, the integration of systems and information of the 
participating institutions has become necessary.    
According to the literature review, Schiller says that that the police 
department, like the Erlanger, Ky., police department that used manual operations to 
process crime information faced numerous challenges and could not share 
information and benefit from the integrations. Once the department automated their 
systems and integrated with other operational areas and departments, the officers 
could quickly access information or share it across different operational areas to 
identify perpetrators even when driving in patrol cars. Crime intelligence, which 
concerns information that is manipulated to help the police prevent, combat and 
reduce crime, is comprised of information that is integrated from various sources that 
produce crime relevant information.  
In order to reduce crime, the police have to collaborate with many different 
organizations. This was evidenced from the Nigerian authorities when they built 
their crime intelligence system to reduce crime. According to Alese and Falaki 
(2007) the Nigerians included various different government agencies and 
stakeholders’ whose information requirements were taken into account to facilitate 
ease of access to its information by all who are concerned and authorized while it 
also enables inputs from various internal and external sources.   
5.7.5   The analysis of policy formulation against global trends    
Access to information policy promotes access by everyone, to information 
held by government as well as promoting for security to be implemented to protect 
the information against privacy violation for instance. The government undertook 
efforts at creating an environment of transparent and participatory policy formulation 
processes including information policy. The government also tried to comply with 
the freedom of expression and freedom of access to government information rights 
as enshrined in the Constitution ant took various initiatives on access to information 
that were also put in place to ensure the attainment of universal access to government 
information. The initiatives included the implementation of government to citizens’ 
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communications through multi-purpose community centers (MPCC) and implemented a 
mechanism to survey the implemented MPCC to establish means of strengthening 
them to achieve their intended purposes.  
According to Jaeger (2007) information policy provides the control measures 
which are necessary to put in place some limits or security to exclude access to 
certain types of information where privacy concerns may be sited as the reason for 
instance. Buckland (1991) says that in order to be as inclusive as possible and to 
reach as many communities as possible, the access to information policy makers 
must take various factors that enable access to information into account when 
formulating access to information policies. These can be in the form of 
communication language and the cost of the process of access to information for 
instance. By ensuring that a policy that enables access to information held by 
government is in place, this is ensuring compliance to international law (Mathiesen, 
2008).   
5.7.6   The analysis of legislation against global trends    
The Promotion of Access to Information Amendment Act 54 of  2002.  gives 
effect to the constitutional right of access to information held by government in a 
speedy, cost effective and effortless manner. According to the law, access to 
information held by government or any one has to be allowed if information is 
required for the exercise or protection of any rights. The law also gives effect to the 
right to privacy by everyone and thereby limiting the right of access to information 
under certain conditions. 
According to Sharma and Gopal (2006) personal information in the hands of 
government is collected and used specifically for lawful functions and can be 
disclosed to third parties without the owner’s consent strictly if it is permitted by 
law, if the disclosure thereof is for reasonably necessary for law enforcement etc.  
While the legislation is in compliance with the global trends, it does not set 
out time frames or deadlines for the transfer of information to help SAPS to comply 
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with other legislation like the Criminal Procedure act which sets out the detention 
deadlines.    
5.7.7   The analysis of e-governance findings between SAPS and DoHA  
Even though the departments have each developed e-governance programs 
for their internal automated access to information for identification of perpetrators 
and citizens at SAPS and DoHA respectively, automated access between the 
departments is not implemented to automate access by SAPS, to information held by 
DoHA. According to the findings, two of the reasons were revealed.  
The first barrier is the requirement by the courts that all printed material from 
DoHA must bear the signature of the DoHA DG to be acceptable as evidence in 
courts. This renders printed material that can be remotely obtained by SAPS from 
DoHA through the automated process to be unrecognized and useless as evidence at 
the courts.    
The findings also revealed that the second barrier was caused by the designs 
of both departments’ systems which are incompatible and would need huge 
investment to design and implement the interfaces to link the two systems. This was 
evidenced by the failure of the DoHA system to instantly identify perpetrator owners 
of the latent fingerprints taken from the scenes of crime by the police. The latter 
identification process is the main source of focus for SAPS.   
5.7.8   e-Governance development process against global trends 
The Presidential National Commission in the Information Society and 
Development Plan or ISAD Plan (PNC-ISAD, 2006) is the entity that was used to 
initiate the e-governance development plan in South Africa and must therefore 
represent the executive coordinator that is required. According to Klischewski 
(2011), this complies with one of the conditions required for the successful 
development of e-governance, the presence of an executive with adequate authority 
to oversee the process.   
The second requirement for successful e-governance development process is 
an adaptive policy and regulations as explained by Paskaleva-Shapira (2006) which 
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Michel (2005) says should be continually evaluated. South Africa addressed this 
requirement when the IT policy framework and regulations were formulated to 
provide guidelines for all public institutions to implement various initiatives that are 
aimed at better government (DPSA, 2001).   
Failure to comply with the e-governance development requirements results in 
the implemented solutions failing to deliver the desired benefits which Klischewski 
(2011) explains as the delivered of architectures that are not relevant to the specific 
context.   
5.7.8.1   Automated access to information in South Africa   
 South Africa has set Minimum Inter-operability Standards (MIOS) which laid 
a foundation for effective government to government (G2G) communications that 
utilizes e-governance to automate access by a department to information held by 
another department. This process is regulated through the Amendment of Public 
Service Regulations of 5 January 2001 (RSA, 2001).  
 According to Shapard (1996) all government departments locally or globally 
are either in the process of inter-connecting to share information or have already 
implemented. e-Governance has the interoperability function that is capable to 
integrate the systems of the departments that are remotely dispersed while enabling 
the systems to be controlled by different individuals who may be locally or remotely 
located and yet achieving this feet at optimized and integrated government 
operations at lower operational costs (Klischewski, 2011).   
Gordon (2002) says that e-governance can also be utilized to transform the 
traditional hierarchical organizational structures that operated separately in silos of 
authoritarian top down decision and policy making models to multiple departments 
or agencies that collaborates through loosely coupled networks. Joia (2004) refers to 
these traditional structures as outdated workflows within or between government 
departments and says that they can be replaced by establishing digital links.   
e-Governance achieves this feet by performing the Horizontal integration to 
integrate departments within the same level or the Vertical integration for different 
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levels of government departments or tiers of government such as national, provincial 
and local OECD (2003a). The integrations enable the departments to operate as a 
single organization that adopts shared platforms for the core technologies on which 
to execute common applications.   
The Enterprise Application Integration (EAI) is an example of an integrated 
e-governance model. There are four requirements for a successful implementation of 
e-governance integration model to share information between departments.   
Fan and Zhang (2007) names the four requirements where the first one, the    
Environmental requirements refer to a central coordinating executive who has 
adequate authority over the participating departments to control and coordinate the 
integration process. The second condition is the Intra-organizational requirements 
which require the top organizational support for the integrations.    
The third condition refers to the Inter-organizational requirements which 
require the need for the participants to have trust that the participants will all act in 
the best interest of the integrated environment. The fourth and last condition, the 
Perceived performance requirements refer to the perceived benefits of the integrated 
solution. 
5.7.8.2   e-Governance security    
The country has set the Minimum Information Security Standards (MISS) to 
control the security of information during automated access by a department to 
information held by another department. This process is regulated through the 
Amendment of Public Service Regulations of 5 January 2001 (RSA, 2001). MISS 
specifies security standards due to possible integrations of public operations and 
services (RSA, 2001). These standards define the requirements and conditions that 
are prerequisite for the security of a connected and web-enabled government.  
e-Governance provides security measures such as the encryption technique 
that can protect information that is being shared between two or more departments. 
The technique renders information in the network and being illegally intercepted by 
hackers to be unreadable and useless to them since they are not in possession of a 
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decryption key like the Public Key Cryptosystem and Agency Identification for 
instance. The public Key is applied to decode the information back to readable 
format (Sharma and Gopal, 2006 and Headayetullah and Pradhan, 2009) 
5.7.8.3   e-Governance policy process against global trends 
The Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) as the 
custodian of the development of ICT plans implemented an ICT policy framework 
for government which is to provide guidelines for government ICT development. 
During policy formulation, broad consultation ranging from the presidency up to 
grass roots levels were undertaken and efforts implemented to ensure central 
coordinated ICT procurement to standardize the national ICT infrastructure and 
applications. 
The DPSA policy framework contains various recommendations that include 
e-government initiatives that address the intra-governmental operations or G2G to 
address access by a department, to information held by another department. The 
policy also specifies the accessibility and security standards which are the Minimum 
Inter-operability Standards (MIOS) and the Minimum Information Security 
Standards (MISS) respectively.    
e-Governance policy development can be achieved through consultations 
where the process can be done interactively with other government departments or 
stakeholders  (Michel, 2005 and Paskaleva-Shapira, 2006).  Michel further points out 
that policy can continually undergo evaluation process.  
Various writers including Paskaleva-Shapira and Singh (2010) share the same 
view that the objectives of e-governance are the same as those for good governance. 
This means that e-governance policy has to address, amongst others, the accessibility 
and security requirements of information. The latter is necessary to protect sensitive 
or personal information to address concerns relating to privacy for instance. It has 
become important for e-governance policy to include the plans for acquisitions and 
implementations of the new technologies to ensure attainment of these requirements. 
Singh points out the importance of this as per the lessons learned from the Indian e-
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governance development where it was discovered that ignoring the technical issues 
could render the implemented solutions not to comply with the policy requirements.  
The e-governance’ accessibility Policy should also specify and detail issues 
that must be taken into consideration for the quality of the integrated and shared 
information which can be maintained by the utilization of ICT public key 
infrastructure to maintain data integrity using MD5 algorithm (Headayetullah and 
Pradhan, 2009). 
5.7.8.4   e-Governance security policy against global trends 
The South African e-governance policy initiative for security calls for the 
security standards where the regulation sets up the Minimum Information Security 
Standards (MISS) for the security of information. 
e-Governance security policy should provide for various security measures to 
protect and maintain confidentiality of information across the network between 
departments, for instance. Headayetullah and Pradhan (2009) suggest that the policy 
should include secure protocol that protects information for confidentiality by 
implementing ICT security applications like the Public Key Cryptosystem and 
Agency Identification using a unique mapping function. 
5.8   Chapter summary and overview of next chapter     
The policy guidelines that define the mandates of both SAPS and DoHA have 
been identified and taken into account during the analysis of the findings from both 
departments. The themes and findings have been analyzed and matched with 
operational practices by both departments. 
The next chapter will provide the conclusions on practices by the departments 
as these will be compared against global trends and recommendation provided in the 
same chapter six.   
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS   
6.1   Introductions  
This chapter provides the conclusions based on the analysis of the findings 
from the effects of policy on e-governance and recommendations. Policy plays a role 
on the success of crime reduction operations through its influence on e-governance 
which enables the automation of the identification of perpetrators of crime.  
If our objective as a society is to reduce and prevent crime, then there are 
specific processes and knowledge that is required to make this a reality. The 
processes include means of automated citizen identification for all citizens in order 
to be able to effectively identify perpetrators of crime from amongst the total 
population. 
Knowledge required to solve crime is about ICT skills required to perform 
automated and electronic access to information held by a department. However, it 
may not be sufficient simply to hold the electronic records of convicted criminals. It 
may be necessary to hold electronic records for all citizens and requiring citizens’ 
records to be fully electronic and available. This raises policy concerns regarding 
citizens’ rights to privacy versus government need for access to information to solve 
crime.  
6.2   Conclusions   
In order to attain the crime reduction objective of this research, the effects of 
policy on access to information held by government were studied. The aim was to 
reveal lessons needed for the formulation of effective e-governance policy to enable 
the automation of access to information held by government. The automation of 
access to information is necessary to enhance crime reduction through rapid 
identification of perpetrators.  
The conclusions are based on the analysis of the findings. The findings 
revealed that while access to information policy was not adequately effective to 
enable automated access by SAPS, to information held by DoHA, there was another 
barrier in the form of the absence of a non-adaptive e-governance policy. Figure 6.1 
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is a schematic representation of policy enablers and barriers to automated access by 
SAPS, to information held by DoHA for the identification of perpetrators. 
Figure 6.1 below indicates that while lack of policy constitutes a barrier to 
the development of e-governance, the reverse does not apply since its availability 
does not necessarily constitute an enabling environment. As the diagram shows, 
policy must not merely exist, but should be controlled and adapted to the changing 
environment that is mostly influenced by ICT. This is because policy may act as 
barrier or enabler. Even though there are other factors apart from policy that may 
play a role to affect access to information for the identification of citizens. Factors 
such as person’s attitudes, levels of competencies with regards to the operations of 
the e-governance technologies and criminal elements amongst the persons within the 
departments revealed as playing minor roles in this study. The schematic 
representation is only based on the conclusions of the role played by policy on e-
governance which is needed for the identification of perpetrators to enhance crime 
reduction. 
6.2.1   Compliance with accessibility policy 
The accessibility requirement of policy is about the promotion of access to 
information held by government. Policy calls for the right of access to information to 
be protected and effected. According to policy, access to information should only be 
used legally and for intended purposes since uncontrolled access to information my 
result in dangers of increasing stolen identity crimes for instance.    
The Department of Home Affairs has fully complied with this requirement of 
policy in granting access by SAPS to information in its possession. The challenges 
and concerns that are raised about access to information being manually done, slow 
and not assisting the police in some cases, serve as indications of unintended 
outcomes of the current policy which is therefore not adequate to enhance crime 
reduction. 
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Figure 6.1: Schematic representation of policy role on crime operations   
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6.2.2   Compliance with the security policy 
The security requirement of policy is about the promotion of the safety and 
protection of information held by government so that it is not used for unintended 
purposes.   
The Department of Home Affairs has fully complied with this requirement of 
policy in granting controlled access by SAPS to protected information in its 
possession. Security measures for manual and automated access to information were 
found to be implemented by both departments in their areas. There are agreements 
between them about the security measures and how access to information will be 
controlled to ensure their adequacy not to be too tight or otherwise to stifle or allow 
uncontrolled access to information. Security measures for both manual and 
automated access to information are however time consuming during identification 
of the police at SAPS, access control at entrances and the authentication of 
application forms for information. These measures delays the feedback from DoHA 
needed for crime reduction and therefore act as barriers to access and automated 
access by SAPS, to information held by DoHA.         
6.2.3   Compliance with the privacy policy 
The requirement of privacy policy is about ensuring that information of 
private citizens held by government is not used without their permission except as 
permissible by law.   
The Department of Home Affairs has fully complied with this requirement of 
policy in granting access by SAPS to reliable and non-contaminated information in 
its possession. In the case of automated access to information, this has also been 
carefully been granted through controlled password driven automated access by only 
authorized SAPS officials, to information in its possession. Both manual and 
automated security requirements involve processes such as continued identification 
of the police or being subjected to access control procedures to offices containing 
systems which act as barriers to crime operation due to delays.  
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6.2.4   The Identification of perpetrators against global trends    
The crime reduction strategy of this research is about the utilization of e-
governance for the identification of criminals.  
Even though both SAPS and DoHA have implemented e-governance to 
automate their internal access to information for rapid identification of perpetrators 
and citizens respectively, e-governance is not implemented to integrate their systems 
to enable automated access by SAPS, to information held by DoHA. This is due to a 
lack of an effective e-governance policy. The current access to information policy 
does not provide for automated access, by a department to information held by 
government.     
The Erlanger police department improved their identification process after 
they automated their systems and integrated with other departments and was able to 
quickly access information where they could identify perpetrators even when driving 
in patrol cars. The integration of the systems with other departments is a key 
requirement to the successful identification of all perpetrators. South Africa has 
therefore not complied with the global trends where SAPS and DoHA did not 
connect and integrate their systems. 
6.2.5   The formulation of policy versus global trends     
Even though access to information legislation in South Africa did not follow the 
normal policy formulation process that precede the law making, there has been various 
initiatives that were taken that include Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Access to 
Information process, Transparent information policy formulation process and Government 
policy initiatives on access to information which were undertaken at various stages towards 
formulating access to information policy.  
These initiatives led to the conclusion that South Africa follows a 
consultative and transparent process of policy formulation. By consultations, South 
Africa caters for the global requirements of taking factors that affect access to 
information into account since various languages have been included as 
communication medium to be accommodative to various ethnic groups. The 
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country’s policy also complies with the right of access to information in public office 
since this is also enshrined in the Constitution. This is in compliance with the 
explanations of Jaeger (2007) about how information policy controls access to 
information.  The local privacy policy calls for security measures to be implemented 
for legal and authorized access to information in compliance to accommodating the 
privacy concerns of citizens which Singh (2010) says is for confidentiality of 
personal information. Even though South African policy formulation follows the 
internationally accepted trends, the information policy and various initiatives taken 
to enable access to government information, access by SAPS to information held by 
DoHA does not enhance crime reduction. This is because South Africa did not fully 
comply with global norms since even though policy formulation is based on 
consultations, there is no policy that governs access, by a department, to information 
held by another department. If this was the case, the departments would take into 
account other departments’ needs and considerations when building their systems. 
The current policy therefore is inadequate and not adaptable to the current situation 
to enhance crime reduction.  
6.2.6   The South African legal implementation against global trends    
The access to information law gives effect to the right of access to 
information held by government while limiting the right under certain conditions 
such as for the protection of citizens’ privacies. South Africa therefore complies with 
international trends since globally, personal information in the hands of government 
should be collected and used specifically for lawful functions and can be disclosed to 
third parties without the owner’s consent strictly if it is permitted by law, if the 
disclosure thereof is for reasonably necessary for law enforcement.  
Since the access to information legislation does not set out transaction 
completion deadlines, and seeing that the Criminal Procedure act does set out 
detention time limits or deadlines, this points to the laws being enacted in isolation 
without coordination with other relevant laws.     
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6.2.7   The impact of policy on e-governance between SAPS and DoHA  
SAPS and DoHA may have implemented e-governance to automate access to 
information for the identification of perpetrators and citizens respectively but this 
does not enhance crime reduction since e-governance is not implemented to 
automated access by SAPS, to information held by DoHA. The reasons for this have 
nothing to do with the policy practices by DoHA officials as per the analysis of the 
findings. This has to do with the lack of an effective and adaptable e-governance 
policy that is necessary to guide e-governance development process of government. 
This problem has resulted in the design of the SAPS and DoHA systems being 
technically incompatible. While the accessibility requirement of policy in this 
regards has been fully complied with by DoHA, lack of adaptable e-governance 
policy has however been the reason that each department has developed their e-
governance separately and did not take into account, other departments’ needs of 
access to information.   
6.2.8   e-Governance development versus global trends 
The development process of e-governance in South Africa follows the path of 
global trends that require wider consultation and higher management involvement to 
control and coordinate the developmental operations. South Africa is fully in 
compliance with these conditions as the e-governance development process followed 
a wide consultative strategic approach that was initiated by the President through the 
PNC – ISAD plan. The country complies with the second global requirement of a 
guiding policy and regulation by formulating the IT policy framework document 
(DPSA, 2001) and an Amendment of Public Service Regulations of 5 January 2001 
(RSA, 2001) respectively to guide the national e-governance development.   
 South Africa may have complied with the requirements to a certain extend 
however the IT policy and regulations are not continually evaluated since they are 
not adaptive to the specific departments’ needs. Failure to comply fully with 
requirements leads to failure of the delivered solution to yield benefits (Klischewski, 
2011). This has resulted in each department developing its e-governance systems 
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separately and led to technical incompatibilities between SAPS and DoHA. The 
failure of this approach is reflected by the lack of e-governance automation of access 
by SAPS, to information held by DoHA. 
6.2.8.1   The effects of development on automated Access to information   
South Africa implemented measures for automated access between 
departments such as the Minimum Inter-operability Standards (MIOS) and can 
possibly include quality standards for the integrated information as per global norms. 
According to Headayetullah and Pradhan (2009) ICT public key infrastructure can be 
utilized to maintain data integrity using MD5 algorithm.  
Shapard (1996) says that all government departments locally or globally are 
either in the process of inter-connecting to share information or have already 
implemented. South Africa is still lacking in the government department systems 
inter-connections to share information. This means that the country or SAPS and 
DoHA have failed to utilize e-governance which, according to Gordon (2002) can 
transform the traditional hierarchical organizational structures which operate 
separately in silos of authoritarian top down decision and policy making models, into 
the departments that function as multiple departments that collaborates through 
loosely coupled networks and lower total costs.  
The separate operations of SAPS and DoHA shows that South Africa has not 
developed and implemented e-governance to follow the global trends where e-
governance can be utilized perform the horizontal and vertical integration of the 
departments that would enable them to operate as a single organization that adopts 
shared platforms for the core technologies on which to execute common applications 
OECD (2003a). The country does therefore not benefit from possible better 
government quality services at lower costs. Under these conditions, SAPS would be 
able to identify all perpetrators with less effort.  
Even though South Africa is lacking behind the integration trends of e-
governance for the automation of access by a department, to information held by 
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another department, the country is in compliant with the four conditions for the 
implementation of the automated data sharing model listed by Fan and Zhang (2007).  
 The first condition, the Environmental requirements refer to a central 
coordinating executive who has adequate authority over the participating 
departments to control and coordinate the integration process. The President fulfills 
this role through the PNC – ISAD plan (PNC – ISAD, 2001). The second condition 
is the Intra-organizational requirements which require the top organizational support 
for the integrations. DPSA has been appointed to control and coordinate as the 
custodian of the public ICT implementation strategy plans and can therefore 
represent this function to comply with the second requirement by coordinating and 
communicating at top management level to ensure organizational support.  
The third condition refers to the Inter-organizational requirements which 
require the need for the participants to have trust that the participants will all act in 
the best interest of the integrated environment. South Africa achieves this at various 
levels starting at the PNC-ISAD Plan through the departmental top management 
representatives, the Government Information Technology Officers who hold 
occasional meetings that are chaired by their counterpart from the DPSA.  
The fourth and last condition, the Perceived performance requirements refer 
to the perceived benefits of the integrated solution. This condition was complied with 
through the PNC-ISAD plan which includes the description of the Vision 2014 as the 
creation of the information society. According to this description, the information 
society utilizes ICT correctly to yield benefits in the form of modernized ICT 
infrastructure that enables government to offer top quality services that attain ICT 
universality while contributing positively to the socio-economic developments of 
South Africa.  
Despite these compliances plans and structures, South Africa has failed to 
implement them when failing to enforce departments to follow the plans through and 
also failing to adapt the e-governance policy to identify various needs by certain 
departments. This has resulted in separate e-governance development by departments 
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and incompatible technical designs that inhibit automated access, by a department to 
information held by another department to the detriment of the safety of citizens.    
6.2.8.2   The effects of development on e-governance security    
South Africa is in line with global trends when it comes to the security 
measures that are set up for the possible protection of information in the network 
between departments. The measures are in the form of the MISS being set up for 
automated access to information between departments. This is in compliance with 
global security measures such as the encryption techniques which Headayetullah and 
Pradhan (2009) explains as the Public Key Cryptosystem and Agency Identification 
for local and remote automated access to information. According to the explanations, 
the techniques render the illegally intercepted information to be unreadable and 
useless to the hackers.  
6.2.8.3   The effects of development on e-governance policy   
The Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) as the 
custodian of the development of ICT process has implemented an ICT policy 
framework for government. DPSA further coordinates and engages in wide 
consultation with all the departments through the GITO council meetings. This is in 
accordance with how a successful e-governance policy formulation can be achieved 
as presented by Michel (2005) and Paskaleva-Shapira (2006). They are saying that 
the consultations can be enhanced through remote interactive communications 
between government departments.  
South African e-governance policy complies with the accessibility and 
security of information requirements through the regulation of MIOS and MISS. In 
order to cater for global trends to control the procurement and standardize the ICT 
infrastructure across departments, DPSA created SITA to achieve this and comply 
with requirements to harmonize the old and new technology infrastructure and 
ensure that technical requirements are taken into account. The country however did 
not implement as planned to comply with the standardization requirement since the 
systems at SAPS and DoHA are technically incompatible to effect access by SAPS, 
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to information at DoHA. This is because e-governance policy was not adapted to 
consider the role certain departments could play in assisting others to achieve their 
mandates. DoHA has a specific role to pay for all other departments who seek to 
identify and verify the identities of citizens. An adaptable e-governance policy is 
therefore lacking in South Africa.   
The quality of network information being catered for by MIOS can be 
adapted to include the utilization of ICT public key infrastructure which is 
emphasized by Headayetullah and Pradhan (2009) as necessary to maintain data 
integrity using MD5 algorithm. 
6.2.8.4   The effects of development on e-governance security policy   
The South African e-governance policy initiative for security calls for the 
security standards where the regulation sets up the Minimum Information Security 
Standards (MISS) for the security of information.  e-Governance security policy 
should provide for various security measures to protect and maintain confidentiality 
of information across the network between departments, for instance. Headayetullah 
and Pradhan (2009) suggest that the policy should include secure protocol that 
protects information for confidentiality by implementing ICT security applications 
like the Public Key Cryptosystem and Agency Identification using a unique mapping 
function. South Africa should not have any problem in adapting if not yet done so 
since ICT products can be bought of the shelves.  
6.3   Recommendations   
The objective of this research is to promote crime reduction through the 
implementation of e-governance that is needed to automate access to information 
held by government which is required to enhance the identification of perpetrators of 
crimes. Since this raises policy concerns of citizens’ privacy violation against 
government need for access to information to reduce crime, the situation calls for an 
effective e-governance policy to enable automated access to information while 
setting up security measures to cater for privacy concerns.     
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6.3.1   The accessibility policy 
The accessibility policy should be adapted to specify shorter time periods of 
access by SAPS, to information held by DoHA which should be better managed for 
faster feedback to enable the police for timely identification of perpetrators even if 
the process is manual. Policy can specify feedback time limits like “feedback to be 
provided within twenty four hours of working court hours after being received”. The 
requests for identification information at DoHA should be based on the seriousness 
and the urgency of the request and these could be classified and appropriate actions 
defined for each within the accessibility policy.  
6.3.2   The security policy 
Security should not be implemented up to a point where the process stifles 
and delays daily operations. While its implementation is very important for various 
reasons including privacy, the security measures should be monitored and care taken 
to ensure that the measures are not responsible for any delay that might jeopardize 
the crime reduction efforts. The security policy should include clauses that exempt 
the police from avoidable delaying checks during requests for access to information.   
6.3.3   The privacy policy 
The security measures that are implemented are done so to protect the 
personal information against privacy violation. The security system should therefore 
ensure that only authorized access to information takes place within time limits that 
are specified. Identification levels could be categorized and less sensitive 
information like just confirmation of owner of finger prints could be remotely 
provided by DoHA. SAPS could remotely submit, for instance, ID. number and 
name and receive a remote response that say “Match” or “No Match” where after a 
higher level verifications can take place for an appropriate action like effecting an 
arrest for instance, could be effected.   
6.3.4   Crime reduction recommendations   
Since crime reduction operations in this research are based on the 
identification of perpetrators, and the process can be enhanced by e-governance, 
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South Africa should follow that example of the rest of the world where governments 
have either connected or are in the process of connecting their departments to share 
information. This could be based on the example of The Erlanger, Ky., police 
department which improved their identification process after they automated their 
systems and integrated with other departments and were able to quickly access 
information where they could identify perpetrators even when driving in patrol cars.   
6.3.5   Information policy formulation     
Even though the South African policy formulation process follows the global 
trends of wider consultations and take factors that influence access to information 
into account to ensure that all stakeholders’ views and interests are accommodated, 
policy should be adapted to regulate departments like DoHA differently. The 
differences in the public institutions and in how they can provide certain services to 
other public institutions must be taken into account by policy. As the national hub of 
the identification information where all other departments are dependent on it for the 
identification, authentication of identity documents as well as verification for 
positive identification of citizens, DoHA should be regulated to identify this 
important role that the department plays in the effectiveness of the operations of 
other departments. This makes DoHA a special and unique department that can offer 
essential services to other departments 
Access to information policy should have specific provisions that regulate 
DoHA differently where policy takes into account its essential services to other 
departments. These provisions should be created outside DoHA at DPSA and the 
GITO council be allowed to play a major role so that the policies and regulations that 
emerge, would cater for the rest of the departments and be adaptive for emergency 
identification requirements, for instance, to promote and maximize national interest.  
The stakeholder consultation of DoHA or information policy formulation 
must not only be about how the project is going to benefit it, but should be about 
how other departments are going to benefit. This calls for DPSA to centrally 
coordinate this process while all other departments must not develop their e-
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
149 
 
governance project until they know how DoHA is going to develop its database and 
how are other departments who are offering essential services elsewhere and who 
may  require access to information held by DoHA are going to access it. Access by 
SAPS, to information held by DoHA should for instance, where possible, be based 
on the needs of crime reduction operations while being adaptable to other 
departments.  
 6.3.6   The formulation of legislation 
Since the detention deadlines set out in the Criminal Procedure act 
undermines the crime reduction efforts of the police who are utilizing the Promotion 
of Access to Information act for the identification of perpetrators, it would be 
beneficial to crime reduction if the enactment of laws were coordinated to take into 
account other relevant pieces of legislation. This access to information law would, 
for instance include shorter access to information deadline periods for the police at 
DoHA.   
6.3.7   e-Governance development process  
 While global e-governance’ best practices and trends serve as important 
guidelines that are formulated by experts who are exposed to latest state of the art or 
sophisticated and innovative practices and ICT advancements, every situation has its 
unique requirements that may mostly not be catered for by the global experts. The 
global e-governance development guidelines should be used as general guiding 
criteria but the detailed unique and local challenges must be analyzed more closely 
and global trends must be adapted and customized to specific local challenges to 
maximize local output. 
e-Governance development process in South Africa is mostly based on best 
global practices even though the process is lacking in some cases. The IT policy 
framework that was established by the DPSA should continually be evaluated to be 
adaptive to the dynamic nature of the requirements of e-governance. This should be 
adapted to ensure that the departments develop and implement their e-governance 
systems together where the GITO council to ensure that there is a technical 
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standardization across the departments to achieve technical compatibilities between 
departments’ systems where automated access by SAPS, to information held by 
DoHA could be enabled.   
DoHA employees have revealed that massive investments would be required 
to adapt the system for automated access to its information by SAPS. Where DoHA 
is allowed to develop its e-governance systems, the interface costs can be avoided in 
future where all other public institutions must be made aware of how identity 
numbers for instance are going to be stored or retrieved by waiting for DoHA to 
develop and complete its e-governance projects or DoHA has make the design 
documents available to all these departments. This would avoid the need to build 
expensive interface applications trying to link the systems after they have already 
been completed.  
A new e-governance policy that recognizes this important feature of DoHA 
and others that may be in the same situation has to be formulated to take control of e-
governance development process out of the jurisdiction of DoHA and shift this to a 
central coordinating authority that has the national responsibility and accountability 
such as DPSA in liaison with the GITO council or any similar structure. This could 
be to the benefit of the entire nation. 
6.3.7.1   Automated Access to information   
Since all other government departments locally or globally are either in the 
process of inter-connecting to share information or have already implemented, South 
Africa should follow suite to enable automated access by SAPS, to information held 
by DoHA. By this interconnection, South Africa should be able to transform the 
traditional hierarchical organizational structures or departments that operate 
separately in silos into the departments that function as multiple departments that 
collaborates through loosely coupled networks.  
The country should follow global trends where e-governance is utilized to 
perform the horizontal and vertical integration of the departments that would enable 
the entire government departments to operate as a single organization that adopts 
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shared platforms for the core technologies on which to execute common applications 
and eliminate duplication costs while improving on services. South Africa would not 
experience any difficulty for this transformation since the country is in compliant 
with the four conditions for the implementation of the automated data sharing model. 
Once achieved, the transformed environment would enable automated access by 
SAPS, to information held by DoHA.  
6.3.7.2   e-Governance security process    
The recommendations for the current e-governance security measures, the 
MISS can be upgraded to or combined with the encryption techniques such as the 
Public Key Cryptosystem and Agency Identification for local and remote automated 
access to information. The techniques would provide the security measures to protect 
the citizens’ privacies by rendering the illegally intercepted information to be 
unreadable and useless to the unauthorized hackers.   
6.3.7.3   e-Governance policy process 
 DPSA should continually evaluate and adapt the ICT policy framework for 
government. DPSA should further maintain the coordination of the evaluated process 
that include a wide consultation with all the departments through the GITO council 
and other relevant structures to ensure that there is always an existing e-governance 
policy that is current and relevant to the e-governance needs of the country. The 
consultation should help the DPSA to maintain an e-governance policy that achieves 
the standardization across the departments. Such a policy would also enable 
automated access by SAPS, to information held by DoHA.  
The e-governance policy should also cater for the quality of the network 
information by setting the currently utilized Minimum Information Inter-operability 
Standards (MIOS) to include the specifications for ICT public key infrastructure that 
is necessary to maintain data integrity using MD5 algorithms. 
6.3.7.4   e-Governance security policy formulation 
The South African e-governance security policy should set up the currently 
utilized Minimum Information Security Standards (MISS) to accommodate the 
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secured protocol that protects information for confidentiality by implementing ICT 
security applications like the Public Key Cryptosystem and Agency Identification 
using a unique mapping functions.   
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1:  Interview Questions   
Introduction 
This Masters-level research explores the needs for greater efficiency and 
effectiveness in access to information, in order to benefit those working in crime 
reduction. It gathers data on the value of automated access to information, using 
information and communication technologies.  The research aims to understand the 
challenges associated with rapid manual access to information and automated access 
to information.  George Motlhabane is a post-graduate student completing a Masters 
degree at the University of the Witwatersrand. 
Confidentiality 
While all Masters research reports are available through the University Library, 
confidentiality will be observed with respect to the parties interviewed. The student 
does not require any information on crime reduction practices, which should not be 
made public. 
Thank you for your participation. 
 
Job Title/Rank Department City  Date Time  
           
 
1. Requirements of access to information policy. 
1.1 How do the Officials comply with the policy requirements for accessibility, security 
and privacy? 
1.2 What are the relevant procedures for meeting these policy requirements?  
1.3 What are the concerns or challenges?   
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Accessibility Security Privacy 
1.1                 
1.2          
1.3          
 
2. Requirements of e-governance policy 
2.1 How do the Officials comply with the policy requirements for accessibility, security, 
privacy? 
2.2 What are the relevant procedures?  
2.3 What are the concerns or challenges?   
 
Accessibility Security Privacy 
2.1          
2.2          
2.3           
 
3. Relevance of policy issues to crime reduction.  
3.1 How do the accessibility, security and privacy requirements of information held by 
DoHA contribute to effective crime reduction? 
3.2 How can these requirements inhibit or compromise crime reduction?  
 
 
 
 
4. What is the extent to which manual access to information held in DoHA is a 
barrier or enabler to effective crime reduction within SAPS? 
Accessibility Security Privacy 
3.1          
3.2         
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5. What is the extent to which automated access to information held in DoHA is a 
barrier or enabler to effective crime reduction within SAPS. 
 
6. How can policy requirement for privacy (manual access versus automated 
access) act as barrier to access to information held by DoHA? 
Privacy 
Manual Access Automated Access 
6.1     
  
7. How can policy requirement for security (manual access versus automated 
access) act as barrier to access to effective crime reduction?  
 
Security 
Manual Access Automated Access 
7.1   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Barrier Enabler 
4.1     
Barrier Enabler 
5.1     
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8. How can the concerns associated with the policy requirement for privacy be 
addressed to present an enabling environment for effective crime reduction? 
 
Privacy 
Manual Access Automated Access 
8.1   
 
 
9. How can the concerns associated with the policy requirement for security be 
addressed to present an enabling environment for effective crime reduction? 
Security 
Manual Access Automated Access 
9.1   
 
10. How can the concerns associated with any policy requirement be addressed to 
present an enabling environment for effective crime reduction? 
 
End of questions 
Security 
Manual Access Automated Access 
10.1   
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Appendix 2:  Letter of interview approval 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management    
University of the Witwatersrand, 
Johannesburg   
PO Box 601   
Wits  2050   
Tel: 27-11-717-3652 
Mobile : 082 569 7675 
e-mail:luciennesa@gmail.com(mobile email) and 
lucienne.abrahams@wits.ac.za  
 
 
25 January 2011 
 
To Whom It May Concern 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
 
LETTER OF REQUEST: RESEARCH STUDIES MASTER OF MANAGEMENT (ICT 
POLICY AND REGULATION) 
 
Mr George Motlhabane, Student Number 0612110R, is a student on the Masters of 
Management (ICT Policy and Regulation) degree programme. He is currently completing 
his research on the topic “Automated access to information for crime reduction”. Mr. 
Motlhabane needs to conduct between 12 and 18 interviews in order to collect data for this 
research report, which constitutes 50% of the credits towards the degree.  
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It would be sincerely appreciated if you would assist by granting him an interview to 
respond to the limited set of questions raised. It would also be very useful if there were any 
documents pertaining to the subject matter of the research that you could share with him.  
 
We understand that there may be certain aspects of the topic which cannot be 
discussed for reasons of state security, however, the focus of the subject here is on the 
transition from manual to automated systems for managing and sharing information 
between two government departments. This falls within the broader frame of research 
interest, with respect to changes in government occurring based on the introduction of 
computing and the Internet, otherwise referred to as electronic government.  
 
This is a very interesting subject and student research will enable us to have graduates 
who can further contribute to these developments in government and the private sector. 
 
Should you require any further information, please contact the writer at 082 569 7675. 
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Luci Abrahams, Degree Convenor: Masters of Management (ICT Policy and Regulation)  
& Director LINK Centre, University of the Witwatersrand 
